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"We will spare no legal means to identify, locate and incapacitate
terrorists and those who aid and abet them in their criminal
activities."1
U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, ca. 2001
1. Jules Crittenden, War on Terrorism:: Arizona Man Indicted for Lying in Terror
Probe, BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 13, 2001, at P8, available at 2001 WL 3813541.
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"If any persons shall.., insure or contract [to insure] any slaves, ...
the persons [including] their aiders and abettors shall be ... [impris-
oned] for a term not exceeding fourteen years, or ... confined ... to
hard labour [for at least] three years. "2
British Parliament, ca. 1824
"[I]t shall be unlawful ... to aid or assist in the carrying away ... as
slaves ... inhabitants of Africa .... All insurances ... in respect to
any ... [slave] trading ... shall be .. .unlawful."3
British Parliament, ca. 1807
"[N]o citizen.., shall... trade or traffic in slaves .... Every person
[found] aiding or abetting .. .shall pay the sum of two thousand
dollars."'
U.S. Congress, ca. 1794
"Terror has existed in America for hundreds of years... and slaves
quite frequently were killed even though they were innocent."5
* President William Jefferson Clinton, ca. 2001
INTRODUCTION
Arguably, before the devastating September 11th attacks on the Penta-
gon and the World Trade Center,6 few corporations, small-to-mid-size
businesses, or governmental entities truly appreciated the need for terror-
While the nation was riveted by the threat of anthrax attacks, federal investigators yester-
day threw the book at a man who was questioned in the Sept. 11 terror attacks for lying to
them. ... 'This indictment serves as a reminder that the Department of Justice will bring
the full weight of the law upon those who attempt to impede or hinder this investigation,'
Ashcroft said. Id.
2. The Slave Trade Act, 1824, 5 Geo. 4, c. 113, § 10 (1824) (Eng.). See also Hargrove
v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 937 F. Supp. 595, 600 (S. D. Tex. 1996).
[T]he Colombia legislature passed the ANTI-ABDUCTION ACT, ACT 40 OF 1993.... Under
the Act, any person who - 'knowing that money is going to be destined to pay a ransom
for the release of an abducted individual, participates in the transaction thereof' - is con-
sidered to have aided and abetted the kidnapper and faces up to five years in prison. Id.
3. An Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, 1807, 47 Geo. 3, c. 36, §§ 3, 5.
4. Slave Trade Act of March 22, 1794, ch. 11, §§ 1, 2, 1 Stat. 347, 347-49 (prohibiting
carrying on the slave trade from the United States to any foreign place or country).
5. Joseph Curl, Clinton Calls Terror A U.S. Debt to Past: Cites Slavery in Georgetown
Speech, WASH. TiMEs, Nov. 8, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL 4166154.
6. Michael Grunwald, Terrorists Hijack 4 Airliners, Destroy World Trade Center, Hit
Pentagon, Hundreds Dead, Bush Promises Retribution Military Put on Highest Alert,
WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2001, at AL, available at 2001 WL 27731754.
There were no reliable estimates last night of how many people were killed in the most
devastating terrorist operation in American history. The number was certainly in the hun-
dreds and could be in the thousands. It was the most dramatic attack on American soil
since Pearl Harbor .... The commandeered jets obliterated the World Trade Center's twin
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ism insurance. Also, among those who purchased insurance, probably
only a few could fully decipher the highly complex coverage and exclu-
sion provisions appearing in their insurance contracts.7
Furthermore, before September 11th, perhaps an even smaller number
of ordinary Americans knew that the terrorism insurance industry is
huge, spanning both national and international markets. In fact, the in-
dustry has an exceedingly long history.8 Also, average consumers proba-
bly did not know that property and casualty insurers - those who pitch
terrorism insurance - make exceedingly large profits. For example, in
2001, Allstate made $7.2 billion dollars. 9 In addition, Liberty Mutual1"
and Axa"1 - major American and French property and casualty insurers,
respectively- earned collectively more than $70 billion in profits.
Furthermore, several countries operate government- or state-backed
insurance pools to cover various sorts of terrorism risks. Essentially, if
110-story towers... and ripped a blazing swath through the Defense Department's impos-
ing five-sided fortress .... Id.
7. Without doubt, many commercial terrorism insurance contracts are highly compli-
cated, requiring insureds as well as insurers to petition state and federal courts for declara-
tory relief. See, e.g., Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 863 F.Supp. 542, 544-547
(N.D. Ohio), affd, 105 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 1997) (outlining complicated coverage and excep-
tion clauses).
8. Cf. Alan Cowell, Lloyd's Expects Claims From Attacks to Top $1.9 Billion, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 27, 2001, at W1. "Lloyd's of London, the world's biggest insurance market,
said ... that it expected to face $1.92 billion in claims ... related to the [recent] terrorist
attacks in the [U.S.], making it the most costly calamity in Lloyd's 320-year history." Id.
9. See Allstate Reports 29% Jump in Profit For Fourth Quarter, WALL ST. J., Feb.8,
2001, at Cll, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2853711. "Allstate Corporation reported a 29%
surge in fourth-quarter net income, citing the success of strategic initiatives to boost profit-
ability in the company's core property casualty insurance business." Id. See also Christo-
pher Oster, Investigation and Mobilization: AIG Raises Loss Estimate From Attacks To
Pretax $800 Million, Plans Charge, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2001, at A6, available at 2001 WL-
WSJ 2878061 (stating that "During the same period, AIG disclosed that it had a "net in-
come of $1.63 billion on revenue of $12.58 billion .. .[and] $50 billion in shareholder
equity.").
10. See Christopher Oster, Liberty Mutual Seeks to Alter Its Structure, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 18, 2000, at C15, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 26609980. "Liberty Mutual [is] one of the
10 largest property-and-casualty insurers in the U.S., with $13.6 billion in revenue last
year." Id.
11. See David I. Oyama, World Watch ? Axa Reports Nine-Month Revenue Growth,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2001, at A17, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 29677829.
French insurer Axa said demand for new products and increased premiums helped it post
higher revenue .... Revenue for the nine months [increased] 10% from a year earlier to
55.54 billion euros ($49.7 billion), and was up 2.5% on a comparable basis. Revenue from
life insurance and savings products jumped 6.4% to 35.14 billion euros. Revenue from
property and casualty insurance, buoyed by rising premiums, rose 3.2% to 12.35 billion
euros. Id.
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insurers' or reinsurers ' 12 resources are insufficient to cover losses, na-
tional governments step in to help. For example, England established a
pool to help victims recover from Irish Republican Army attacks.13 In
1954, Spain formally approved a state-backed pool, which "originated [af-
ter] the Spanish Civil War.",14 South Africa developed a terrorism pool in
1979 following the civil unrest in Soweto.15 More recently, the United
States established a very restrictive and temporary government-backed
terrorism insurance pool.16
Although the majority of American insurance consumers probably do
not understand the particulars of the terrorism-insurance industry, they
arguably had some reasonable expectations before September 11th: 1)
they reasonably expected insurance companies to process claims in a
timely manner when victims presented claims; 2) insureds expected ter-
rorism insurers to settle claims, pay proceeds and reimburse expenditures
once insureds proved that "terrorism" caused their financial losses; and,
3) after settling a claim or compensating victims, consumers expected in-
surers to continue to sell terrorism insurance at an affordable price to
cover future attacks and losses.
However, in the wake of September 11th, the American public, busi-
nesses and state governments have been forced to face several unex-
pected and disturbing developments. As reported above, terrorism
insurers have made billions of dollars historically on an annualized ba-
12. Oster, supra note 9, at A6 ("Insurers buy reinsurance to spread the risks of indi-
vidual policies.").
13. See Assuring The Insurers, BUFFALO NEWS, Nov. 6, 2001, at B10, available at 2001
WL 6362837 (commenting that "Britain faced similar problems after Irish Republican
Army radicals planted bombs in London. Its solution was a government-backed terrorism
insurance pool."). See also Commercial Terror Cover Will Not Quit, INS. DAY, Aug 8, 2001,
at 12 (stating that "Commercial terrorism insurers are determined to continue providing
alternative cover to the UK's government-backed Pool Re scheme, despite last week's Eal-
ing bomb. The blast in a busy suburban street is believed to have been the latest in a string
of London attacks by the breakaway Real IRA group.").
14. See Carolyn Aldred, Insurance Pools Untapped: Some Governments Guarantee
Terrorism Coverage, Bus. INS., Sept. 24, 2001, at 35. "Spain's state-backed Consorcio de
Compensacion de Seguros originated as a result of the Spanish Civil War, which lasted
from 1936 to 1939. Although operational since 1941, the Consorcio was formally recog-
nized by Spanish law in 1954." Id.
15. Id. ("The South African Special Risks Insurance Association. was formed in 1979,
in response to the 1976 riots in Soweto, a racially segregated township near Johannesburg,
South Africa ").
16. See Donna Kato, Airlines Offer Few Definitive Answers Checking With Carrier
Advised As Schedules Change, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Sept. 25, 2001, at 8A (recognizing
that "President Bush has signed a bill giving U.S. airlines $15 billion in cash and loan
guarantees, as well as state-backed insurance against war and terrorism risk for the next six
months.").
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sis.17 In fact, even after settling some of the September 11th claims,' 8
insurers still made enormous profits.'9 Yet, as of this writing, a majority
of property and casualty insurers intend to cancel commercial and resi-
dential terrorism insurance. According to the carriers: they cannot and
will not continue to underwrite large and repeated losses, like those oc-
curring at the World Trade Center.2 °
17. See Swiss Re Estimates Damage from Sept. 11 Totals $90 Billion, WALL ST. J., Dec.
21, 2001, at A13, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 29681330.
The Sept. 11 terrorist attacks caused almost as much physical damage as history's most
damaging earthquake .... [There is] more than $115 billion in losses from direct physical
damage, according to a study by Zurich-based Swiss Reinsurance Co., the company with
the largest exposure among the 22 [property and casualty] carriers that insured the World
Trade Center .... Only the 1995 earthquake in Kobe, Japan, caused bigger damage - an
estimated $100 billion .... Even so, the bulk of the damage wasn't covered by insurance.
Swiss Re estimates that [only] $19 billion of the costs of property damage and business
interruption caused by the terrorist attacks will be borne by the insurance industry. (em-
phasis added). Id.
18. See, e.g., Nine Insurers to Avoid Lawsuits in Resolving Disputes Over Attack,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2001, at B6, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 29680265 (stating that "Nine
major insurance companies have agreed to try to resolve any Sept. 11 terrorism coverage
disputes.., through negotiation or mediation... The principal aim is to avoid the cost and
delay of lawsuits."); Jonathan D. Glater, Insurance Battle Escalates, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
2001, at Bi1 (noting "The World Trade Center's largest insurer said ... a demand for an
immediate payment [had been made].... This dispute may eventually be decided in fed-
eral court ...."); Jonathan D. Glater, Trade Towers Leaseholder Sues Insurers, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 6, 2001, at B8 (noting that "Larry A Silverstein, the developer who won the lease [to]
the trade center.., sued Ace Bermuda Insurance [and] XL Insurance, two Bermuda com-
panies that covered the complex."); and, Insurers View Attack As Single Destruction, NEws-
DAY, Nov. 27, 2001 at A13 (stating that "The Battery Park City Authority should not
expect twice the insurance payout for damage sustained in the World Trade Center at-
tacks .... [He] said the insurance industry regards the Sept. 11 attacks as one event - and
he predicted that the courts would agree. The issue already is in federal court.").
19. See Hartford Financial Services Group Inc.: Terror Claims of $440 Million Blamed
in $103 Million Loss, Wall St. J., Oct. 30, 2001, at B5, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 29676323
(noting that, "Hartford Financial Services Group Inc., stung by $440 million in claims
stemming from the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, reported a third-quarter net loss of $103 mil-
lion .... [But its revenues were] $3.72 billion, down 1.8% from a year earlier."). See also
Oster, supra note 9, at A6.
AIG had second-quarter net income of $1.63 billion on revenue of $12.58 billion. He also
said AIG was poised to take advantage of rising prices in the property-casualty insurance
market, pointing to AIG's $50 billion in shareholder equity. Mr. Greenberg said the $800
million loss estimate related to the terrorist attacks was net of reinsurance .... AIG esti-
mates its gross loss in the attacks at $2 billion to $2.1 billion. Id.
20. See, e.g., Steve Dwyer, Dealing With Disasters: Terrorist Attack Exposes Risk, in 5
INS. NETWORKING & DATA MomT. 38 (December 2001) (noting that "Many insurers have
stated that they will be unable to support repeated losses of such magnitude, and reinsurers
indicate they may begin canceling commercial terrorism-risk coverage."); United States
House Backs Terror Aid Package for Insurers, LLOYD'S LIST, Nov. 9, 2001, at 2. "US insur-
ers say they can pay the expected [40 billion dollars] in claims but cannot support repeated
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For a while, a few American insurers will continue to provide full ter-
rorism coverage for low-profile 2' businesses and properties, but not for
high-profile22 residential and commercial properties.23 A few others will
provide some limited coverage, 24 although at exorbitant prices.25  But
these new realities, themselves, are increasingly terrorizing property own-
ers and at an alarming rate. For example, some property owners - who
cannot secure terrorism insurance - "are reluctant to speak out for fear
of scaring tenants and drawing attention to themselves.
' 26
losses of that magnitude, particularly as reinsurers are expected to cancel commercial ter-
rorism-risk coverage from January 1, when most such contracts come up for renewal." Id.
21. See Christopher Oster, Terror-Insurance Costs Cut Into Demand, WALL Sr. J., Jan.
4, 2002, at A4, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3382024. "Smaller, lower-profile businesses are
less affected by the insurance industry's retrenchment. They are generally still able to get
terrorism coverage as part of a basic package, albeit at higher prices than they paid last
year . I..." d
22. See Peter Grant, Market for Trophy Property Slows As Insurance Choices Start to
Fall, WALL Sr. J., Jan. 11, 2002, at B8.
Terrorism insurance is proving most difficult to obtain for owners of high-profile properties
that seem likely targets .... Companies that have acknowledged losing terrorism insurance
include Brookfield Properties Corp., Toronto, which owns downtown skyscrapers in a
number of major cities including New York. LCOR Inc., a developer based in Berwyn, Pa.,
lost terrorism coverage on the International Arrivals Terminal at JFK International Air-
port in New York, which it completed last year. Id.
23. See Oster, supra note 21, at A4. "Prior to the Sept. 11 attacks... such terrorism
coverage was included as part of a standard policy. Now, terrorism coverage is being
stripped out of the policies offered to most large businesses and owners of properties
viewed by insurance companies as the likeliest targets, including tall office buildings, sports
stadiums and shopping malls." Id.
24. Oster, supra note 21, at A4.
Even those insurance buyers who are getting terrorism coverage are getting less of it ....
The tougher environment for buyers results from a reluctance by the reinsurance sector,
which takes on some of the risk underwritten by primary insurers, to continue assuming
terrorism risks. The world's biggest reinsurers announced after the Sept. 11 strikes that
they would no longer assume such exposures. Id.
25. Shailagh Murray and John D. McKinnon, Never Mind: What Killed Stimulus?
Hints of a Recovery and Politics of 2002- Aftermath of Sept. 11 Attack Gives Way to Parti-
sanship and Fears About Deficit, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2001, at Al, available at 2002 WL-
WSJ 29681437. According to the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. O'Neill: "Insurance premi-
ums for people who had to do renewals for property and casualty since Sept. 11 have
doubled and tripled . I..." d. Oster, supra note 21, A4. "'There is terrorism coverage
available, but it's at outrageous prices,' said Bob Spadaccia, senior vice president for the
Northeast at USI Insurance Services Corp., a San Francisco insurance broker." Id. Dwyer,
supra note 20. "Even if carriers continue to offer such coverage, it's a good bet that premi-
ums will rise significantly .... " Id.
26. Grant, supra note 22, at B8 (The Real Estate Roundtable's Senior Vice-president,
Clifton Rodgers, Jr., stated, "We're hearing it quietly expressed from people, but they
won't give us details.").
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Perhaps, the most terrifying development, from the public's point of
view, is occurring in state legislatures. Since September 11th, American
insurance companies have been petitioning states for permission to ex-
clude terrorism coverage altogether. More specifically, insurers want to
insert terrorism exclusion clauses into commercial-umbrella and general-
liability contracts, two "wildly sold" products among small and midsize
businesses, associations and organizations.27
Incredibly, state legislators and regulators have responded quickly and
definitively. Just a few months after the attacks on the Pentagon and the
World Trade Center, "the majority of states ... granted terrorism exclu-
sions ... noting that, without the exclusions, insurers would be forced to
take on large risks without the benefit of reinsurance. ' '28 Furthermore,
the remaining state regulators have stressed that "they will follow suit
unless Congress approves a federal backstop for terrorism insurance."29
Why do these political decisions terrorize the business community
more than terrorism, itself? Corporations and owners of midsize opera-
tions worry about maintaining access to capital. From their perspectives,
if they cannot secure terrorism insurance to cover potential losses, banks
will be less willing to lend money. 3° Also, many fear that business envi-
ronments will sour and capital markets will suffer profoundly31 if states
27. Michael Schroeder and Christopher Oster, Congress Fails to Pass Terror-Insurance
Bill, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2001 at A2, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 29681438 ("Small and
midsize businesses may soon begin complaining to their representatives in Washington ....
[Ilnsurers have been pushing state insurance departments for permission to remove terror-
ism coverage from policies now protected by regulators.").
28. Christopher Oster and Michael Schroeder, Workers' Comp Insurance Now Harder
to Get, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2002, at A3, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3382460 ("After Sept.
11, nearly all the world's major reinsurers, which typically assume some of the exposures
underwritten by primary insurers, announced that they wouldn't provide coverage for
terrorism.").
29. Christopher Oster, States Approve Terrorism Curbs On Insurance, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 14, 2001, at C14, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 29680696.
State insurance regulators have begun to approve broad terrorism exclusions in commer-
cial insurance policies .... The exclusions, which mostly apply to the small and midsize
businesses generally covered by the regulators, have already been approved in South Da-
kota .... Exclusions on the larger commercial insurance policies, which generally aren't
subject to state regulatory approval, have been put into effect since the Sept. 11 attacks.
Id.
30. Schroeder and Oster, supra note 27, at A2 ("If businesses aren't covered for ter-
rorism damage, one fear is that banks won't lend them money or might consider their loans
in default.").
31. Helene Cooper, Robert Guy Matthews and Jacob M. Schlesinger, Bailout Request
Stirs Industrial-Policy Issue, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2001 at A2.
Within days of the terror attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President
Bush and aides quickly concluded that the airline industry was vital for the working of the
U.S. economy, leading them to sign off quickly after the attacks on a $15 billion bailout for
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allow insurers to exclude terrorism coverage. Of course, some insurers
argue that such apprehension is completely unfounded,32 because inter-
national insurers, like Lloyd's of London,3 3 will always offer terrorism
coverage.34 Consequently, sustained economic activity and prosperity
will continue.
Such assurances ring hollow among supporters of and participants
within other major social institutions. During the latter part of the twen-
tieth century, the following "pillars of American society"35 received the
brunt of "terrorist attacks": abortion-clinics,3 6 charities,37 churches,
38
that industry. Officials also have argued that the terrorism-insurance coverage is essential
for American companies, and the possibility of such coverage drying up this year justifies
federal involvement." Id.
Schroeder and Oster, supra note 27, at A2. "Terrorism coverage has been more readily
available to small and midsize companies, partly because state regulations require that
terrorism claims be covered in many types of policies. The same holds for homeowners'
insurance." Id.
32. Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Business World: Hurry Up, Washington, or Insurance May
Fix Itself, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2001 at A21, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 29679842.
Some would have you believe that all real-estate lending and similar projects would come
to a halt. Bankers would no longer be willing to lend, investors to invest, builders to build,
because they would no longer be able to [transfer to] an insurance company the risk of
potential loss from a terrorist attack. To buy this alarum, you would have to believe...
against all evidence ... that the U.S. economy would fold up and die because financiers
and entrepreneurs are too weenie to find a way to proceed despite the absence of insur-
ance for terrorism risk .... Not a likely scenario. Id.
33. Oyama, supra note 11, at A8.
British insurance market Lloyd's of London announced [that it is gearing] up to cash in on
surging insurance rates .... Industry watchers interpreted the capacity increase as a vote of
confidence by investors in the market. Lloyd's, the world's largest insurance market, esti-
mates it will have to pay out GBP 1.9 billion ($2.73 billion) - its largest-ever single loss -
because of claims related to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S.. Id.
34. Jenkins, supra note 32, at A21 ("Even Swiss Re, which [experienced the biggest
loss] from the World Trade Center, has begun offering terrorism coverage on a 'very lim-
ited' basis.").
35. Cf. Edward Epstein, It's Controversial and Influencing Clinton - The Politics of
Communitarianism, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Jan. 5, 1994, at Al, available at 1994 WL
4079013 ("[The] communitarian movement [is] a loose-knit coalition of people from a
broad band of the political spectrum .... The movement is neither liberal nor conserva-
tive .... [T]he communitarians are bursting with ideas for rebuilding what they see as the
pillars of American society - the family, the school and the community.").
36. See generally Oster, supra note 29, at C14 (stating that "The exclusions, spurred by
the actions of largely unregulated reinsurers, initially met with resistance from state regula-
tors. They said proposed exclusionary language would eliminate coverage for church and
abortion-clinic bombings."); Peter Baker, Gore Denounces Abortion Clinic Attacks - "We
Will Not Let You Terrorize America's Women... We Will Find You," WASH. POST, Jan. 23,
1997, at A14, available at 1997 WL 2247685.
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day-care centers,39  hospitals, 4° mosques,4 ' nuclear families, 41 syna-
37. Cf. Tracey Kaplan, Fire Strikes at the Heart of Homebuilding Charity a Ruined
Warehouse With No Insurance Devastates Group, KANSAS CITY STAR, Apr. 18, 1995, at B1,
available at 1995 WL 4156765.
Habitat for Humanity, the charity that helps put roofs over the heads of the poor, now
needs a roof itself. Charred roof beams and blackened steel walls were all that re-
mained ... of its warehouse ... after an arson fire .... The fire caused about $45,000
damage, mainly to the 17 trusses that hold up the roof. The loss is particularly devastating
to the group, which has built 89 houses for the poor in the past 16 years, because the
warehouse was not covered by insurance. Id.
38. See, e.g., Attacks on Churches Frustrate Black Leaders They Call for Action
Against Domestic Terrorism, ST. Louis PosT DISPATCH, Mar. 29, 1996, at 7A, available at
1996 WL 2759885.
A preliminary report by the nonprofit group showed that 33 cases remain unsolved in the
45 attacks on black churches in the South since January 1990. Many of the churches, nearly
all-small and in rural areas, have had trouble rebuilding after they were burned or heavily
vandalized . . . . 'I remember when church bombing was a method used to terrorize us in
the 1960s,' said the. . . chairman of Democratic Renewal's board. Id.
39. See generally Sue Anne Pressley, Bomb Kills Dozens in Oklahoma Federal Build-
ing - More Than 200 Missing Children at Day Care Among Victims of Apparent Terrorist
Attack, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1995, at Al (discussing terrorist bombings).
40. Cf Matthew Celia, Specter of Terrorism Looms Over ERs Hospitals- Upgrading
Preparedness in the Event of Biological, Chemical Attack, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2001, at
C8, available at 2001 WL 4163038.
At the Georgetown University Medical Center ... the emergency preparedness plan man-
ager, said the hospital's contingency plan is being 'fine-tuned' in the wake of the [Septem-
ber 11th] attacks .... [T]he Washington center convened a task force in 1999 to address
bioterrorism. The hospital created response scenarios for small, large or massive attacks,
with priorities on identifying potential agents, assessing the threat of each and managing
those who have been exposed. Id.
41. See generally Deborah Kong, Anti-Arab Threats, Slurs, I Attack Reported- Win-
dows of Dallas-Area Mosque Shot Out: Arab, Muslim Groups Fear Collective Blame For
Terrorism, BEACON J. (AKRON), Sept. 13, 2001, at A10 (discussing the assault on America);
Laura Vozzella, Maryland Muslims Brace Against Harassment Many Feel Threatened; Po-
lice Officer Stationed at Mosque, BALT. SUN, Sept. 14, 2001, at 13A (noting that "From
Chicago to Denton, Texas, mosques, Islamic community centers and Arab newspapers
have been pelted with insults and explosives.").
42. Debbie Goldberg, Prosecutor Says Sons Terrorized Their Family 2 Skinhead Teen-
agers Held in Deaths of Parents, Brother, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 1995, at A3, available at
1995 WL 2081453.
The older brothers became involved in the skinhead movement .... said Bob Steinberg,
the Lehigh County district attorney. Large and hulking with shaved heads, Bryan and
David Freeman stood out in a crowd even before they had the words 'Berzerker' and 'Seig
Heil,' respectively, tattooed on their foreheads .... Their parents feared for their safety in
recent years as their sons 'terrorized the family,' Steinberg said. 'The parents had rules,
they had recently sold their (sons') car, thrown away neo-Nazi literature, and this all added
to the disharmony within the family.' Id.;
Barbara Vobejda, Allegations Focus National Attention on Society's Response to Spouse
Abuse- 1,500 Women a Year Died of Domestic Violence in U.S. in 1980s, WASH. POST,
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gogues4 3 and universities.44 Their physical structures were repeatedly
bombed,45 torcheda6and defaced.47 Their members were viciously intimi-
dated,48 physically assaulted 49 and murdered.5" Therefore, it is easy to
Jun. 19, 1994, at A18 ("Domestic violence is common in this country. Estimates place the
number of women beaten by boyfriends and husbands each year at 4 million.").
43. See, e.g., FBI Ties 2 To Plot Of Racist Terror: Complaint Says Rap Stars, Syna-
gogues Were Targeted, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jul 30, 1993, at 1A (noting that "[A]n
alleged member of a white supremacist group called the American Front, confessed to [an]
FBI Special Agent ... that the planned mayhem included the bombing of synagogues and
the assassinations of rap stars. Specific targets for 'political bombings' were Jewish syna-
gogues [and] Jewish-related agencies ....").
44. University Bomber Gets Life in Prison Ex-Ohio Man Convicted of Terrorist Cam-
paign at Florida A&M Last Year, BEACON J. (AKRON), Sept. 16, 2000, at A3 ("A white
man was sentenced yesterday to life in prison for setting off two pipe bombs that spread
terror last year at the predominantly black Florida A&M University but caused no inju-
ries."); 'Mad Scientist' Terrorizing New York Research University: Someone's Poisoned Cof-
fee, Turned on Valves Releasing Deadly Gas, Set a Fire and Made Anonymous Death
Threats, LEDGER-ENQUIRER, July 27, 1994, at C5.
45. See, e.g., Dale Russakoff, Church Bombing Trial Told of Accused's Racism -For-
mer Girlfriend Says Blanton Terrorized Blacks. WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 2001, at A13, availa-
ble at 2001 WL 176239 (stating that "From across the decades, witnesses in the trial of
former Ku Klux Klansman Thomas Blanton Jr., accused of murdering four black girls in
the 1963 bombing of the 16th Street Baptist Church, told a state court jury how he boasted
of wanting blacks to die and terrorized them routinely."); Jon Jeter, Man May Have Killed
Self in Garage Blast, Police Say Officer at Door to Ask About Church Bombing, WASH.
POST, May 30, 1998, at A2. "Local, state and federal officials had compiled a list of nearly
350 people to interview in connection with Sunday's bombing, which ripped a 10-by-15-
foot hole in a wall of the First Assembly of God Church during morning services." Id.
46. Marc Kaufman, FBI Probes Oregon, University Lab Arsons, Blazes Targeted Tree
Genetics Experiments- Environmental Terrorism Suspected, WASH. POST, May 24, 2001, at
A17.
Both sites have been associated with the genetic modification of trees, which has become
an emotional target of protest and attack by radical environmentalists. An agency official
in Seattle said that the university fire ... is being investigated by the Puget Sound Joint
Terrorist Task Force, a federal, state and local effort. [T]he Oregon attack is also being
probed by the FBI as an act of terrorism .... Id.;
Linda Kanamine, 'Unmistakable' Terrorism in Arson at Tennessee Church, USA TODAY,
Jan. 12, 1996, at 3A, available at 1196 WL 2042919 ("Federal investigators aren't ready to
call the firebombing of a Knoxville, Tenn., church racially motivated, despite racial slurs
found in the rubble. 'This was an arson, without doubt,' said the FBI [agent] ....
Whatever the motive, 'this is an unmistakable act of terrorism,' says Brian Levin of the
Southern Poverty Law Center.").
47. See, e.g., Hate Graffiti Sprayed at Synagogue in Bethesda Vandalism Preceded
Building's Dedication, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2001, at B1, available at 2001 WL 17617685.
"The graffiti was sprayed on the pavement that leads to the parking lot of Adat Shalom
Reconstructionist Congregation, a synagogue that was the subject of a long-standing zon-
ing dispute among residents of the Carderock Springs enclave in Bethesda." Id.
48. See, e.g., Editorial, Hateful Crime Deserves More Time, ATLANTA J. CONST., Feb.
24, 2000, at A22, available at 2000 WL 5442902. "Georgia's proposed Anti-Domestic Ter-
rorism Act assigns extra jail time for hate crimes inspired by a victim's race, religion or
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understand why these segments of society are concerned about losing ter-
rorism coverage.
Very likely, displeased consumers and politicians will try to reverse in-
surance regulators' hasty decisions, and agitate to thwart additional plans
to terminate terrorism insurance. Because long before the attack on the
World Trade Center and before insurers' decision to eliminate terrorism
coverage, choruses of consumers were uttering some extremely malicious
things about the insurance industry in general, and about specific insurers
in particular.
First, critics asserted that state insurance regulators aided and abetted
insurers' anti-consumer practices, by helping companies to victimize vul-
nerable policyholders. Some insureds, for example, adopted views like
this one: "[The] laws of our supposedly free and fine country are [essen-
tially] designed to aid and abet . . . the insurance industry['s] [outright
thievery]."51 Others maintained: "[Specific companies use] fraud investi-
gation[s]... to terrorize people ... and corrupt officials to aid and abet
their scheme."52 Still others suggested: "Aiding and abetting is the Fed-
sexual orientation .... As a nation, we have a right and an obligation to speak forcefully
against crimes of terror designed to deliver a message of hatred and intimidation to an
entire class of people, whether gays, Christians or blacks." Id.
49. See, e.g., Stephen Barr, Serial Bombs Feared After Atlanta Blast Attack at Gay
Club Similar to Explosions at Clinic, Olympics, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 1997, at Al, available
at 1197 WL 9336284.
A bomb exploded ... at a nightclub here popular with gay men and lesbians in an attack
that officials said is strikingly similar to one against a suburban abortion clinic .... Law
enforcement officials familiar with both [the] attack and the abortion clinic assault last
month said there were chilling similarities in both the devices and the circumstances of the
terrorist attacks. Id.
50. See, e.g., Editorial, Abortion Clinic Killers: Terrorists, Not Saviors, USA TODAY,
Jan. 3, 1995, at 12A, available at 1995 WL 2919085. "The truth is that abortion is legal; the
painful, awful choice of whether to have an abortion rests with each woman, not with those
who would kill in the name of preventing killing or with their supporters. The truth is that
such people are terrorists deserving only public fury and scorn." Id.
51. Medical Whores and the IME - Yes Virginia, There are Medical Whores. Report
Them!, at http://graham.main.nc.us/-bhammellmwhore.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2004).
If you are sent, by an insurance company, to an 'Independent Medical Evaluation' (IME)
- that's what they call it - nine times out of ten you will be sent to one of the insurance
company's medical whores .... The insurance scam is that your state essentially puts a gun
to your head, forcing you to purchase (specifically automobile) insurance policies. The
insurance companies then collect the payments but then try to find every way, legal or
illegal, . . . not to pay you in the event of an accident. It used to be called 'highway
robbery .... ' [Now] in doublethink, it's called insurance, an oxymoron ... if there ever
was one. Id.
52. Judy Morris, MD, Criminality at Bureaucratic Discretion - DA Rejects Patently
Criminal Charges, at http://graham.main.nc.us/-bhammel/INS/DA.html (last visited Jan.
12, 2004).
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eral Justice System .... [H]ow many would guess that the government
would aid and abet corporate interests in delaying response to insurance
victim's pleas.... We have seen the California [Department of Insurance]
take a non-enforcement policy against certain insurers .... There is a
growing trend of collusion between our government representatives and
criminal corporations. What possible solution is there but to protest and
protest loudly?"53
But the insured and their congressional allies lobbied the most fero-
cious and vociferous attacks against specific property and casualty insur-
ers, and private managed-care 54 companies. Among other accusations,
citizens asserted that these insurers terrorized the citizenry,55 by putting
corporate interests and greed above patients' and consumers' reasonable
expectations and medical concerns. In fact, some critics called property
Since I filed my disability claims with UNUM, I have lived in almost constant fear. I have
been pursued in my car, had my privacy invaded, had my credit checked for unapproved
purposes . . . and then had these false impressions sent to my former employer. The De-
partment of Insurance has published false statements about me and then, knowing they
were false, sent them to my elected officials. Id.
53. Cf. Repeating Patterns - A Clearinghouse for Recording the Corruption of All-
state Insurance Company: Delaying Justice is Decaying Justice, at http://
www.crowman.com (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
54. Cf. Laurie McGinley, Hospitals Feel Sting of Cuts From Insurers, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 16, 2000, at B2, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 3021873.
Hospitals' financial performance deteriorated sharply last year, largely reflecting reduced
reimbursements from private insurers, according to a new study to be released today by a
congressional advisory group .... [M]ost of the decline resulted from cutbacks in pay-
ments from managed-care companies and other private payers, which are pressing hard to
hold down health costs. Id.
55. See, e.g., Barry L Duncan & Scott D Miller, The Heroic Client. Doing Client-Di-
rected, Outcome-Informed Therapy, at http://www.mcfadz.fsnet.co.uk/therapy/re-
views.htm#heroic (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
We sound the alarm bells and put a call out to therapists and consumers to question mental
health authority .... Our vision of this alternative embraces change that is client directed,
not theory driven, subscribes to a relational rather than a medical model, and is committed
to successful outcome instead of competent service delivery.... [T]here are clearly many
lessons which can be learned in Europe from the American experience of managed care: a
monster made in the field's own image - a hodge-podge of empirically dead practices
pieced together and now running amuck and terrorizing the citizenry. Id.
See also M.E. Victoria Association, Self Help Group for People with Chronic Fatigue Syn-
drome, at http://members.shaw.ca/me.victoria/newsletters/99jul-aug.html (last visited Jan.
25, 2004).
Do any of the 'insurance people' composing report forms, or handling them, or assessing
them ... really know the agony of ME/CFS, or how terrifying, frustrating, demoralizing
and humiliating it is for a previously competent, intelligent and active individual to try and
obtain a diagnosis and then have to beg for money? Do the top brass of insurance compa-
nies know just how terrorizing and harassing their communications can be to a very sick
individual? Id.
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and casualty insurers' practices "economic terrorism., 5 6 Others labeled
insurers' behaviors "commercial terrorism for profit."57
As an illustration, thousands of physicians and health-care providers
treat millions of Medicare and Medicaid patients each year. Conse-
quently, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Service Administration
(CMS)58 receives millions of claims from all sorts of providers. CMS
hires insurance contractors - private insurance companies - to process
the claims, investigate fraud, and perform other duties.59 Quite recently,
members of Congress criticized CMS's contractors harshly for "terror-
izing" physicians and other providers. To help address those concerns,
CMS reported that it would implement a new initiative entitled, "End the
Terror."6
56. Arthur Gottschalk, Corporate Insecurity Info- Terrorism is Emerging as a Threat to
Business and Civil Networks. But Smart Companies will be Ready for the New Logic
Bombs and Self-Replicating Worms, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Aug. 10, 1996, at 1C ("The
definition of terrorism is also widening to include so-called economic terrorism. Besides
violence ... economic terrorism can include everything ....,")
57. Cf 2 Ex-Hostages Sue Iran for $600 Million, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1992, at A16,
available at 1992 WL 2851861. "Former hostages Joseph Cicippio and David Jacobsen sued
Iran on Wednesday for $600 million . . . . 'Iran was guilty of 'commercial terrorism for
profit' lawyer James J. Oliver said." Id. See also Law Targeting Animal Rights Protests
Nullified, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2001, at A30, available at 2001 WL 28919891. "In Salt Lake
City, U.S. District Judge Bruce Jenkins struck down the state's Commercial Terrorism law,
a statute that targeted animal rights protests, as overly broad and unconstitutional." Id.
58. See, e.g., Amy Goldstein, HMOs Expected to Drop More Medicare Patients Ad-
ministration Seeks Looser Rules on Managed Care, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2001, at A27,
available at 2001 WL 23190266. "The head of the federal agency that runs Medicare pre-
dicted yesterday that 'several hundred thousand' elderly Americans will be dropped from
private health plans. .. . Thomas A. Scully, administrator of the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, said: 'we have done everything but the kitchen sink to keep them in."'
Id.
59. Janice Stanfield, Legislative News - Initiatives to Improve Medicare Contractor
Operations, at http://www.wocn.org/legislative (last visited Jan. 12, 2004).
[T]he Centers for Medicare & Medicaid services Administrator, Thomas A. Scully ...
announced several more initiatives designed to improve Medicare Contractor Operations.
Scully told the House Small Business Committee that CMS is taking steps to improve the
quality of the telephone call centers operated by contractors, which received 24 million
calls in 2000. The centers provide billing and other information to physicians and other
providers. Medicare contractors are private insurance companies .... Id.
60. Id.
Scully made his comments as members of the committee harshly criticized contractors,
claiming they make life unnecessarily difficult and complicated for Medicare providers ....
Scully also announced that CMS this fall would unveil a new nursing home quality initia-
tive. 'End the Terror.' 'Terrorizing by these contractors has got to end,' committee Chair-
man Donald A. Manzullo (R. Ill.) said, adding that he would keep referring to CMS as the
Health Care Financing Administration until he was convinced the agency had become
more responsive to providers and beneficiaries . . . .Donna M. Christian Christensen
(D.V.I.), who is a physician, said the burden associated with contractors is causing many
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Additionally, before September 11th, policyholders confronted Allstate
and accused the insurer of terrorizing women as a way to insure large
profits. Some critics even described the practice as "Allstate's War on
Women."61 According to complainants, Allstate used "intrusive surveil-
lance" and other tactics to defeat insured women's right to receive fair
compensation after experiencing physical and financial losses. Those
same critics also claimed that Allstate terrorized minorities and low-in-
come persons when those policyholders filed legitimate claims with the
insurer.62
To be sure, the charges against Allstate have been extremely severe.
During the 1990's, consumers and politicians advanced substantial
charges against a number of major, well-known insurers.63 Complainants
alleged that a variety of insurance companies- automobile, disability,
homeowners, health, life, and property and casualty underwriters64 -
aided and abetted "domestic terrorism." Who were the terrorists? They
doctors to leave Medicare. Providers 'want these carriers out of their lives,' she said, call-
ing for a moratorium on provider investigations. Id.
61. See INSURER CRIME OUTLINE, at http://graham.main.nc.us/-bhammel/INS/
CASenate/ico061700 (last visited Jan. 12, 2004). "Allstate is also famous for terrorizing
women with intrusive surveillance, so .... they [can] quit their claim - Allstate's war on
women." Id. See also Allstate Insurance Sucks.com, (searching for the word "terror"
within this complaint archive provides another look at just how Allstate is terrorizing wo-
men) at http://www.allstateinsurancesucks.com/ViewComplaints Jul-AugSept_2001.htm
(last visited Jan. 12, 2004).
62. INSURER CRIME OUTLINE, June 17, 2000, at http://graham.main.nc.us/-bhammel/
INS/CASenate/ico061700 (last visited Jan. 12, 2004). "Allstate 'targets' those least able to
fight back with profiling programs such as COLOSSUS. This includes low-income, the
undereducated, minorities, widows, and women in general, who are programmatically
weighted for 'lowballing' or denial." Id.
63. See, e.g., Abused Lose Insurance, Panel Told, PHOENIX GAZETTE, Mar. 15, 1995, at
A16 (stating that "[aifter various cases became public, State Farm Insurance [decided to
sell] life insurance to women who still lived with a past abuser"); Fern Shen, For the Bat-
tered Spouse, Insurers' Bias Worsens Pain, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1995, at Al. "In the case
of the Pennsylvania woman who was hit by a shoe, Nationwide Insurance Co. turned her
down after citing medical records that showed her husband broke her nose .... [A]nother
Pennsylvania woman was denied life, health and mortgage insurance by State Farm Insur-
ance and life insurance by First Colony." Id.
64. Cf Andy Miller, Effort to Outlaw 'Pinklining' by Insurers Gains Steam Bill Aims
to Help Victims of Domestic Abuse, ATLANTA J. CONST., Mar. 12, 2000, at D1. "The Geor-
gia bill would make it illegal for an insurer to refuse, cancel or restrict coverage, raise a
premium or refuse a claim because someone is a victim of domestic violence .... The law
extends to life, health, disability, and property and casualty insurance, including homeown-
ers and automobile." Id. Maggie Sieger, SCC Backs Abuse Victim Law, ALBUQUERQUE
J., Oct. 2, 1996, at D5. "The legislation would cover health, life, disability, property and
casualty insurance .... Testimony during the hearing also revealed that domestic violence
shelters often are denied property, casualty and automobile liability insurance coverage."
Id.
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were husbands and boyfriends who terrorized and murdered millions of
wives and girlfriends each year.65 The evidence for that chilling assertion
appeared in a 1988 survey of sixteen insurance companies.66
In the survey, half of the insurers admitted that they intentionally re-
fused to issue or renew insurance contracts if the applicants were battered
women. More disquieting, subsequent surveys revealed that even larger
percentages of insurers victimized women in different ways. How? Un-
derwriters purposefully allowed the presence or absence of domestic vio-
lence in one's life to influence a variety of underwriting decisions.67
65. According to conservative estimates, intimate partners are significantly more
likely to terrorize American women than strangers or foreign terrorists. Each year, hus-
bands and lovers attack at least 1.8 million women and about 1,400 women die from those
violent attacks. See Editorial, Don't Let Insurers Cancel - Some Companies Compound
Abuse, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, May 31, 1997, at 10A (stating that "[p]hysical assault by an
intimate is the leading cause of injury to American women"); Beth Warren, Domestic Vio-
lence: Family Disputes Turn Deadly Domestic-Related Killings Rose Dramatically Last
Year, ATLANTA J. CONST., Feb.18, 2001, at JJ1. "Domestic violence accounted for 70 per-
cent of [Gwinnett County's] homicides last year - compared with 25 percent the previous
year .... Statewide, residents made an estimated 50,000 calls to domestic violence crisis
lines in 1999, according to the Georgia Department of Human Resources." Id. Dave
Ghose, Jews Acknowledge Domestic Violence- Author Brings Home Reality that Abuse
Exists in Jewish Community, BEACON J. (AKRON), Feb. 26, 2001, at B3.
Elaine Weiss followed all the rules .... But Weiss soon learned that the formula she...
followed in seeking the right mate was far from perfect .... [She is] a domestic violence
survivor .... Few people identify domestic violence as a problem among Jewish families.
But statistics paint a different picture. Jewish women are abused at the same rate as wo-
men in the general population, and the rate of abuse is the same among Orthodox, Con-
servative and Reform Jews, according to Jewish Women International .... Id.
66. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, Insurers Reject Battered Women: Legislation Against
Practice Sought, N. Y. TIMES, May 12, 1994, at A2, available at 1994 WL 8650542.
After being beaten up by her husband and shoved across the room, a Pennsylvania woman
in her mid-20s sought life, health and mortgage disability insurance from State Farm Insur-
ance last year. She was denied all three .... Aides to [Rep. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y.] said
a survey of 16 insurance companies found that eight 'admitted to discriminating against
victims of domestic violence.' Id.
See also Fern Shen, For the Battered Spouse, Insurers' Bias Worsens Pain, WASH. POST,
Mar. 9, 1995, at Al (stating that "[in 1994,] a congressional survey found that half of the
largest insurance companies would refuse to cover a woman who had a history of being a
battered spouse"); Deborah S. Hellman, Is Actuarially Fair Insurance Pricing Actually
Fair? - A Case Study in Insuring Battered Women, 32 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 355, 356,
n5 (1997);
67. Miller, supra note 64, at D1.
Surveys [conducted] by insurance commissioners in Kansas and Pennsylvania . . . found
that 24 percent of insurance companies admitted to using domestic violence as a factor
when deciding whether to issue or renew a policy. The surveys showed more than half of
health insurers and about two-thirds of life insurers use domestic violence as a factor in
underwriting, the process that analyzes claims experience and general risk in order to de-
termine a policy's cost. Id.
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Assuredly, those horrific findings produced widespread anger, and helped
to solidify the common view: husbands and boyfriends terrorized women
first. Then, American and international insurance companies terrorize
women again.68
Quite possibly, the perception that insurers aid and abet6 9 domestic
68. Editorial, Stop Bias Against Battered Women 2000 Georgia Legislature, ATLANTA
J. CONST., Mar.16, 2000, at A22. "Incredible as it seems, many insurers have taken the
position that victims of domestic abuse were to blame for 'risky lifestyles' .... The legisla-
tion, as it stands, will do essentially what the governor promised: keep insurance companies
from making victims of domestic-violence victims a second time by canceling, limiting or
denying coverage." Id. Miller, supra note 64, at D1. According to Gov. Roy Barnes, "for
years, insurance companies have made victims of domestic violence into victims a second
time by canceling, limiting or denying them insurance coverage." Id. Laura Gatland, Do-
mestic-Abuse Victims Want Help from Insurance Industry - Illinois Considers Law to Pro-
tect Victims of Domestic Violence, but is it Enough? CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jun. 5,
1998, at 3. "Washington State Insurance Commissioner [observed:] 'what's so ironic... is
that you tell victims to report the violence (to authorities) and to tell the doctor .... But
when [that information] appears in her records and she tries to get her life back together,
she's victimized again."' Id. Editorial, Don't Let Insurers Cancel Don't Let Insurers Can-
cel, supra note 65, at 10A. "Being in the business of calculating risk for profit, many insur-
ance companies routinely use domestic violence as an underwriting criterion or as a
rationale to cancel life-insurance policies or deny claims. That practice is wrong. It further
victimizes women trying to recover from domestic attacks." Id. Abused Lose Insurance,
supra note 63, at A16. "An abusive husband struck Jody in the face with a soda can and a
shoe in separate 1990 attacks. Four years later she received another blow: Her insurance
company denied her a life insurance policy. It had found out about the past abuse through
medical records." Id. Shen, supra note 66, at Al. "What do sky divers, travelers entering
war zones and battered spouses have in common? Many insurance companies refuse to
cover them, insisting that they have chosen high-risk lifestyles that make them potentially
too costly to insure .... 'I'm basically being punished because I'm the victim of a crime,'
[according to a woman, who secured] insurance ... after she contacted advocates for bat-
tered women and a lawyer." Id. Seelye, supra note 66, at A2. "[A] senior staff lawyer
with the National Organization for Women's Legal Defense and Education Fund [ob-
served:] 'By punishing women for having a history of domestic violence in their medical
records, the insurance companies are discouraging women from disclosing abuse."' Id.
See Editorial, Don't Deny Insurance to Victims of Abuse, ALBUQUERQUE J., June 2, 1996,
at A10 (stating that "victims of domestic abuse are twice victimized in New Mexico: first by
the perpetrators of their abuse and second by a law that allows health insurers to deny
coverage to victims of domestic abuse").
69. Editorial, Don't Let Insurers Cancel Don't Let Insurers Cancel, supra note 65, at
10A. "By categorizing domestic violence as a deliberate vice, on the order of smoking or
drinking, insurance companies routinely have violated women ... [who have been] terror-
ized by those closest to them." Id. See Editorial, Don't Deny Insurance to Victims of
Abuse, supra note 68, at A10. "Knowing that they could lose their health benefits or even
be denied future coverage only adds to the victimization [and] furthering inhibiting [terror-
ized women] from seeking help." Id. See also Shen, supra note 66, at Al (noting that
insurers refusal to insure abused victims will discourage terrorized women from "reporting
abuse, leaving their abuser and seeking treatment"); Seelye, supra note 66, at A2 (noting
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terrorism will continue. As of this writing, forty per cent of the states
70
still permit insurance companies to discriminate against terrorized wo-
men. Furthermore, in light of insurers' recent decision to terminate ter-
rorism insurance, an even greater percentage of the public will likely
embrace the view that carriers aid and abet terrorists. But there is more.
In post-September 11th America, it is highly probable that insurance con-
sumers and their supporters will promote an even more disconcerting po-
sition: federal and state courts aid and abet terrorism indirectly, by
helping insurance companies to discriminate against terrorized individu-
als, businesses and social institutions.71
Is there credible evidence to support this latter assertion? Presently,
many citizens firmly believe that federal and state civil-court judges are 1)
corrupt,72 2) inherently biased in favor of one group over another, 73 and
that insurers who make insurance policies "unavailable or more expensive ... [are also]
making it harder for women to leave the abuser").
70. See Editorial, Stop Bias Against Battered Women 2000 Georgia Legislature, supra
note 68, at A22 (noting that "thirty-one states [60%] have already enacted laws to ban
pinklining - [insurance discrimination against victims of domestic violence]"); Gatland,
supra note 68, at 3. "At least 30 states [60%] have passed laws recently, after hearing of
women . . . [who were] denied insurance or. . . [were] charged higher rates because their
husbands abused them."). See also Editorial, Don't Deny Insurance to Victims of Abuse,
supra note 68, at A10. "In an unscientific survey of health and life insurance underwriters
in New Mexico, it was recently discovered that many companies routinely deny coverage to
[battered spouses] .... Some insurance companies have stopped the practice, but it is
unlikely that all competitors in an industry that is fundamentally profit driven will stop
voluntarily." Id.; see Hellman, supra note 66, at nn. 7-9, 17 (listing enacted state statutes,
and proposed state and federal legislation to prevent insurance companies from victimizing
battered women).
71. Cf. Allstate's Patterns of Deceit - Repeating Patterns, A CLEARINGHOUSE FOR
RECORDING THE CORRUPTION OF ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, http://www.crowman.
com (last visited on Mar. 6, 2002).
Did you know a corporation could place you under house arrest? Aiding and abetting is
[an attribute of] the Federal Justice System. [Courts] delay insurance cases that are danger-
ous to the insurers. We all knew about insurance companies tactics to stall and delay
claims. But, how many would guess that the government would aid and abet corporate
interests in delaying response to insurance victims pleas. Id.
72. See, e.g., Joseph Perkins, In League With Lawyers, ATLANTA CONST., May 24,
1995, at A13.
Every year, another 18 million civil suits are added to state and federal court dockets...
The reason so many Americans have become sue-happy is because they view the court-
rooms as casinos. .. This lust for lucre has had a corrupting effect on America's civil justice
system. Courtrooms are no longer sanctums of justice. They are simply venues where
money changes hands between litigants, where justice frequently is sacrificed on the altar
of avarice. Id.;
Brian Flanigan, Joe Swickard And Bill McGraw, Feds Probe Detroit Courts, DETROIT
FREE PRESS, Jan. 15, 1987, at 1A (noting that "Federal authorities are investigating allega-
tions of bribery and corruption in Detroit's ... civil courts... The undercover FBI opera-
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3) very inclined to allow personal biases and extra-legal factors to influ-
ence procedural rulings, opinions and declarations. 74 In fact, some judi-
cial watchers stress that the legal community should lobby for more
procedural safeguards to deter judicial bias and some judges' propensity
to allow immaterial factors to generate highly unprincipled, strained and
predetermined declarations.75 But more pertinently, many in the legal
community firmly believe that some judges' questionable and arbitrary
rulings help insurance companies to defeat insureds' reasonable expecta-
tion ... is focused on judges who allegedly have accepted cash in exchange for favorable
rulings... ").
73. See, e.g., Saundra Torry, Bias Survey Shows Unequal Courtroom Tendencies-
Presidential What? WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1995, at F7.
A common and striking theme, the committee found, was the stark difference in the way
white and minority attorneys view the court system. This came through loudly in the com-
mittee's survey of attorneys who practice at the court. White lawyers who responded gen-
erally 'believed that little bias affected proceedings' in the federal courts, while a 'much
higher percentage' of minority lawyers 'perceived significant bias in the system,' according
to the report. Id.
74. See, e.g., Louis B. Cei, Biases Play Big Role, Writer Says, RICHMOND TIMES-Dis-
PATCH, Aug. 1, 1999, at F4 (reviewing Mary Frances Berry's THE PIG FARMER'S DAUGH-
TER AND OTHER TALES OF AMERICAN JUSTICE: EPISODES OF RACISM AND SEXISM IN
THE COURTS FROM 1865 To THE PRESENT. "According to the .. .head of the United
States Commission on Civil Rights and a professor of American Thought at the University
of Pennsylvania, race, class, and gender biases determine the decisions handed down by
judges. Rather than objectively and impartially reviewing the facts .... judges systemati-
cally make rulings that favor white males."). See also Willy E. Rice, Judicial Bias, The
Insurance Industry and Consumer Protection-An Empirical Analysis of State Supreme
Courts' Breach-of-Contract, Bad-Faith, Covenant-of-Good-Faith and Excess-Judgment De-
cisions, 1900-1991," 41 CATH. U.L. REV. 325, 340-352 (1992) (documenting courts' incon-
sistent application of settled principles of law).
75. See A Reasonable Judicial Precaution, WASH. POST, Jul. 1, 1997, at A18. Com-
ments of Rep. Charles T. Canady, (R-Tex.) stating,
As the author of legislation that would allow peremptory challenges of federal judges, ...
[I should add that] 17 states have judicial peremptory challenge procedures that have been
in operation in some states for more than a century. While seldom used, the threat of a
challenge serves to deter judicial bias and provides an added level of assurance that the
parties will receive a fair and impartial consideration of their case... [Arguably] judicial
peremptory challenges provide an additional safeguard against racial and gender-based
bias. Id.
See also Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Discord Over Whether Liability
Insurers Must Defend Insureds' Allegedly Intentional and Immoral Conduct. A Historical
and Empirical Review of Federal- and State-Court Declaratory Judgments-1900-1997, 47
AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1194-1214 (1998) (establishing conclusively that judges allow imper-
missible and immaterial factors to influence their rulings and declarations).
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tions7 6 of timely and appropriate relief under insurance contracts gener-
ally and under terrorism contracts in particular.77
Consider, for example, the case of National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pitts-
burgh v. Port Authority of New. 78 In 1993, terrorists bombed the World
Trade Center and generated millions of dollars in losses. 79 As the lessor-
manager of the trade center, the Port Authority cited the indemnification
provision in the lease-management agreement, and asked the tenants to
reimburse the Authority for the cost of settling third-party claims.80 Na-
tional Union Fire and other insurers intervened on behalf of their tenant-
insureds, instructed them not to indemnify and asked a court for declara-
tory relief.
On its face, the language in the indemnification clause was extremely
broad: "[Tenants will] indemnify [the] Port Authority and hold it harm-
76. Cf Sandra Fleishman, How a Fire Can Turn Your World Upside Down In Picking
Up the Pieces- Road to Settlement Can Be Long, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2002, at H1.
How quickly and how willingly insurers respond to claims determines how fast a family can
get back to business. Insurers say homeowners frequently do not have reasonable expecta-
tions about how much money they can get because they do not read, understand or update
their policies. The insurers say their goal is to be fair and prevent fraud. At the same time,
some consumer groups say insurers are dragging their feet more often and demanding
more documentation than ever. Id.
77. Cf. Erik Ingram, Consumer Lawyers Accuse A Judge Insurance Hearings Are Un-
fair, They Say, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Apr. 4, 1990, at A6.
Lawyers for a coalition of consumer groups accused an administrative law judge .. of
issuing 'improper, highly unorthodox and arbitrary rulings' that favor the insurance indus-
try... [The] attorneys for Public Advocates... made [the accusation] both orally and in a
legal document, prompting... [the judge to say that his] rulings were shaped by law, not
bias... Id.
See also Allstate's Patterns of Deceit, supra note 71.
If you have not experienced a problem with an insurance company or HMO, you probably
know of someone who has .... We are besieged with corporate attacks ... and no one is
even recognizing the crimes. Government mandates by law [that] you must have insur-
ance. Yet, they do little to enforce these policies when claims occur. The medias are silent.
The government is silent. The insurers are certainly silent. And, the only cries you hear are
the few victims' pleas for justice. Let us in the courts to plead our cases. Let us have...
American Government! Id.
78. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. The Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 261
A.D.2d 259, 690 N.Y.S.2d 260, N. Y. Slip Op. 04686 (1999).
79. See Douglas Feiden, Port Authority and Insurers Sue for 450 Million, Daily News
(N.Y.), Mar. 22, 1996, at 38 ("After the bombing, the PA collected about $ 510 million
from its insurers, and now those companies are trying to get the money back through the
suit.").
80. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 261 A.D.2d at 259 (After terrorists
bombed the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993, some 28 third-party victims file
personal injury claims against the Port Authority. Those persons - at the time of the
bombing- were on premises that Inhilco and Hilton International leased and/or managed
at the World Trade Center.).
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less, 'from all claims and demands of third persons including but not
limited to those for death, personal injuries, or for property damages
arising out of the use or occupancy' of the [tenant's] premises."81 One
can reasonably assume that the parties to the contract - along with their
talented lawyers - knew exactly what they were bargaining for when
they inserted such broad language into the agreement. Nevertheless, the
trial judge decided in favor of the insurance company and their insureds.
Why?
In an extremely short memorandum decision, the judge simply stated
that the third-party claims and payments - for which the Authority
sought reimbursement- did not arise from the tenants' use or occupancy
of premises in the World Trade Center. Instead, a bomb - over which
the tenants exercised no control - caused the third-party injuries.82 This
declaration is disconcerting, because the court simply stated a conclusion
without conducting a thorough analysis of the legal issues. There is a rich
arsenal of legal theories to help judges to decide whether to grant declar-
atory relief.83 The judge in National Union did not cite or employ any of
those doctrines to support her conclusion.
In addition, the ruling did not show any sensitivity for the plight of the
terrorized victims. That is another major limitation, for it lends some
credence to the general perception that courts are significantly more con-
cerned about protecting insurers' interests unconditionally. For sure,
third-party victims are the intended beneficiaries under many indemnity
agreements as well as under liability and indemnity insurance contracts.'
It is arguable, therefore, that the very intent of the World Trade Center's
lease-indemnification agreement was 1) to force all tenants to secure in-
surance for the benefit of third-party victims, and 2) to insert broad lan-
81. Id. at 261 (Emphasis added).
82. Id. at 261-262.
83. See, e.g., Rice, supra note 75, at 1021-1022 nn. 113-117 (outlining various doctrines
that courts employ to decide whether to award declaratory relief under contracts - gen-
eral, insurance, liability and indemnity agreements).
84. Cf. Assessing The Costs And Benefits - Public Policy Reports, 71 N.Y. ST. B.J. 32,
33 (April, 1999) (noting that "Liability insured costs include direct written premiums
for ... liability insurance. The.. .premiums [also] ... reflect the portion of those coverages
devoted to paying benefits to third parties [who experience injuries] or damages .... ).
See also David M. Summers, Third Party Beneficiaries and The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 880, 892 (April 1982).
Under the first Restatement, some courts searched for the primary purpose of the contract.
When they found that the contract's primary purpose was to benefit the promisee, [they]
concluded that any [third-party] benefit . . . was incidental. This type of analysis is
flawed ... Many contracts have several purposes [and the] parties ... often intend that
some benefit accrue to a third party, although the "primary" benefit of the contract runs to
the original parties. Id.
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guage into the agreement to insure the identity of the party who would
assume the ultimate responsibility for compensating those victims.
Unquestionably, National Union is not the only poorly reasoned deci-
sion. There are others, which easily could lead cynics and judicial watch-
ers to conclude that insurers and their allies on the bench aid and abet
terrorists. First, consider the simple facts in Nichols v. Nationwide Mutual
Ins. Co.85 On April 19, 1995, Timothy McVeigh bombed the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, terrorizing and murdering
hundreds of people.86 McVeigh planted the bomb in a rented Ryder
truck and parked the vehicle next to the federal building.8 7 When the
bomb and truck exploded, Richard and Bertha Nichols were sitting a con-
siderable distance away in their small car. Suddenly, the axle from the
Ryder truck landed on the hood of their Ford Festiva, causing substantial
property damage and bodily injuries.88
The Nichols filed a claim under their uninsured-motorist, automobile
policy. Later, they sued Nationwide when the company refused to pay.
Nationwide filed a motion for summary judgment. The court granted the
motion and dismissed the case.8 9 Why? The federal judge decided that a
85. Nichols v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 948 F.Supp. 988 (W.D. Okla. 1996).
86. See Richard A. Serrano and James Risen, Bombing Suspect in Custody FBI Ques-
tions 2nd Man; Death Toll Hits 65 Terrorism, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1995, at 1 (stating that
"FBI agents arrested a crew-cut suspect ... in the bombing of a federal building in
Oklahoma City, where at least 65 [ultimately, 168] people died .... Thomas James Mc-
Veigh, 26 ... was put under federal arrest ..... His arrest and the surrender of Terry
Nichols ... made it apparent that the bombing was domestic terrorism.").
87. See Richard Serrano and Ronald J. Ostrow, FBI Believes Video Shows Bomb
Truck, L. A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1995, at 1. "The vehicle, a 1993 Ford truck obtained from a
Ryder rental franchise in Junction City, Kan., is believed to have delivered 1,000 to 1,200
pounds of a volatile mixture of fuel oil and ammonium nitrate, a fertilizer, to a spot near
the front entrance of the nine-story office building shortly before the blast... " Id.
88. Nichols, 948 F.Supp. at 990; see also Kevin Johnson, Witness Identifies Ryder
Truck, USA TODAY, May 15, 1997, at 3A.
Nichols [said he] saw a humongous object whirling toward them from the direction of the
Murrah building. . . [It was] the 250-pound axle from the Ryder truck... He said he
reached for his wife, who was unbuckling the child from the back seat of their tiny Ford
Festiva. It hit the front passenger side of the windshield and knocked the car back about
10 feet," he said... [He] sent his family to the hospital... Id.
89. See also Id. at 994.
Plaintiffs [ed] their bad faith claim . . .upon two grounds: 1) Nationwide's citation to a
'terrorist exclusion clause' that was not in the contract, and 2) Nationwide's knowingly
incorrect conclusion that the uninsured motorist provision [did] not cover plaintiffs'
losses .... The facts are in dispute regarding plaintiffs' allegation that Nationwide unrea-
sonably and in bad faith cited a fictitious terrorist exclusion clause as an additional basis
for denying coverage on the vehicle ..... [As] the [c]ourt has ruled that those losses were
properly disputed by Nationwide, plaintiffs' bad faith claim also fails under the fictitious
terrorist clause argument. Id.
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trial by jury was inappropriate, because the Nichols' evidence was insuffi-
cient to support every elements of a multi-part test. Under Oklahoma
law, insureds must prove the following if they expect insurers to pay unin-
sured motorist claims: 1) proof that the "injury [arose] out of the use of
the motor vehicle"; 2) proof of "a casual connection between the use of
the vehicle and the injury"; 3) proof that "the use [is] related to the trans-
portation nature of the vehicle"; 4) proof that "an intervening force [did
not] sever the causal connection" between the vehicle's use and the in-
jury; and, 5) proof that the uninsured [was the] owner or operator of the
vehicle during the commission of the wrongful act."9 °
Although finding that the Nichols' injuries arose out of the use of the
Ryder truck, the judge found no causal connection between Timothy Mc-
Veigh's use of that vehicle and the insureds' injuries. How did the judge
defend that startling ruling? The judge said: "[O]nce the Ryder truck was
parked, it was no longer being used as a vehicle for transportation...
[Instead, McVeigh was using it to pack and conceal explosives, a use] de-
cidedly not connected to transportation."9 1 The judge also ruled against
Richard and Bertha because they could not prove that McVeigh was the
owner or operator of the Ryder truck when the bomb exploded.
The court reached that highly questionable conclusion this way:
"[When McVeigh] detonated the explosives [] [he was] not engaged in an
activity related to the transportation nature of the vehicle. [Conse-
quently,] an operator [did not cause the injuries] . .. during the commis-
sion of a wrongful act."92 Clearly, this is a decidedly strained and
superficial analysis, one that lacks any hint of common sense. Even a
cursory review of newspapers reveals that Timothy McVeigh operated
and exercised control over the Ryder truck. Furthermore, under
Oklahoma's doctrine of bailment, McVeigh certainly had a possessory in-
terest 93 in the rented vehicle before it blew up, terrorizing and killing
innocent people.
Finally, a New York judge's complex analysis and rulings in Stawki v.
John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.94 also raise major concerns. Before
90. Id. at 990-991 (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Sanders, 803 P.2d 688, 692-693
(Okla. 1990), in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court outlined the parameters of the test).
91. Id. at 991.
92. Id. at 993.
93. See Broaddus v. Commercial Nat. Bank of Muskogee, 237 P. 583, 584 (Okla. 1925)
(holding that "in order to constitute a transaction in bailment, there must be a delivery to
the bailee, either actual or constructive. It has been held that such a delivery of property
must be made to the bailee as will entitle him to exclude for the period of the bailment the
possession thereof, even of the owner.").
94. Stawski v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 163 N.Y.S.2d 155 (1957).
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Israel became a state, two Jewish terrorist groups - Irgun Zvai Leumi
and Stern Gang - campaigned against British rule in the territory.95
Israel became a state on May 14, 1948. A month later [the] Govern-
ment faced a fateful issue. Irgun... tried to bring thousands of guns in on
a chartered ship, the Altalena. David Ben-Gurion, the Prime Minister,
saw it as an attempt to maintain a private army - and that, he said,
would 'murder the state.' He ordered the Altalena shelled. The ship sank
off Tel Aviv.96
Abraham Stawski was on the Altalena. However, he neither owned the
chartered vessel nor performed any official duties during its voyage.
Stawski was the manager, and he was sitting in the mess room when the
Israeli Army attacked. 97 He died the next day from fatal wounds. Before
the voyage, Stawki purchased a life insurance policy from John Hancock
Mutual Life. A supplemental coverage provision stated in pertinent part:
"[The company will pay when the beneficiary proves that] the Insured's
death was caused.., by a bodily injury sustained solely by external, vio-
lent, and accidental means."98 But, an exceptions clause stated in rele-
vant part: "'No such Additional Benefit will be payable . . . if death
results, directly or indirectly, or wholly or partially... from injuries in-
tentionally inflicted on the Insured by any person.., or from a state of
war, riot or insurrection ... ."' Clearly, the language in the policy was
ambiguous.
Brocha Stawski -the decedent's wife and beneficiary- tried to collect
under the supplemental provision. John Hancock refused to pay, and she
sought relief in court. The judge ruled in favor of the insurer. Why?
First, the court justified its decision by highlighting the insurer's contrac-
95. Jonathan Freedland, "I Used To Be A Terrorist," THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), Dec.
4, 2001, at 8.
[Uri Avnery] is a 78-year-old Israeli patriot ... He has served three terms in the Knesset
and is a national legend in his home country ... He has no time for the current talk of
removing Arafat and replacing him with a more pliable leader. . . 'After all,' he says, 'I
used to be a terrorist myself.' . . . [At age] 15, he joined the Jewish underground against
'colonial British rule,' fighting in the Irgun, the right-wing group headed by Menachem
Begin... [He] remembers that the extremist Jewish groups melted away . . . [and] . . .
believes, the likes of Hamas and Jihad would go the way of the Irgun and Stern Gang: they
would become redundant overnight. Id.
96. Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home - A Fateful Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1988,
at 27. See also Stawski, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 156-57 (stating that "The master further testified
that at Kvar Vitken some thirty men came on board the Altalena and that these men were
members of the Irgun, a military organization in Israel at odds with the government and
carrying on terrorist activities .... [The] attack was made by the Haganah, then the official
army of Israel.").
97. Stawski, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 157.
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. Id. (emphasis added).
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tual defenses under the "state of war" and "insurrection" language in the
exclusion clause. But the court conveniently ignored two important facts:
1) John Hancock did not prove that Israel was in a state of war with its
own citizens- the members of the Irgun and Stern Gang; and, 2) The
insurer did not present any evidence to establish that those terrorist orga-
nizations were "insurgents," operating against Israeli interests.100 In fact,
they were working to protect Israel and to secure her national interests.
Without doubt, the ruling in Stawski is vexing for two reasons. First,
the judge spent an inordinate amount of energy trying to determine
whether "accidental means" or "intentional conduct" was the proximate
cause of the Abraham's death, 101 without clearly defining those terms.
Quite simply, the court's analysis was extremely inappropriate because
New York had embraced several recognized theories to help tribunals to
interpret ambiguous terms and conditions in insurance contracts.10 2
Clearly, the judge should have employed one of those doctrines at the
outset; instead, the court chose an exceedingly complicated proximate-
cause-foreseeability analysis to reach a strained and highly suspect
conclusion.
Second, even if the proximate-cause analysis was the appropriate test,
the beneficiary still should have prevailed. Why? In one instance, the
judge found that an "accident" was the independent cause of Abraham's
death.10 3 But the judge also declared that an "intentional act" was the
100. Id. at 158 ("No finding need [be] made as to whether the Altalena was controlled
by insurgents...").
101. Id. at 159 ("Israeli forces opened a destructive bombardment of shot[s] ... on the
Altalena while it was in Tel Aviv harbor [.]... [The] death of a passenger as a result of such
a barrage 'cannot be said to be unforeseen, unexpected or extraordinary.' Indeed, it would
have been a phenomenon if no one had been hurt. Serious injury to those on board was
inevitable...").
102. Janneck v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 57 N.E. 182, 182 (N.Y.1900).
In considering insurance contracts courts should be guided by two cardinal rules of univer-
sal application. The first is that, when the language is clear and unequivocal, the contract
should be enforced according to its terms, without regard to the equitable considerations,
which may be urged in avoidance of it. ["Plain Meaning Rule"]. The second is that, when
the language of an insurance contract is so ambiguous as to render it susceptible of two
interpretations, it should be most strongly construed against the insurer, because the latter
has prepared the contract, and is responsible for the language used." - ["Doctrine of
Ambiguity"] Id.;
Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n of Am., 295 N.Y. 294, 301 (N.Y. 1946)
("Our guide must be the reasonable expectation and purpose of the ordinary business man
when making an insurance contract[.] - ["Doctrine of Reasonable Expectation]").
103. Stawski, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 157 ("The proof adequately shows death was the result
of accidental means.").
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sole cause of death.1" 4 Obviously, the decision is seriously flawed and
unintelligible, for New York's insurance law is exceptionally clear about
two matters: 1) the intentional infliction of an injury is not accidental; °5
and, 2) a court must construe ambiguous language in an insurance policy
against the insurer, if the language generates harsh or unreasonable
results. 1
0 6
Even though the evidence appearing above is rather unsettling, we still
must ask: is it compelling enough to establish conclusively that courts are
biased in favor of insurance companies? More important, do the findings
prove categorically that insurers intentionally aid and abet terrorists, by
refusing to compensate the terrorized insured and third parties when
those persons present and prove legitimate claims? Do these revelations
conclusively establish that state and federal courts intentionally or unin-
tentionally aid and abet terrorists? At first blush, the answer to each
question is yes. Certainly, the findings in National Union, Nichols, and
Stawski, as well as several other cases,'0 7 strongly suggest that courts are
significantly more likely to rule in favor of insurers than victims of terror-
ism; and judges issue such rulings more frequently than one would expect.
104. Id. at 159 ("[It] must be held that the death of the insured resulted from injuries
intentionally inflicted within the meaning of the policy.").
105. Rex Roofing Co. v. Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 116 N.Y.S.2d 876, 877-78
(1952) ("[The] dictionary [defines] an accident as an event which is unexpected, the cause
of which cannot be traced, or at least is not apparent [.]... "[The] intentional infliction of
injury cannot be regarded as an accident ..."); Nellenback v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 3
N.Y.S.2d 657, 659 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1938) ("The rule ... seems to be well established that
where one is in the act of doing that which he intended to do, and where no extraneous
force or occurrence unforeseen is brought in to divert from the intended act, there has
been no accident."); Appel v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 83 N.Y.S. 238, 241 (N.Y. App. Div.
1903), affd., 72 N.E. 1139 (N.Y. 1904) ("[The] evidence wholly fails to show that the de-
ceased did anything which he did not fully intend to do ... ; therefore the result of such
acts- his death-was not produced by 'accidental means."').
106. Atd. Basin Iron Works v. Am. Ins. Co., 226 N.Y.S. 676, 678 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928)
("If [the language] is fairly susceptible of two interpretations ... it should be most strongly
construed against the insurer. A construction which makes the contract fair and reasonable
will be preferred to one which leads to harsh or unreasonable results.").
107. Younis Bros. & Co. v. Cigna Worldwide Ins. Co., 899 F.Supp. 1385, 1399 (E.D.
Pa. 1995) (holding that the insureds' evidence was not sufficient enough to support the
jury's findings that the insurance company must pay for the insureds' property which was
destroyed in Monrovia, Liberia during an insurrection); Wilker Bros. Co., Inc., v. Lumber-
mans Mut. Cas. Co., 529 F.Supp. 113, 118 (S.D. N.Y. 1981) (holding that the insurer did not
have to compensate the insured when a mob looted and terrorized the insured's pajama
factory in 1979 during a civil war and insurrection in Nicaragua); Int'l Wire Works v. Hano-
ver Fire Ins. Co., 283 N.W. 292, 293-294 (Wis. 1939) (dismissing insured's complaint and
holding that the insurer with a contract to provide coverage against damage or loss caused
by riot, had no duty to pay for damages stemming from mob action and terror).
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On the other hand, however, the evidence is not so compelling if we
limit our examination to data obtained solely from "modern" records,
documents and reported judicial decisions. In fact, several relatively re-
cent cases' 0 8 suggest that some courts have decided insurance controver-
sies in favor of the insured and victims of terrorism. Consider the facts in
Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,1°9 a
fairly renowned case. On September 6, 1970, Palestinian terrorists11 ° hi-
jacked a Pan American 747 airliner over London and forced the crew to
fly to Egypt. After landing in Cairo, the hijackers released the passen-
gers. Then they detonated explosives, which completely destroyed the
aircraft.1" After the losses, Pan Am asked its all-risks insurers to make
reimbursements.
Some underwriters refused vehemently, arguing that "excluded perils"
- hijackings, war, war-like operations, insurrection and others1 12 -
rather than "covered perils," proximately caused the 747's destruction
and subsequent financial losses. Pan American sued. The federal judge
ruled in favor of Pan Am, declaring that the language appearing in the
exclusion clause was, at best, ambiguous. The judge stressed that the an-
cient marine insurance language in the exclusion clause simply did not
108. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Ins. Co. of Penn., 863 F.Supp. 542, 545-48 (N.D. Ohio
1994) (Although a terrorism exclusion appeared in the policy, the case turned on the inter-
pretation of a "civil commotion" provision. The court held that the insurer must compen-
sate Sherwin-Williams for losses caused by looting and vandalism, following the United
States' invasion of Panama in 1989); New Mkt. Inv. Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 774
F. Supp. 909, 915-17 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (Embracing the jury's finding, the court held that
Fireman's must compensate Frupac International - an importer of Chilean fruit- for
financial losses proximate caused by terrorists, disgruntled Chileans who had contaminated
the grapes with cyanide); Frupac Int'l Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 1990 WL 204380,
*1 (E.D. Pa.) (denying the insurer's motion for declaratory relief).
109. Pan Am. World Airways Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989 (2nd Cir.
1974).
110. Id. at 998-99.
[Two men, Diop and Gueye, acting for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,]
purchased tickets in Amsterdam for Pan American Flight 093 .... Forty-five minutes after
Flight 093 departed from Amsterdam, Diop and Gueye produced handguns and grenades,
and took control of the aircraft, ordering the crew to fly to Beirut, Lebanon.. . After Diop
and Gueye threatened to blow up the 747 in mid-air if not permitted to land, Lebanese
officials reluctantly granted permission on the condition that it take off again after refuel-
ing. The 747 took off for Cairo, still under PFLP command. Again after PFLP threats,
Egyptian officials reluctantly gave their permission for it to land. The explosive fuses were
lit while the aircraft was still in the air. After landing, the passengers were evacuated in
good order. The explosives detonated on schedule, and the 747 was a total loss." Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1005.
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describe the Palestinian terrorists' "violent and senseless intercontinental
hijacking" over London.' 13
Therefore, reviewing just contemporary "pro-insured" and "pro-in-
surer" cases and related materials will not produce a decisive answer to
the question: do insurers and their alleged allies on the bench aid and
abet terrorism? But, terrorism is not just a modern phenomenon; it has
an exceedingly long history.114 Arguably, one of the longest periods of
commercial terrorism in Western democracies occurred during the trans-
atlantic slave trade. More important, research has uncovered some scat-
tered, but fairly rich historical records, confirming that both British and
American underwriters participated heavily in the terrors of slave trade
from the very inception of that commerce. Also, hundreds of British and
American insurance-law cases have preserved a remarkable record of in-
surers' role in the slave trade, from the mid-seventeenth to the mid-nine-
teenth century. Therefore, with these resources, we can substantially
increase the likelihood of answering the questions presented above more
intelligibly and definitively.
Why is it important to determine whether insurance companies and
courts have a propensity to aid and abet commercial and other types of
terrorists? Among other reasons, two are outstanding. First, in post-Sep-
tember 11th America, President George W. Bush and members of the
Bush II Administration' 15 have stated repeatedly: America has entered a
new era;116 and, the country should expect repeated terrorist attacks.
11 7
113. Id.
114. Linda Doherty, Carolyn Cummins, & Claire O'Rourke, Scramble For Terror
Cover As Insurers Quit, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Dec. 18, 2001, at 1 ("The United
Kingdom and South Africa with long histories of terrorism have insurance terrorism
pools."); Richard F. Teichgraeber III, Multiple Forms Of Terrorism Are Challenge To Soci-
ety, TiMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 25, 1995 at B7 ("Mytho-terrorism may be the oldest and most
familiar form of terrorism. Others include state terrorism, which has a long history in our
century: Hitlerite Germany, Stalinist Russia, Suharto's Indonesia, Argentina's 'Dirty War,'
Idi Amin's Uganda, Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge... the list goes on.").
115. The Bushes: A Dynasty is Born, BALT. SUN, Jan. 28, 2001, at 4M.
As president, George Herbert Walker Bush [refused to] to visit the tiny English village of
Messing, in Essex, where in 1631 - 11 years after the Mayflower - a farmer named
Reynauld Bush decided to leave for New England, establishing the American branch of
the Bush family [;] historians aren't ready to anoint them the nation's preeminent dynasty
ever .... But a two-term Bush II administration could help. . . Id.
116. Dan Eggen, Tough Anti-Terror Campaign Pledged - Ashcroft Tells Mayors He
Will Use New Law to Fullest Extent, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2001, at Al ("Ashcroft, in de-
claring 'a new era in America's fight against terrorism,' said the bill will allow 'airtight
surveillance' of terrorist networks ... to disrupt plans for further attacks").
117. Greg Jaffe & Chip Cummins, Victories Extend Alliance's Hold in Afghanistan,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2001, at A3 ("In his first appearance before the U.N.'s General
Assembly... President Bush warned that 'every nation has a stake in this cause [;] the
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More relevant, Attorney General Ashcroft has stated unequivocally that
the Bush II Administration will "identify, locate and incapacitate ter-
rorists and those who aid and abet them." '118 For that reason, we ask: was
the attorney general thinking about national and international insurance
companies and about American and English courts when he made that
declaration? If so, we should examine those institutions' historical
records to determine 1) whether they have aided and abetted commercial
terrorism, and 2) whether they are likely to aid and abet terrorists again.
These concerns, therefore, become the focus of this Article.
Part I presents a fairly short discussion of the various forms of terror-
ism, and it critiques and challenges the conventional wisdom about who
qualifies as a terrorist and what qualifies as terrorism. Part I also stresses
that the activities and persons associated with the transatlantic slave trade
qualify as terrorism and terrorists - respectively - under anyone's defi-
nition of those terms. More important, Part I reveals that English courts
certainly viewed the slave trade as being both terrorism and illegal com-
merce. Of course, later in the article, the relevance of this point will be-
come more apparent. At that point a discussion of how insurance
companies' commercial activities helped to terrorize young African fa-
thers, mothers and children appears.
Part II outlines various American doctrines about aiding and abetting
liability, those appearing in the common-law and under various statutes.
They come in two flavors - civil and criminal. In addition, Part II ex-
plores aiding and abetting liability in England. Even though a good por-
tion of the American doctrines evolved out of English common law-
which prohibits persons from aiding and abetting criminals, American
and English civil aiding and abetting rules are somewhat different. Part
II, therefore, highlights the convergences and divergences.
Part III gives a short overview of all-risks commercial and marine in-
surance contracts as they developed in England and in America. Neces-
sarily, a general discussion of terrorism coverage and of other types of
perils will occur, along with a discussion of insurers' and the insured's
contractual rights and obligations under all-risks insurance agreements.
This part also describes the scope of insurance regulation in England and
in America, presently and historically. Most definitely, there are signifi-
cant differences and those dissimilarities greatly affect whether insurers
terrorists are planning more murder - perhaps in my country or perhaps in yours."'); Jill
Carroll, National Guard Takes on Big New Role At the Front Lines of Homeland Defense,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2001, at B5 ("In the wake of the ... terrorist attack . . . Attorney
General John Ashcroft underscored the urgency of the task . . . saying the U.S. faces a
,very serious threat' of more terrorism.").
118. Crittenden, supra note 1, at P8.
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are criminally or civilly liable for aiding and abetting terrorists in the re-
spective countries.
Again, it is worth repeating: the totality of the transatlantic slave trade
was economic or commercial terrorism. Therefore, Part IV presents a
comprehensive discussion of British and American insurers' roles as aid-
ers and abettors of that nefarious enterprise. The analysis covers insur-
ance companies' direct and indirect participation, before and even after
the enactment of anti-slave trade legislation in England and in America.
Under both English and American civil laws, there are some arguably
"settled" legal principles: 1) courts will not open their doors to persons
with "unclean hands;" 2) declaratory and equitable actions cannot pro-
ceed in courts if the underlying conflicts involve illegality; and 3) courts
will not enforce any illegal contracts, including insurance contracts. Part
V thoroughly discusses those legal doctrines under English and American
law, respectively. These principles are discussed in the first instance be-
cause they have significant bearings on the discussion in Part VI. The two
systems are discussed separately because there are some fairly significant
differences between English and American rules.
Part VI documents and illustrates how British and American courts
aided and abetted the slave traders' terrorist activities, before and after
the enactment of anti-slave trade legislation in the two countries. This
part shows convincingly that American and English courts intentionally
disregarded, failed to remember, circumvented and deviated from settled
principles of law to help insurance companies practice economic
terrorism.
Finally, the conclusion section discusses some implications of the find-
ings reported in this article. As mentioned at the outset, the Bush II Ad-
ministration has made it clear that terrorism will become more prevalent
in this country and that resources will be invested to apprehend and pun-
ish those who aid and abet terrorists. The article concludes by encourag-
ing public officials to expand their definitions of terrorism, aiding and
abetting. It urges members of the legal community to start monitoring
courts' and insurance companies' activities more carefully to ensure that
those institutions do not wittingly or unwittingly aid and abet terrorism,
regardless of the form in which it might appear.
PART I. AN OVERVIEW: "TERRORISM"-COMPETING DEFINITIONS,
VARIOUS ORIGINS, TYPES AND DIMENSIONS
A. The Conventional Wisdom Regarding Terrorism and Terrorists
It is important to repeat what others have observed: International orga-
nizations and academicians have not embraced a universal definition of
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terrorism. 1 9 As of this writing, even the United Nations cannot define
the term without generating disagreement.120 Therefore, given the ab-
sence of a common definition, all sorts of human activities, including
clearly legitimate economic, political, and social activities' 21-have been
labeled terrorism. On the other hand, if one carefully examines legal
commentaries as well as printed and televised news reports, one could
easily conclude: "true terrorism"122only appears in a few, unadulterated
flavors - domestic, 123 international, 124 state-sponsored 1 25 and state-
119. David Kris, Interpreting 18 U.S.C. §2331 Under U.S. and International Law, 27
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 579, 592 (1990) ("[N]o generally accepted definition of terrorism has
emerged in the international political arena. Academic efforts to define the term have
fared no better.").
120. See generally James C. Hathaway and Colin J. Harvey, Framing Refugee Protec-
tion in the New World Disorder, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 257, 267-270 (2001) (discussing the
history of attempts to reach a common definition of terrorism).
121. See, e.g., Leigh Strope, Rebel Flag Removal Advances in South Carolina, THE
SEATrLE TIMES, May 12, 2000 at http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com (last visited Jan.
19, 2002). "A bill to remove the Confederate flag from the Capitol dome gained final
House approval... Flag supporters in the House such as Republican Rep. Ron Fleming
tried to derail the compromise, saying, 'I don't think we need to give in to economic terror-
ism."' Id. Barry Meier, Clinton's Lawsuit Threat Shocks Tobacco Industry, THE NEW
YORK TIMES, Jan. 20, 1999, at A20. "President Clinton's announcement that the Justice
Department was preparing to sue cigarette makers came as a shock .... A spokesman for
the cigarette industry, Scott Williams, said. . . 'This political and economic terrorism against
the industry has got to stop [.]"' Id. James Worsham, Labor Comes Alive, NATION'S Busi-
NESS, Feb. 1996, at 16, available at 1996 WL 8505597. "Organized labor, its ranks and
political power at a low ebb, is rattling its sabers and marshaling its forces for a new cru-
sade to regain the clout it once had in the nation's factories and ballot boxes .... Thomas
J. Donohue, president and chief executive officer of the American Trucking Associations,
[said]: ... 'Corporate campaigns amount to economic terrorism . I...' Id.
122. Cf. Jeffrey Fleishman, In Italy, a Resurgence of Terrorism -These Radicals
Aren't as Violent as the Notorious Red Brigade, but Security has been Increased, PHILADEL-
PHIA INQUIRER, May 6, 2001, at A2. "The Italian Interior Ministry is publicly playing down
the spasm of terrorism . . . . 'The terrorist situation in Italy is of maximum concern but
there is no need for alarm,' said Interior Minister Enzo Bianco. 'Italy is in a very different
atmosphere from what it was 20 years ago, when every day true terrorism was capable of
striking.'" Id.
123. See, e.g., Frank Keating, Domestic Terrorism: A Leadership Response, 21 OKLA.
CirY U. L. REV. 187, 187-189 (1996) (listing examples and incorrectly observing that the
"bombing of the Murrah Federal Office Building in . .. Oklahoma City on April 19,
1995 ... was an unprecedented act [because] [n]ever before had an American community
been targeted by apparent domestic terrorists .... ) (emphasis added).
124. See generally Book Note, Legal Aspects of International Terrorism, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1395 (1980) (discussing and presenting a very narrow view of international
terrorism).
125. See, e.g., William P. Hoye, Fighting Fire With ... Mire? Civil Remedies and the
New War onState-Sponsored Terrorism, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 105, 106 (2002)
(stating that "[u]ndoubtedly, few acts, if any, are more egregious or shocking to the con-
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supported1 26 terrorism.
Moreover, the conventional wisdom about terrorism has produced
some additional, unsubstantiated conclusions: 1) terrorism is primarily a
twentieth century development;1 27 2) among the community of nations,
only a few "rogue" states export terrorism;1 28 3) "true terrorists '1 29 are
more likely to be members of certain ethnic130 and religious 131 groups;
and, 4) "true terrorists" are substantially more likely to commit violent
science than states utilizing their vast sovereign powers and resources to finance and spon-
sor acts of terrorism .... ).
126. Cf. Frederic L. Kirgis, J., The Security Council's First Fifty Years, 89 AM. J. INT'L
L. 506, 516 (observing and restating that "[m]ere allegations that a particular government
supports terrorism do not make the case). For example, "if the United States, for example,
has evidence of Libyan state-supported terrorism, as it has claimed it does, it could make
the evidence available to the Security Council in a way that would protect intelligence
sources." Id.
127. See, e.g., Maggie Mulvihill, Experts: No Foolproof Method of Thwarting Terrorist
Attempts, BOSTON HERALD, Jul. 28, 1996, at P10. "'(Terrorism) is a risk of the 20th cen-
tury,' said Northeastern University Professor Edith Flynn, an expert in criminal justice and
international terrorism." Id. But see Patricia A. Long, In the Name of God: Religious
Terrorism in the Millenium - An Analysis of Holy Terror, Government Resources, and the
Cooperative Efforts of a Nation to Restrain its Global Impact 24 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.
REV. 51, 56 nn. 14-19 (2000) (discussing and naming a variety of religious terrorist organi-
zations - the Jewish Zealots from 66-70 AD; the Islamic Assassins (Nizari) from 1090 to
1275; and the First Crusades' Urban II, commencing about 1095- that practiced terrorism
many millennia ago).
128. Barry Schweid, Report: Terrorism Sets Record State-Sponsored Violence Ebbs, but
Privately Funded Killers More Active, ATLANTA J. CONST., May 2, 1999, at B2. "The de-
partment made no changes in listing seven countries - Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North
Korea, Sudan and Syria - as sponsors of terrorism." Id.
129. See, e.g., Edward J. Fitzpatrick, Letters to the Editor - Heroes, Not Terrorists,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2002, at All.
Robert Bartley's observations in 'Conquering Guilt, Forging a New Era' militarily . . .
[identifies] Eamon De Valera[,] a major leader in the Irish struggle for freedom, 1916-21 as
a terrorist (Thinking Things Over," Jan. 7). DeValera and the other Irish patriots were
true heroes who successfully culminated a 700-year struggle against English imperialism...
The true terrorists were the British imperialists ... Id.
See also Editorial, Terrorists Return to Action, ATLANTA J., Dec. 26, 1991, at A12, available
at 1991 WL 8005985.
Optimists... [thought] that perhaps terrorism had run its course as a political tactic among
those who hate Israel. There were signs, to be sure, that the practice was leading no-
where ... But true terrorists are as stubborn as they are stupid, and they could not let such
a year of promise end without doing something to dash the hopes of decent people. Id.
130. See U.S. Attorneys, Police to Interview Young Foreign Men Justice Department
Acts on New Anti-Terror Focus War on Terrorism: The Nation, BALT. SUN, Nov. 14, 2001, at
12A, available at 2001 WL 6175559 (stating that "[c]ivil rights groups have accused federal
investigators of unfairly targeting people based on ethnicity in the sweeping investigation
of the Sept. 11 hijacking attacks on New York and Washington").
131. Connecting the Dots, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2001, at A22, available at 2001 WL
30327700. "The federal campaign to disrupt potential terrorists is as aggressive as any in
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and horrendous acts for political rather than for economic or commercial
reasons.
132
Of course, a thorough critique of these conclusions will not appear
here. But these points are important: commercial terrorism is as real as
political terrorism; and certain forms of the former are as lethal as certain
forms of political terrorism. And although commercial or economic ter-
rorism has not been defined universally, some commentators define it as
the "unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to in-
timidate or coerce commercial interests., 133 Moreover, it appears that
economic terrorism occurs fairly frequently. Insurance companies cer-
tainly insure against it; 134 and, the topic generates a considerable amount
interest within the legal community. 135 But more important, private or-
ganizations,' 36 governments1 37 and corporate entities 138 have been ac-
cused of practicing various forms commercial terrorism.
modern times. And in a country that resists ethnic and religious stereotyping and the as-
signment of group blame, it is a campaign that goes right up to the line." Id.
132. See, e.g., Leah M. Campbell, Defending Against Terrorism: A Legal Analysis of
the Decision to Strike Sudan and Afghanistan, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2000). "The
United States defines terrorism as 'premeditated, politically motivated violence perpe-
trated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents."' Id.
See also Jim Hoagland, The Political Uses of Terrorism, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1994, at C7.
"Invariably, ... terrorist-fanatics ... pour out a lifetime of personal anger and frustration
into acts that they believe will have broad political effect . . . Such acts rarely have the
larger political impact that their perpetrators and supporters intend." Id. But see William
Porter, Journalist Says U.S. Target for Terrorism, PHOENIX GAZETTE, May 31, 1989, at C1.
"Terrorism - not Soviet missiles - is the biggest threat to America's security .... [Jack]
Anderson calls it 'entrepreneurial terrorism'- sophisticated, professional terrorists-for-
hire who are motivated more by money than ideology." Id.
133. Bruce Braun, Dane Drobny and Douglas C. Gessner, www.commercial-terror-
ism.com: A Proposed Federal Criminal Statute Addressing the Solicitation of Commercial
Terrorism Through the Internet, 7 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 159, 160 (2000).
134. See, e.g., Michele Chandler, Insurers Want Terrorism Cap, MIAMI HERALD, Jan.
11, 2002, at 3C. "About 430 commercial insurers operate in Florida. State officials have
received 115 requests to either drop or place limits on terrorism coverage for commercial
policies ... The flood of requests for limits comes after Congress failed to weigh in on the
commercial terrorism insurance issue..." Id.
135. See Joan Biskupic, Lawyers Find Something in Common in Common Law, USA
TODAY, Jul. 17, 2000, at 3A, available at 2000 WL 5783970.
The largest [7000] contingent of American lawyers to converge here in 15 years
open[ed] ... the American Bar Association's four-day meeting in the cradle of the United
States' legal tradition [Runnymede, England] ... Panels over the next four days will ad-
dress issues such as international human rights, the death penalty, cyberspace law and eco-
nomic terrorism. Id.
136. See, e.g., Jerry Knight, Economic Terrorism Comes With a High Price, WASH.
POST, Sept. 17, 2001, at El, available at 2001 WL 27733138 (stressing that the "long-term
threat is that the World Trade Center bombing will push the U.S. into a recession" and that
billions of dollars will be authorized to win the war against economic terrorism); Sam
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Finally, even though the world community cannot agree on a common
definition of political or commercial terrorism, some acts are substantially
more likely to be perceived as terrorism- regardless of one's religion,
Howe Verhovek, In a Verdict, a Sign that His Town is no Haven for Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
9, 2000, at A7, Col. 1 (reporting the local mayor's sentiment: "[T]he Aryan Nations has
committed 'economic terrorism' against his city"); Sanjoy Hazarika, Focus is on Tamils in
Bombay Blasts, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1993, at 7 (describing "the explosions that killed 250
people and wounded more than 1000... as 'brutal economic terrorism."'); and, Dirk John-
son, Indian Fishing Dispute Upsets North Woods' Quiet, N.Y. TIMEs , Apr. 24, 1988, at 20.
"Tom Maulson['s], a 46-year-old Chippewa[,] . . fishing craft was rammed by white boat-
ers . . . 'The Indians are raping the resources,' said Dean Crist, the protest group leader,
who was arrested ... and accused of vandalizing the van of a Chippewa fisherman. 'It's a
blatant attempt at economic terrorism."' Id.
137. See, e.g., Arundhati Roy, The Algebra of Infinite Justice, GUARDIAN, Sept. 29,
2001, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/saturday-review/story/0,3605,559756,00.html
(last visited Jan. 12, 2004) (arguing that the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were
chosen intentionally as the targets of the attacks and suggesting "that the stygian anger that
led to the attacks has its taproot in the U.S. government's record of commitment and sup-
port [for] economic terrorism outside America); Kevin Sullivan, Castro Warns About U.S.
Military Plans: Cuba's President Says Fighting Could Lead to "Infinite Killing of Innocent
People," WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2001, at A38 (stating that "Cuban musicians donated
blood for the attack victims and Cuba offered other humanitarian aid, largely setting aside
its contention that the four-decade-old U.S. economic embargo constitutes 'economic ter-
rorism'"); Lee Michael Katz, Ex-Hostages Seek Slice of Iran's Assets, USA TODAY, Oct.
14, 1992, at 1A (reporting that "Iran profited from 'commercial terrorism' by linking [Jo-
seph Cicippio's and David Jacobsen's] release to U.S. payments of once-frozen Iranian
assets"); William Claiborne, South Africa's Vital Minerals Figure in Sanctions Fight: Cutoff
of Strategic Exports Could Hurt West, WASH. POST, May 6, 1988, at Al, available at 1998
WL 2054610 (reporting that the Botha government viewed the economic sanction as "an
act of economic terrorism"); Nora Boustany, Aide to Berri Says Amal Has No Role in Case
of 7 Americans Islamic Jihad: Issues New Threat, WASH. POST, Jul. 4, 1985, at A21, availa-
ble at 1985 WL 2108075 (reporting that the Lebanese government describes America's
move to close its airport as "economic terrorism").
138. See Jose de Cordoba, Armed Men in Haiti Strike Aristide Palace: President is
Secure, as Mobs Burn Offices of Opposition Leaders, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2001, at A10
(reporting that after international donors cut off aid to protect contested elections, Presi-
dent Aristide "accused the international community of 'economic terrorism"'); Linda Ash-
ton, Apple Workers, Teamsters Eager for Summer Hearings, SEATrLE TIMES, Jun. 25, 1998
at http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com (last visited: January 19, 2002). "[T]he Na-
tional Labor Relations Board filed complaints against Stemilt and Washington Fruit, accus-
ing them of intimidating workers to keep out the Teamsters. 'What they are using against
the workers is economic terrorism."' Id. See also Peter Sinton, Lines Drawn on Securities
Initiative, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Jun. 25, 1996, at C1 (reporting that opponents of an anti-
securities fraud initiative view the process as "economic terrorism since it would pressure
companies to settle meritless suits"); Evelyn Richards, Revlon Suit Revives the Issue of
'Sabotage' by Software Firms; Manipulation of Computer Programs Damages Credibility,
WASH. PosT, Oct. 27, 1990, at C1, available at 1990WL 2101829 (reporting that after sabo-
teurs disabled software that controlled the company's operations, a company representa-
tive "condemned the act as 'sabotage' and 'something verging on commercial terrorism"').
[Vol. 6:1
AMERICAN & BRITISH INSURERES
ethnicity, socioeconomic status, political orientation or geographical loca-
tion. Those acts are: 1) "the use of force or threats to demoralize, intimi-
date and subjugate a group of people"; 139 2) committing or threatening to
commit a "murder, kidnapping and hijacking - with the clear intention
to intimidate a population";140 3) "kidnapping, maiming and murdering"
innocent persons to secure political ends;'41 4) stealing and kidnapping
for profit; 142 and, 5) raping, murdering and kidnapping a people to de-
moralize them.
143
B. The Transatlantic Slave Trade As A Form of Commercial Terrorism
Arguably, when the average citizen thinks about terrorism, the transat-
lantic slave trade144 does not readily come to mind. Among many rea-
sons, the horrors of that commercial enterprise have not received
comprehensive coverage in most American secondary schools.' 4 5 Never-
theless, serious historians and researchers continue to reveal how disrep-
utable commerce produced widespread and brutal violence over many
centuries. Arguably, it was one of the worse forms of commercial ter-
ror.146 In addition, the transatlantic slave trade was a combination of
139. Sandy Banks, They Rule by Fear Right Here at Home, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2001,
at 1 Part 5 ("[M]aybe we're so preoccupied with foreign terrorism these days, we don't
realize the threat posed by urban terrorists in our midst.").
140. Charles Bremner, Italy Blocks Agreement on Europe Warrant-War on Terror,
THE TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 7, 2001, at 18, available at 2001 WL 29009975 ("The definition
will exclude civil protests such as those by the anti-globalisation movement." ).
141. A.D. Maclin, Terrorism, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 16, 1990, at 12.
142. Hargrove v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 937 F.Supp. 595, 600 (S. D. Tex.
1996) (The Colombia legislature passed the ANTI-ABDUCrION ACT, ACT 40 OF 1993 which
prohibits insurance companies from abetting and aiding terrorists. Insurers face up to five
years in prison if they pay ransom.)
143. See Merilie Robertson, Letters Desk - Terrorism and Legal Niceties, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 29, 1985, at 4, Part 2 (reporting that, "Terrorism is something about which we
are all concerned. I refer to U.S.-sponsored terrorism in Nicaragua. The war being waged
by the Contra forces is pure and simple terrorism. [Tihe Contras kidnap, rape, torture and
kill, for purposes of demoralizing people").
144. See generally James Pope-Hennessy, SINS OF THE FATHERS: A STUDY OF THE
ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADERS - 1441-1807 (N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf 1968); REV. RUFUS W.
CLARK, THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE (Boston, Am. Tract Society, 1970); F. George Kay,
THE SHAMEFUL TRADE (LONDON: FREDERICK MULLER, 1967).
145. But see Glen Elsasser, Irish-Americans Demand Famine Be Taught In Schools,
CHI. TRIB., Mar. 16, 1998, at 1.
State education officials may be wary of legislative mandates, but since the early 1990s a
number of states have encouraged or required school officials to include sensitive historical
topics in their curriculums. In Massachusetts, legislation has been framed so that schools
teach not only the Irish potato famine but also 'the Transatlantic Slave Trade and Middle
Passage [...]' Id.
146. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 144, at 1.
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state-supported,'4 7 state-sponsored,'148 domestic 149 and international15 °
terrorism. Consequently, it generated all sorts of terroristic acts before,
The purchase or capture of some fifty million human beings for a period of four centuries
was perhaps the greatest crime against humanity ever perpetrated by Christendom, not
least because those responsible for the most part saw no moral evil in treating men, women
and children as merchandise. [T]he Nazi cremation camps and slave labour regiments pale
into a brief and minor aberration of a civilized people. Id.;
A VIEW OF THE PRESENT STATE OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE: PUBLISHED BY DIREC-
TION OF A MEETING REPRESENTING THE RELIGIOUS SOCIETY OF FRIENDS IN PENN-
SYLVANIA, NEW JERSEY, ETC., 6 (Philadelphia: William Brown Printer, 1824) ("When the
atrocious character of the African slave trade and the various laws enacted for its suppres-
sion are considered, it may appear incredible that this traffic should still continue to dis-
grace the Christian name; yet it is unquestionable fact that these people remain exposed to
all the horrors inseparable from this iniquitous commerce."). See also Douglas W. Kmiec,
Military Tribunals Are Necessary In Times of War, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2001, at A26
("Terrorism is not ordinary crime within an ordered society. It is the indiscriminate killing
of innocents and the destruction of property. As such, it is the quintessential crime against
humanity; it is not a social or cultural dysfunction capable of rehabilitation or rectification
by means of ordinary law enforcement and prosecution.").
147. See Rafael Tammariello, The Slave Trade: Slavery, LAS VEGAS REV. J., FEB. 08,
1998, http://lvrj.conilvrj-home/1998/Feb-08-Sun-1998/ opinion/6918250.html (last visited
Nov. 26, 2000).
The British South Sea Company founded in the early 1700s as an officially sanctioned
monopoly to furnish African slavers to Spanish American empire claimed some notable
shareholders. Among those holding slave stocks were Sir Isaac Newton, formulator of the
law of gravity; Jonathan Swift, the great Irish-born satirist; the [E]arl of Halifax, founder of
the bank of England; Daniel Defoe, author of 'Robinson Crusoe' not to mention numerous
'royals.' Id.
148. See Steve Lubet, Haven't We Fought This Battle Before?, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 4,
2001, at 21.
[A]rguably, the slave trade could not be suppressed without the cooperation of nations
such as the United States, France, Spain and Portugal. The paradox, of course, was that
several of these countries depended on the slave trade for revenue and colonial labor.
Thus the British spent decades attempting to bring the 'sponsors of slavery' into a grand
anti-slaving coalition. Id.
See also Robert Joiner, What's The Interest On 40 Acres And A Mule? ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH Aug. 30, 2001, at B7 (" [A] team of lawyers is expected to sue the government
for slavery and for black codes and other state-sponsored terrorism that curtailed the rights
of African-Americans after emancipation."); HUGH THOMAS, THE SLAVE TRADE: THE
STORY OF THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE - 1440-1870, 372-373 (N.Y.: Simon and Schuster,
Inc. 1997) (chronicling the involvement of some African chieftains in the trade).
149. See, e.g., Jim Meenan, Clinton: Terrorists Misjudged America, SOUTH BEND
TRIB., Oct. 12, 2001, at Al (reporting that "Former President Bill Clinton entered the
Mendel Center at Lake Michigan College... [and delivered a] reality check in response to
the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. Clinton reminded the crowd of just how long terrorism [has]
been around [;] that America itself had used it against slaves and American Indians.");
Walter Russell Mead, Extreme Measures, WASH. POST, Jul. 25, 1999, at X6.
The treatment of "militias" and other violent right-wing fringe groups in the United States
doesn't fully engage the long history of American terrorism based on squirrelly political
ideas and religiously justified notions of white supremacy. Groups like the Ku Klux Klan
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during and after the transportation of millions of slaves to America, the
Caribbean and the West Indies. 5 '
Before slave voyages and within the interior of Africa, traders adopted
cold-blooded measures to control men, women and children who refused
to be enslaved for profits. Some eyewitness reports, for example, re-
vealed that traders beat their captives inhumanely until scabs and wounds
appeared on the slaves' bodies and, at other times, until death. 52 Even
after death, traders continued to brutalize the victims. Rather than bury-
ing the corpses, the terrorists simply threw the decedents' bodies "into
some [random] place, to be devoured by birds, or beast of prey. ''153
Eyewitnesses also reported other horror stories about the treatment of
captives before they reached the ships: slave traders often raped and ter-
rorized women and young girls, especially when the latter refused "to
offer themselves 'willingly. ' 154 And, after slavers invaded peaceful vil-
lages, they tore children from the arms of parents, tethered the children
have a long record of using terror as a political weapon; thousands of African Americans
were lynched in this country. This was surely terrorism [.1 Id.;
Ross K. Baker, Terrorism Is Actually an Old Story in America, NEWSDAY, Sept. 3, 1996, at
A33.
The period immediately preceding the Civil War witnessed a level of savagery among
whites that was unparalleled. Terrorism was employed in Kansas in the late 1850s both by
those seeking to claim the state for slavery and those seeking to admit Kansas to the Union
under a free-state constitution. Again, the logic of the terrorist was indiscriminate slaugh-
ter to induce fear in others. Id.
150. See Lubet, supra note 148, at 21.
[S]lavers acted privately, in the sense that they were not employed or directed by any
nation. Each slave ship can be thought of as a separate cell, indeed a floating cell, only
loosely tied to a central authority. The slave trade was, in fact, a vast, international, crimi-
nal network -supported and encouraged by many states, but acting independently of any
government. Id.
151. See CLARK, supra note 144, at 24 (noting that "Mr. Wilberforce added: 'Never
was there a system so replete with wickedness and cruelty. To whatever part of it we
turned our eyes, whether to Africa, the middle passage, or the West Indies, we could find
no comfort, no satisfaction, no relief.").
152. See THOMAS, supra note 148, at 382. "Slaves were harshly treated in Africa
[M]ost of them were 'severely and barbarously treated by their master. [Merchants] trans-
ported their slaves by means of the yoke if a so-called bois mayombe, by which, if the slave
pulled, the supervisor could tug and choke, even strangle the slave." Id.
153. Id.
154. See JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, THE SLAVE COMMUNITY, 154-155 (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, New York 1979) (noting that "Generally speaking, the women were literally
forced to offer themselves "willingly" and receive a trinket for their compliance rather
than a flogging for their refusal and resistance. Slave traders frequently engage in [this]
kind of practice.").
2003]
THE SCHOLAR
together by the neck, placed them on ships, and subjected them to all of
"the horrors of the middle passage. 155
What were the conditions on board slave ships? Simply put, they were
extensive and terrorizing. First, traders "branded" the slaves. 15 6 Then
crewmembers secured each slave to "about four square feet" of space, an
amount considerably less than the "twelve square feet per person in [the
economy class on a Boeing 747 airliner]., 157 Also, during long voyages, a
substantial number of captains "stowed slave directly on water casks cov-
ered with hides or mats. ' 158 Consequently, diseases and mortality were
extremely high among both adults and children.15 9 Furthermore, traders
drove many slaves to commit suicide. 160  But even more egregious,
crewmembers terrorized slaves by whipping161 and throwing them over-
board 16 for various reasons. Perhaps, the best description of the activi-
ties on the ships is this one: "There was misery, unending misery [and
terror everywhere]. ' 63
Without a doubt, terrorism for profit continued even after the slave
ships arrived in America, the Caribbean and the West Indies. Traders
employed a variety of unspeakable punishments to prevent escapes, ma-
jor insurrections or any semblance of an uprising. One English gen-
tleman described the systematic terrorism this way: "slaves were kept in a
155. See CLARK, supra note 144, at 20 (emphasis in the original). See also the accom-
panying footnote on page 20.
156. See BASIL DAVIDSON, THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE 13 (Boston: Little, Brown &
Co. 1980) (During the later stage of the slave trade in the nineteenth centuries, an English-
man went on board the North Star, a slave ship, and discovered "the familiar horrors of the
Middle Passage." He saw 505 men and women who "were all branded like sheep, with the
owners' marks. [They] were impressed under breasts, on arms, and burnt with a red hot
iron [.]")
157. See DAVID ELTIS, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE ENDING OF THE TRANSATLAN-
TIC SLAVE TRADE 136 (New York: Oxford University Press 1987).
158. Id. at 136.
159. Id. at 136-137 (stating that "[S]lave-trade mortality was as high or higher in the
nineteen century that it had been in earlier centuries. [And] mortality was always higher in
the slave trade than in other [involuntary and voluntary] long-distance traffic Children
were particularly susceptible to the diarrheal diseases which accounted for most deaths on
board ship[s]").
160. See CLARK, supra note 144, at 23 (A ship surgeon reported: "[M]ost of the slaves
labored under a fixed melancholy. [M]any [tried] to destroy themselves, and [some did].").
161. See Id. ("Others obstinately refused to take sustenance; and when the whip, and
other violent means were used to compel them to eat, they looked up into the face of the
officer and said with a smile: 'Presently we shall be no more."').
162. See, e.g., Gregson v. Gilbert, 99 Eng. Rep. 629 (1783); DAVIDSON, supra note 156,
at 13 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1980) ("[T]he crew [of the North Star] has thrown fifty-
five [slaves] overboard during their seventeen days at sea [in 1829].").
163. See DAVIDSON, supra note 156, at 13.
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state of terror."' 64 Traders nailed slaves to the ground and slowly burned
them from their feet to their heads. On other occasions, slavers chopped
off feet, whipped slaves until they were raw, poured scalding wax on their
skins, and poured salt and pepper into slaves' wounds.' 6 5 More telling,
these terroristic acts were not the most severe of the acts that traders and
owners employed to maintain control and ensure financial success. 16 6
Finally, even after the official end of the Atlantic slave trade and slav-
ery, economic terrorism continued against newly freed slaves. This was
very evident in the United States. After the Civil War, the Klu Klux Klan
"used beatings, lynchings and harassment to reinstitute the old order '1 67
in the South. But the long history168 of the slave trade and its terrorism
were not restricted to southern states. "The truth is that slavery existed
all over the early United States .... With the exception of architectural
style, a traveler to the slave-era farms of New England would have found
them virtually indistinguishable from the slaveholding regions of the rural
164. See DANIEL P. MANNIX AND MALCOLM COWLEY, BLACK CARGOES: A HISTORY
OF THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE-1518 TO 1865, 53 (N.Y.: Viking Press, 1962) ("After a
tour of the islands in 1688, Sir Hans Sloane reported that they were punished for major
crimes [and] for [c]rimes of a lesser nature."). Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. ("Sir Hans was not tender-hearted, for he adds: 'These punishments are
sometimes merited by the [b]lacks who are a very perverse [g]eneration of [pleople and
though they appear harsh, yet are scarce equal to some of their [c]rimes and inferior to
what [p]unishment other European [n]ations inflict on their [s]laves in the East-Indies."').
See also Pope-Hennessy, supra note 144, at 238 (noting that "[N]ewly arrived slaves often
died from past ill-treatment on the Middle Passage, from the physical shock of plantation
conditions, or from suicidal melancholia.").
167. John T. Nockleby, Hate Speech in Context: The Case of Verbal Threats, 42 BUFF.
L. REV. 653, 682 (1994) ("Klansmen revived the practice of 'nightriding[.]' [That was] a
form of terrorism which dated to the acts of antebellum overseers, who strove to confine
slaves within their quarters at night through fear .. "); see also George Likourezos, Sexual
Harassment By A Public Official Gives Rise To A Section 1983 Claim: A Legal Argument, 6
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 93, 94 (1995) (stating that, "After the Civil War, a growing wave
of terrorism by the Ku Klux Klan threatened the rights of former black slaves. On March
28, 1871, in response to this terrorism, Rep. Samuel Shellabarger (R., Ohio) introduced a
bill, which was later enacted as the Ku Klux Act of 1871.").
168. See Cornell Lewis, Seeing September l1th Through Eyes of African Americans,
THE HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 8, 2001, at A15. "America terrorized African slaves and
their descendants for 400 years; the beatings, lynchings and forced labor in Southern cotton
fields were a form of terrorism .... " Id.; see also Andrew P. Morriss, Returning Justice To
Its Private Roots, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 551, 560 (2001) (reviewing BRUCE L. BENSON, To
SERVE AND PROTECT: PRIVATIZATION AND COMMUNITY IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1998)).
"The history of vigilantism in the American South is primarily a history of campaigns of
terror aimed at violating the rights of African-Americans in an effort to return them to a
status of de facto slavery. Simply labeling terrorists as vigilantes, however, does not
change their essential nature as terrorists." Id.
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South." '16 9 Again, human misery and terrorism were everywhere; and,
during the entire period, insurance companies aided and abetted those
who practiced economic terrorism. 170 A more thorough discussion of in-
surers' participation appears later.
PART II. COMMON-LAw AND STATUTORY PROHIBITIONS AGAINST
"AIDING AND ABETTING" CRIMINALS, TORTFEASORS
AND"TERRORISTS"
In the wake of the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center
and Pentagon, Attorney General Ashcroft proclaimed: "Lying or at-
tempting to conceal information from federal investigators will not be tol-
erated. . . . We will spare no legal means to identify, locate and
incapacitate terrorists and those who aid and abet their criminal activ-
ity."' 171 On another occasion, he asserted that the Justice Department
would "[arrest and jail] suspected terrorists on minor criminal or immi-
gration charges, [because] it is difficult for a person in jail or under deten-
tion... to aid or abet... terrorism [.]"172 Then "[t]he attorney general
stood before the Judiciary Committee and said that to criticize his anti-
terrorism policies is to aid and abet the terrorists., 173
The latter proclamation generated a barrage of criticisms. Critics as-
serted that the Justice Department's broad scheme to find and punish
alleged aiders and abettors of terrorism is simply a pretext to assault the
169. Brent Staples, Wrestling With the Legacy of Slavery at Yale, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14,
2001, at A16.
Americans tend to believe that slavery was peculiar to the South and that the North, par-
ticularly the New England states, was 'free' This misbelief stems in part from mistaken
ideas about the Civil War - the central metaphor of American popular history - and
partly from the gargantuan reputations left by Northeastern abolitionists like Horace
Greeley, William Lloyd Garrison and Harriet Beecher Stowe. It lingered in Greeley's New
York until 1827, and in Stowe's Connecticut until the late date of 1848. Id.
170. Id. ("[An] archival insurance policies turned up showing that Aetna and other
big firms had insured enslaved Africans for plantation owners in the Deep South. The
language rendering the policies invalid when slaves were beaten to death or worked into
the grave shows that the insurance companies knew exactly what they were into.").
171. Jerry Seper, Anthrax Cases Spread To NBC Affected Woman A Brokaw Aide,
Wash. Times, Oct. 13, 2001, at Al.
172. Jim Mcgee, New Strategy Carries Risks, Officials Say, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 2,
2001, at 25A.
173. Jeffrey Page, Are We Un-American If We Disagree With Ashcrof?. RECORD
(NORTHERN NEW JERSEY), Dec. 11, 2001, at L15 ("Some people fear the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States, and his assertion to a Senate committee that to criticize his anti-
terrorism policies is to give aid and comfort to the enemy. You don't like my ways - and
you say so? You must be for the other guy.").
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civil liberties of all Americans.' 74 Some civil libertarians observed that
the attorney general's broad measures would allow him to arrest and
prosecute all persons, whom government officials "believed" were aiding
and abetting terrorists.1 75 Other critics stressed that the anti-terrorism
measures would permit the government to arrest and detain suspicious
persons indefinitely for allegedly aiding and abetting terrorism.1 76 With-
out doubt, these apprehensions are not completely unfounded. The fed-
eral government has less than a stellar history of circumventing
constitutional rights, ostensibly to identify, arrest and punish suspects for
aiding and abetting terrorists.1 77
Then again, it is highly appropriate for the government and, even, pri-
vate entities to identify, pursue, locate and punish those who aid and abet
terrorists. It appears, however, that the attorney general's failure to de-
fine "aiding and abetting" caused many to question the government's
anti-terrorism policies and efforts. There are two plausible reasons for
the verbal assaults. First, a universal definition of "aiding and abetting"
has not surfaced among laypersons. Second, aiding and abetting liability
appears in at least two flavors under common law. Therefore, in light of
those circumstances, some general confusion about the identities of the
174. See, e.g., Battle over Rights a Balance of Power, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 10, 2001 at
6B.
[I]t seems that in Mr. Ashcroft's vision, Americans would accept meekly and without
question all that he and the president do in the name of fighting terrorism .... More
insidious, though, is the attorney general's suggestion that those who fight for protection of
civil liberties somehow are aiding and abetting terrorists .... What the attorney general
seems to forget, however, is that it is the people who govern. He is the people's represen-
tative, vested with the power to do their bidding, not the government itself. Id.
175. See, e.g., George Lardner Jr., Legal Scholars Criticize Wording Of Bush Order-
Accused Can Be Detained Indefinitely, WASH. PosT, Dec. 3, 2001, at A10.
'The order is rife with constitutional problems and riddled with flaws,' said Laurence H.
Tribe, professor of constitutional law at Harvard. He said its reach is so sweeping that it
could snap up not only terrorist leaders caught overseas but also any resident immigrant
who is 'believed' to have 'aided or abetted... acts in preparation' for international terror-
ism. Id.
176. See, e.g., Special Courts for Terrorism Cases, DENVER POST, Nov. 14, 2001 at A27.
Stepping up the legal war against terrorism, President Bush issued a broadly worded order
that allows the use of special military courts to try suspected foreign terrorists, whether
they are picked up in other countries or in the United States. The order does not apply to
U.S. citizens, but it could apply to foreigners detained in the United States on suspicion of
committing terrorist acts or even 'aiding and abetting' terrorists [.] Id.
177. See, e.g., Terrorism or Advocacy? WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1992, at C6.
Rejecting the old McCarthy era notions of subversive speech, Congress ruled that simple
advocacy cannot be punished. Terrorism or aiding and abetting that crime is justifiably still
an excludable offense, so the government in seeking to deport the eight has now changed
the charges. Thus they have been charged with 'engaging in terrorist activity' by 'soliciting
funds... and [members] for a terrorist organization.' Id.
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aiders and abettors should be expected. Below a brief discussion of aid-
ing and liability theory appears to help remove some of the confusion.
A. Criminal Liability for Aiding and Abetting
Generally, from a layperson's perspective, "abet" simply means to en-
courage a particular activity while, "aid" means to provide another with
whatever is useful or necessary to achieve an end.'78 Therefore, it is very
common for laypersons to allege that one individual aided and/or abetted
a third party to plan or execute legitimate or illegitimate conduct.' 79
However, before one can be criminally liable for aiding and abetting, the
government must prove it in court.
As early as the thirteenth century, Bracton reported that a person who
aided and counseled a criminal was criminally liable himself. 8 ° How-
ever, English courts refined the doctrine in succeeding centuries. For ex-
ample, in 1553, the court in Crown Matters Happening at Salop18' held:
absent "malice pretense," an individual could not be liable for first-de-
gree murder, even if he aided and abetted a murderer at the scene of the
crime. Instead, the abettor would only be liable for manslaughter. 182
Nearly one and a half-centuries after Salop, another English court signifi-
cantly narrowed the doctrine. In Rex v. Plummer,183 the court ruled that
178. See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, TENTH EDITION.
179. See, e.g., Brian J. Redding, The Law Firm of the Future: an Ethics and Malprac-
tice Perspective, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1253, 1253-1255 (1997).
[Lawyers'] biggest problems are the representation of unworthy clients [and] the conflict of
interest rules, [leading to liability]. What does this 'model' claim look like? It's a business
transaction in which our firm's client is sued for fraud, misrepresentation, [and] breach of
fiduciary obligation. The allegation is that the client engaged in wrongdoing and then the
lawyer is sued and I'm using this term as a layman, [for] aiding and abetting the client's
wrongdoing. Now I said I was using that term as a layman [because] the Supreme Court
abolished the aiding and abetting cause of action under Rule 10(b)(5). Id.
See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver 114 S.Ct. 1439 (1994) (not-
ing Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court held that a private plaintiff may not maintain an
aiding and abetting suit under the Securities Exchange Act §§ 10(b).).
180. See, e.g., HENRY DE BRACTON, 2 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF EN-
GLAND - 1210-1268, 334, at http://supct.law.cornell.edu/bracton/Common/index.html (last
visited Apr. 1, 2002) (stating that, "The crime of lese-majesty takes many forms, one of
which is where one rashly compasses the king's death, or does something or arranges for
something to be done to the betrayal of the lord king or of his army, or gives aid and
counsel or assent to those making such arrangements, even though what he has in mind is
not carried into effect.") (emphasis added).
181. Matters Happening at Salop, 75 Eng. Rep. 152 (1553).
182. See Id. at 153 (noting, "If divers intend to murder a man, and another enters in
the affray suddenly, without malice pretense, and kills the person, this is not murder but
manslaughter. [A]lthough they, who were present and abetting, were principals as well as
they, who struck the man and killed him, yet they are principals in the second degree.").
183. See generally Rex v. Plummer, 84 Eng. Rep. 1103 (1701).
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liability could not attach for murder where an alleged aider and abettor
agreed to participate in criminal activities, but had no knowledge of the
murderer's intent to kill a third party.184 There is one final point: under
English criminal statutes, a person is also liable for aiding and abetting if
that individual persuades or lends resources to another who commits a
crime.' 85
Of course, the criminal aiding and abetting doctrine in America
evolved out of English common law; and a version of the doctrine ap-
pears in every state.1 86 The Texas rules fairly represent those found in
other states. As early as 1857, the Texas Supreme Court held that a de-
fendant is not criminally liable for aiding and abetting, even if the defen-
dant was present when a third party committed a crime and the
defendant made no effort to prevent the crime. 87 Alternatively, an indi-
184. See Id. at 1105.
Then the question will be, whether the rest of his accomplices shall be adjudged to be
principals to him, as aiders, abettors or assisters to that murder. And we all held that they
would not be principals: for though they are all engaged upon an unlawful act, and while
they were actually in it, this murder is committed by one of the company so engaged [;] yet
it does not appear to be done in prosecution of that unlawful act, but it may be upon
another account, and those who are in the unlawful act, not knowing of the design that
killed the other his companion cannot be guilty of it. First, the abettor must know of the
malicious design of the party killing [.] Id.
185. See, e.g., Regina v. Whistler, 88 Eng. Rep. 860, 861 (1703).
The question was, whether the defendant was an aider and abettor... within the intent and
meaning of the statute [,] and, whether, if the words 'aiding and abetting' were not in the
statute, the defendant would not be a principal [.j [I]f a man persuade to kill, and lend
dogs and horses, and they are used accordingly, he is aiding therein. I think he is within
the letter of the statute; he is 'an aider therein' as much as if he were present at the fact.
Id.
186. See, e.g., People v. Turner, 195 P.2d 809, 816 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948)
[O]ne who [is not] the principal actor, but who assists in the commission of a crime, is
regarded as a principal. One may aid or abet in the commission of a crime without having
previously entered into a conspiracy to commit a crime. [T]he mere presence alone of an
accused at the scene of a homicide is not sufficient to make him a participant. Id.;
Lamb v. People, 96 Ill. 73, available at, 1880 WL 10078 * 5 (Ill. 1880)
Where the accused is present and commits a crime with his own hands, or aids and abets
another in its commission he may, in either case, be considered as expressly assenting
thereto .... [But] if the accused in such case has not expressly assented to the commission
of the crime,... there can be no implied assent, and consequently no criminal liability. Id.;
People v. McKane, 38 N.E. 950, 951 (N.Y. 1894)
A person concerned in the commission of a crime, whether he directly commits the act
constituting the offense, or aids or abets in its commission, and, whether present or absent,
and a person who directly, or indirectly, counsels, commands, induces or procures another
to commit a crime, is a principal. Id.
187. See Burrell v. The State, 18 Tex. 713, (1857).
Although a man be present whilst a felony is committed, if he take no part in it and do not
act in concert with those who committed it, he will not be a principal merely because he did
not endeavor to prevent the felony or apprehend the felon. Whether he was aware of the
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vidual would be liable if the state proves 1) he was present when a third
party committed a crime, and 2) he participated in the criminal activity,
or encouraged the third party to commit the crime.188 Congress also has
embraced these English principles and enacted them under a criminal
aiding and abetting statute. 18
9
B. Civil Liability for Aiding and Abetting
An individual can also be civilly liable for aiding and encouraging an-
other individual to commit a tort. Many states' 90 have embraced the gen-
eral principle outlined in the Restatement of Torts § 876, which reads in
relevant part: "[O]ne is subject to liability if he (a) does a tortious act in
concert with [another person]. . ., or (b) knows that the [other person's]
conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or
encouragement to the other [person]. . ., or (c) gives substantial assis-
tance to the other [person] in accomplishing a tortious result and his own
conduct... constitutes a breach of duty to the third person. ' 191
intention of his companion and participated in it, is the fact to be proved in order to impli-
cate him in the criminality of the act. Id.
188. See Wood v. State, 11 S.W. 678, 679 (Tex. Ct. App. 1889).
In our opinion the court should have instructed the jury that, if Blackshear did the killing,
and defendant was present, but did not know the unlawful intent of Blackshear, and did
not aid him by acts, or encourage him to commit the act, that then his bare presence would
not make him in any manner liable for the act. Id.
189. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (a) (2001). It states: "Whoever commits an offense against the
United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is
punishable as a principal." Id.
190. Although many jurisdictions have recognized civil liability for aiding and abet-
ting in some circumstances where there is proof of "substantial assistance," not all have
formally adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 (b). See Cobb v. Indian Springs,
Inc., 258 Ark. 9, 522 S.W.2d 383, 387 (1975); Carney v. DeWees, 136 Conn. 256, 70 A.2d
142, 146 (1949); Bierczynski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218, 221 (Del.1968); Smith v. Thompson,
103 Idaho 909, 911, 655 P.2d 116, 118 (App.1982); Farmer v. City of Newport, 748 S.W.2d
162, 164 (Ky.Ct.App.1988); Barnes v. McGough, 623 A.2d 144, 145 (Me.1993); Haddock v.
Stewart, 232 Md. 139, 192 A.2d 105, 107 (1963); Nelson v. Nason, 343 Mass. 220, 177
N.E.2d 887, 888 (1961); Sloan v. Fauque, 239 Mont. 383, 784 P.2d 895, 896 (1989); Boykin
v. Bennett, 253 N.C. 725, 118 S.E.2d 12, 16 (1961); Rael v. Cadena, 93 N.M. 684, 604 P.2d
822, 822-23 (App.1979); Kuhn v. Bader, 89 Ohio App. 203, 101 N.E.2d 322, 327 (1951);
Sprinkle v. Lemley, 243 Or. 521, 414 P.2d 797, 800 (1966); Solberg v. Johnson, 90 Or.App.
90, 750 P.2d 1190, 1192 (1988); Cecil v. Hardin, 575 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tenn.1978); Price v.
Halstead, 177 W.Va. 592, 355 S.E.2d 380, 386 (1987); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis.2d
166, 342 N.W.2d 37, 46 (1984).
191. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 876 (1977) (emphasis added).
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Standing alone, section 876 is highly ambiguous, which explains in part
why Texas 19 2 and other jurisdictions have not embraced it. Moreover,
section 876 has generated less than stellar rulings. 193 In subsections (b)
and (c), breach of duty appears. But there are two broad categories of
torts - intentional and negligence-based violations.' 94 However, duty
192. For that and other reasons, the Texas Supreme Court has refused to embrace
§ 876 and create a civil cause of action for aiding and abetting. See Juhl v. Airington, 936
S.W.2d 640, 643-644 (Tex. 1996).
Subsection (a) of Restatement (Second) section 876 requires at least a tacit agreement to
participate in some tortious act, done in furtherance of a common goal or plan, and which
causes injury. This has common elements with common law civil conspiracy, long a recog-
nized tort in this state. Because Airington's pleadings allege only that defendants were
negligent, civil conspiracy and § 876(a) are not theories upon which he could have relied to
support summary judgment. On the other hand, subsection (b) of Restatement (Second)
section 876 imposes liability not for an agreement, but for substantially assisting and en-
couraging a wrongdoer in a tortious act. This subsection requires that the defendant have
'an unlawful intent, i.e., knowledge that the other party is breaching a duty and the intent
to assist that party's actions.' Even if we were to adopt subsection (b) of Restatement
(Second) section 876 in Texas, Airington could not recover under its terms.") Id.
But see Crescendo Inv., Inc. v. Brice, 61 S.W.3d 465, 472 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001,
pet denied).
Under the Texas Securities Act, to establish liability of an aider and abettor, a plaintiff
must show the following: (1) a primary violation of securities laws occurred; (2) the aider
had general awareness of its role in this violation; (3) the aider rendered substantial assis-
tance in this violation; and (4) the aider either intended to deceive plaintiff or acted with
reckless disregard for the truth of the representations made by the primary violator. Id.
193. E.g., Saunders v. Superior Court, 7 Cal.App.4th 832, 846, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 438, 446
(1994).
Liability may also be imposed on one who aids and abets the commission of an intentional
tort if the person (a) knows the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives
substantial assistance or encouragement to the other to so act or (b) gives substantial assis-
tance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and the person's own conduct, sepa-
rately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person. (emphasis added) Id.
194. Some suggest there are three broad categories of torts - intentional, negligence-
based and strict liability, including products liability. See JOHN WADE, VICTOR E.
SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE SCHWARTZ'S CASES
& MATERIALS ON TORTS, 16 (Foundation Press 1994) ("[N]ote merely that there are three
possible bases of tort liability: a) intentional conduct; b) negligent conduct which creates an
unreasonable risk of causing harm; and c) conduct which is neither intentional nor negli-
gent but which subjects the actor to strict liability because of public policy."). But upon a
closer analysis, there are only two broad classes of tort liability - one based on intent and
the other on a breach of duty. See, e.g., Hanus v. Texas Utilities Co., 71 S.W.3d 874 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (stating that, "The Texarkana court has also recognized
that the exceptions to the duty to warn that originated in negligence law have been applied
to strict liability claims 'on the theory that there is no doctrinal distinction between negli-
gence and strict liability failure to warn actions under the Restatement."), and Olson v.
Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Iowa 1994) ("After reviewing the authors and com-
ments on the failure to warn question, we believe any posited distinction between strict
liability and negligence principles [in warnings cases] is illusory.").
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and breach of a duty are not elements of any intentional tort. Therefore,
some state courts have had to resolve the ambiguity and clearly state
when civil liability should attach for aiding and abetting. For example,
Connecticut's and Ohio's rules are broad, covering both intentional and
negligent conduct. In both jurisdictions, a plaintiff must plead and prove
that a defendant 1) helped the principal tortfeasor to commit a wrongful
act that caused the injury, 2) understood his role when he provided the
assistance, and 3) knowingly and substantially assisted the principal
tortfeasor.1
95
On the other hand, Arizona's and Colorado's rules appear to be more
restrictive, allowing recovery only where an alleged secondary tortfeasor
aided and abetted the principal tortfeasor's negligent conduct. In Ari-
zona, a third-party plaintiff can recover only when she establishes that "1)
the primary tortfeasor [committed a tort that injured] the plaintiff, 2) the
defendant ... [knew] the primary tortfeasor's conduct [was] a breach of
duty, and 3) the defendant . . . substantially assist[ed] or encourage[ed]
the . . . breach." '196 In Colorado, the elements are slightly different. A
complaint must prove that defendant 1) breached a fiduciary duty, 2)
knowingly participated in the breach, 3) caused damages, and, 4) gave
substantial assistance to the principal tortfeasor 9 7
In jurisdictions that recognize a civil action for aiding and abetting, the
injured third party must prove that the secondary tortfeasor gave "sub-
stantial assistance" to the principal tortfeasor. Although state and federal
courts have not adopted a universal standard for measuring "substantial
assistance," most have embraced the factors suggested in a comment to
the Restatement of Torts § 876.198 Specifically, the third-party victim
must present probative evidence of the following: 1) the type of encour-
195. Calore v. Town of Stratford, 2001 WL 58364, *5 (Conn. Super. 2001)
To sustain a cause of action for aiding and abetting, the pleading party must plead and
prove the following elements: (1) the party whom the defendant aids must perform a
wrongful act that causes an injury; (2) the defendant must be generally aware of his role as
part of the overall illegal or tortious conduct at the time that he provides assistance; and
(3) the defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation. Id.;
Guerrero v. C.H.P. Inc., 2001 WL 931640, *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).
196. Wells Fargo Bank v. Ariz. Laborers, Teamsters and Cement Masons Local No.
395 Pension Trust Fund, 38 P.3d 12, 23 (Ariz. 2002).
197. See Nelson v. Elway, 971 P.2d 245, 249-250 (Colo. App. 1998).
A claim of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty is not identical to a claim of civil
conspiracy. The elements [for] aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty include: 1)
breach by a fiduciary of a duty owed to a plaintiff, 2) a defendant's knowing participation
in the breach, and 3) damages .... Also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b)
(1970), upon which the tort is premised, includes as an additional element that a defendant
must give "substantial assistance to the other's breach. Id.
198. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b), comment d (1979).
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agement offered to the principal,' 99 2) the amount and kind of assistance
given to the primary wrongdoer, 20 0 3) the alleged abettor's presence
when the primary tortfeasor committed the tort,2 1' 4) the alleged abet-
tor's relation to the primary tortfeasor; 5) the alleged abettor's state of
mind when he gave assistance, and 6) the duration of the assistance.20 2
Finally, it is important to stress: "substantial assistance can be distant in
time and location from the primary wrongdoing., 20 3
PART III. A BRIEF OVERVIEW: THE EEVOLUTION OF ALL-RISKS
MARINE INSURANCE AND THE REGULATIONS OF INSURERS
IN BRITAIN AND IN AMERICA DURING THE
TRANSATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE
Part IV presents a comprehensive discussion of British and American
insurers' roles as principals in and aiders and abettors of the transatlantic
slave trade and the accompanying terrorism. However, one is less likely
to appreciate the substantial scale of insurers' assistance without first un-
derstanding the evolution and purpose of marine insurance. In fact, a
general comprehension of the "business of insurance" and the "business
of insurers "204 would help to explain 1) insurers' decision to become prin-
cipal players in the slave trade without remorse, guilt or repentance-
even though the slave trade was an illegal enterprise, 2 5 and 2) underwrit-
199. See, e.g., Rael v. Cadena, 93 N.M. 684, 604 P.2d 822 (1979) (finding civil aiding
and abetting liability for verbal encouragement at the scene of a battery).
200. See also Cobb v. Indian Springs, Inc., 258 Ark. 9, 522 S.W.2d 383,387 (1975)
(finding liability where a security guard allegedly urged a younger motorist with a new car
to "run [the car] back up here and see what it will do."). But see Aetna Casualty and
Surety Co. v. Leahey Const. Co., 219 F.3d 519, 537 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that the routine
extension of a loan does not amount to substantial assistance under Ohio's aiding and
abetting law).
201. Patrick J. McNulty and Daniel J. Hanson, Liability For Aiding and Abetting By
Silence or Inaction: An Unfounded Doctrine, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 14, 19-20 (1993).
Neither mere presence of the defendant at the commission of the wrong nor failure to
object to it is sufficient to impose legal responsibility for aiding and abetting. Because there
generally is no duty to take steps to interfere in tortious activity or speak up to discourage
it, action is a necessary predicate for substantial assistance; silence or inaction is legally
insufficient. Id.
202. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 481-82 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Suggestive words
may also be enough to create joint liability when they plant the seeds of action and are
spoken by a person in an apparent position of authority.").
203. Ronald M. Lepinskas, Civil Aiding and Abetting Liability in Illinois, 87 ILL. B.J.
532, 533 (1999).
204. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 210-211 (1979)
("It is important, therefore, to observe at the outset that the statutory language in question
here does not exempt the business of insurance companies from the scope of the antitrust
laws. The exemption is for the 'business of insurance,' not the 'business of insurers."').
205. See infra notes 451-473 and the accompanying text.
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ers' decision to continue to aid and abet slave traders' terrorism- even
after insurers decided to end their direct participation in that enterprise.
But more important, one also must appreciate the state of insurance
regulation in England and in America during the mid-sixteenth to the
early-nineteenth centuries. This is fairly critical, if one wants to under-
stand why insurers participated- as principals, aiders and abettors- in
the horrors of the slave trade for nearly three centuries with impunity.
This part, therefore, explores the evolution, purpose and use of "all risk"
marine insurance contracts; and it also presents a general overview of
insurance regulation in Britain and America during the transatlantic slave
trade.
A. Evolution of "All Risk" Marine Insurance and Its Role in the
Transatlantic Slave Trade
Insuring one's property or enterprise against natural and man-made
perils is a very ancient practice. Marine insurance is the oldest type of
insurance, and one of the earliest forms of property and indemnity insur-
ance. It began around 3,000 BC when Chinese merchants insured them-
selves "against trade losses by distributing the cargo of one merchant
over many boats."2 °6 This involved the well-known and current-day prac-
tices of risk transference and risk distribution.'O° To be sure, insurance
was a significant development in maritime commerce; it allowed and en-
couraged merchants to invest money and assume risky enterprises with
some assurances that others would help in the event of serious losses.
Marine insurance, however, did not start as a highly commercial, for-
profit enterprise. Rather, it began as a non-profit, mutual-help associa-
tion. 0 8 Under the latter, merchants formed small guilds, established
206. See Mohd Tarmidzi, Chapter 5: What Is Insurance? INTRODUCrION To ISLAMIC
INSURANCE (Malaysian Insurance Institute: EBook), at http://www.insurance.com.my/
zonetakaful/takaful (last visited Dec. 1, 2003). See also History of Auto Insurance: History
of Concept of Car Insurance, at http://www.autocarinsurancequotes.com/history.html (last
visited Dec 1, 2003)(stating "[m]arine insurance is as old as marine trade and [dates] back
to 3000 BC. Early merchants trading on China's rivers practiced a form of loss control by
deliberately spreading a given cargo among several vessels, thereby reducing the potential
loss.").
207. See Helvering v. Le Gierse et al., 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1941) (asserting that
"[h]istorically and commonly insurance involves risk-shifting and risk-distributing."). But
see W.S. Badcock Corp. v. Myers, 696 So.2d 776, 782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (claiming
"[r]isk transference and risk distribution are basic characteristics of most insurance transac-
tions. Since these characteristics are present in many other arrangements that are not
viewed or treated as insurance, the determination of what constitutes insurance usually is
predicated on additional factors or considerations.").
208. Tarmidzi, supra note 206 ("One thing is clear is that in the early years, insurance
was not a commercial venture but more of a mutual help scheme on a non-profit basis.").
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pools of reserves and made equitable contributions to those pools to
cover potential losses. Perhaps the earliest form of for-profit "quasi-in-
surance" 209 evolved in Babylon around 2250 BC.21° It was called bot-
tomry; under a bottomry contract, a ship owner borrowed money to
finance voyages. To pay for the use of a lender's money and the risk of
losing it, a ship owner paid an exorbitant amount of interest. However, if
the ship was totally lost, the owner did not have to repay the loan. In-
stead the lender assumed the burden of the loss.
211
The modern premium-insurance contract first appeared in Italy during
late fourteenth century." 212 Under a premium contract, commercial and
See also J. P. VAN NIEKERK, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW
IN THE NETHERLANDS FROM 1500-1800, at 3 (Juta & Co. 1998) (noting that, "There is
general acceptance of the fact that insurance on a profit basis as opposed to insurance on a
mutual basis, was unknown to antiquity in general.").
209. Early on, there was general disagreement over whether bottomry contracts were
precursors to insurance contracts or whether they are indeed "true" contracts of insurance.
The present and prevailing view is that the two are not the same. E.g., NIEKERK, supra
note 208, at 49-51.
[I]t has been said that insurance is a form of bottomry; that bottomry is a form of insur-
ance; that bottomry and insurance are twin sisters with the former having the rights of
primogeniture; that bottomry is mixed contract of loan and insurance; and that even hot-
tomry is the reverse of insurance. The principal common characteristic [between both is]
the transference of risk effected by and between the parties to the respective contracts.
[There are] great and fundamental differences between the contracts of bottomry and in-
surance." Id.
210. See Scott A. Taylor, Taxing Captive Insurance: A New Solution For An Old Prob-
lem, 42 Tax Law. 859, 933 n. 11(1989). Scholars are in some disagreement over the earliest
appearance of these contracts. Compare I. Pfeffer, Essays On Insurance History 4 n.11
(1966) (unpublished manuscript available in the Library of the College of Insurance, New
York City) (dating the practice at 1750 B.C.) with CHARLES FARLEY TRENNERY, THE ORI-
GIN AND EARLY HISTORY OF INSURANCE 46 (1926) (concluding that the practice began in
2250 B.C., some 500 years earlier). Professor Taylor also made the following observation:
"The dispute hinges on the dating of the Code of Hammurabi. This code is named after
the Babylonian King Hammurabi, who is known chiefly for his codification of law, the text
of which archaeologists found on a stone monument in Susa in 1902. Id.
211. Thomson v. Royal Exchange Assurance Co., 105 Eng. Rep 11, 12 (1813). Chief
Justice Lord Ellenborough declaring:
The distinction between an insurance and [bottomry] is simple: [I]n the former case if the
voyage [is] lost, or not worth pursuing the assured may abandon and claim as for a total
loss; [B]ut in the latter case nothing short of an actual total loss will discharge the borrower
of money upon bottomry. I have had occasion to state this distinction as established law;
that in the case of bottomry nothing short of a total destruction of the ship will constitute
an utter loss. Id.
212. See THE AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, THE HISTORY OF MARINE
INSURANCE LAW, at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/91/
ch5.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2003) (claiming [t]he first premium -based insurance policies
covering sea traffic appear to have been developed in Italy by the Lombards in medieval
times." ). See also Todd Roehrig and Trevan Nelson, History of Marine Insurance, at http://
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maritime merchants transferred some or all the risks of during business to
insurers for a predetermined premium. When the insured experienced a
total or a partial loss of ships and cargo, the insurer indemnified or reim-
bursed the insured for his losses.2 13 For centuries, marine insurance for
profit was the predominant form of insurance. "From Italy the insurance
contract ... spread with trade to other parts of Europe .... [and by] the
mid-fifteenth century, the insurance contract in its modern form had be-
come so widely known ... that it attracted the attention of [courts, legis-
latures and jurists]. 214
More important, the for-profit marine insurance contract had been in
use for at least two centuries when John Hawkins commenced his first
slave voyage in the mid-sixteenth century with the support and blessing of
Queen Elizabeth 1.215 In addition, at the very height of the transatlantic
slave trade,216 marine insurance played an indispensable role in maritime
www.acs.ucalgary.ca/mgmt/inrm/industry/marine/hist.html (last visited April 28, 2002) (re-
lating that "[tihe first marine insurance policy was introduced in 1384 in an attempt to
cover bales of fabric traveling to Savona from Pisa, Italy").
213. E.g., Kemp v. Halliday, 122 Eng. Rep. 1361, 1370 (1866) ("A contract of marine
insurance is a contract to indemnify against loss by certain perils, and if the subject matter
of the insurance is totally lost in consequence of those perils, the assured is entitled to
recover as for a total loss; if it is only partially lost, the assured is Only entitled to recover
for a partial loss.").
214. J. P. VAN NIEKERK, I THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE
LAW IN THE NETHERLANDS FROM 1500-1800, 7 (Juta & Co. 1998).
215. Buccaneers, Privateers & Swashbucklers - Captain Sir John Hawkins, at http://
www.vleonica.com/hawkins.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2001).
Hawkins spent the years 1562 through 1568 making four voyages. It was during these
voyages that he was the first English slaver and the first Englishman to invade the Carib-
bean, which was largely of Spanish possession. Hawkins started his career as smuggler.
Slave smuggling was extremely profitable at the time as Spain required all slavers to regis-
ter their cargo at Seville and Spain would take a portion of the proceeds thereby inflating
the price. In October 1562, Hawkins took 3 small ships to Sierra Leone. His purpose was
to raid native villages (collecting slaves), and loot Portuguese ships .... Id.
216. See Exploring Amistad at Mystic Seaport - Timeline: The Atlantic Slave Trade at
http://www.stkitts.co.uk/slavery.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2001) (noting that the seven-
teenth century, "1640-1680 [marks] the beginning of large-scale introduction of African
slave labor in the British Caribbean for sugar production); The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade
at http://africanhistory.about.com/library/weekly/aa080601a.html (last visited May 10,
2002) (citing that at it height in the 18th century (1701-1800), approximately 6,090,000
slaves were transported from Africa to worldwide destinations). See also Raymond T. Dia-
mond, No Call To Glory: Thurgood Marshall's Thesis on the Intent of a Pro- Slavery Con-
stitution, 42 VAND. L. REV. 93, 101-102 (1989).
England's mainland colonies had developed a long history of slavery. The first blacks ar-
rived in Virginia in 1619, before blacks had arrived in Massachusetts, and although Vir-
ginia's legislature and courts would deal on a piecemeal basis with problems occasioned by
the existence of slavery, it was not until 1680 and 1682 that the colony passed its first slave
codes. Id.
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commerce. In fact, the massive and prolonged slave trade as well as the
terrorism that it produced would not have occurred but for ship owners'
and slavers' ability to purchase marine insurance. The financial risks and
potential losses associated with voyages from England to Africa and then
to the Americas were just too great.217 Without a doubt, slavers needed
insurance.218
Addressing that need created an unexpected development: the transat-
lantic slave trade generated a very large and prosperous insurance indus-
try in England219 and in America.220 For example, in England, Lloyd's of
London221 the well-known financial institution opened its doors in 1688,
217. E.g., JAMES A. RAWLEY, THE TRANSATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE - A HISTORY 186
(W. W. Norton & Co. 1981) (stating that, "Marine insurance against the 'perils of the sea,'
with a special provision for possible slave revolts, was necessary to protect a venture.").
218. E.g., ELTIS, supra note 157, at 197 (stating "As with any other large-scale, long-
distance traffic, the slave trade was dependent on highly organized financial markets and
supply facilities. [T]he need for financial services (e.g., credit and insurance) and for legal
services to support claims and expedite transfers of assets were the raison d' etre of ports
the world over.").
219. Cf. A Bristol Hero, True, But He Became Rich Through Slave Trade- City Start-
ing To Acknowledge How It Became Wealthy, THE SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIB., Sep. 20,
1998 at A30 available at 1998 Westlaw 20048593.
More than 2,000 slave ships set out from Bristol [England] between 1698 and 1807. They
sailed to West African destinations where they loaded up on average more than 250 slaves
per ship. 'The economic legacy to Bristol is enormous,' Courtier said. Very few slaves
were ever brought to Bristol, whose 9,000 or so black residents today are descended from
later immigrants. But Bristol was a key slaving port and on the basis of that, and the
industry that developed out of it, the city grew rich.' Id.;
Carl Schoettler, Liverpool Confronts Role In Slave Trade, BALT. SUN, Dec. 9, 1994 at 1A
available at 1994 Westlaw 6954850.
At Town Hall, the facade has sculpted heads of African peoples - silent reminders of the
victims of the slave trade that once helped make this city rich. For 75 years, Liverpool
merchants and seamen dominated the infamous trans-Atlantic commerce in human beings
- until 1807, when Britain banned it. For the next half-century they traded in the cotton,
tobacco and sugar that slave labor produced. The edifices erected with the profits of the
slave trade still stand out in the cityscape, like dubious jewels on a homespun dress.' Liver-
pool was not just the economic capital of the slave trade, but the political capital as well [.]'
Id.
220. See, e.g., Oralandar Brand-Williams, Author.- Slavery Helped Create Wealth Gap,
THE DETROIT NEWS, Jul. 27, 1997 available at http://.www.detnews.com (last visited April
28, 2002) (reporting that "[t]he slave trade produced a slew of cottage industries from
textiles to insurance companies that some historians say made even poor whites rich. 'The
textile industry [and] the insurance industry was built off the back of the slave," said Claud
Anderson, author of BLACK LABOR: THE SEARCH FOR POWER AND ECONOMIC
JUSTICE.'").
221. See Brief History of Lloyd's, available at http://www.lloydsoflondon.com (last vis-
ited Oct. 15, 2000), for a discussion on how the Lloyd's Act 1871, which provided the
business with a sound legal basis and laid the foundations for today's market, incorporated
the Society of Lloyd's.
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at the peak of the African slave trade. "Lloyd's of London ... is still...
the largest meeting place for underwriters and shippers to transact
marine insurance business. In 1906, the British Parliament enacted the
Marine Insurance Act [which] continues to influence marine insurance
policy wordings and conditions." '222
In America, the "slave trade also built entire industries, from rum dis-
tilleries to insurance companies" '223 in the Northeast. In Connecticut, for
example, the "now-defunct Hartford Life Insurance Company ... sold
slave policies. And [among American insurers,] Boston insurance com-
panies ... made up the majority of the underwriters for Rhode Island
slave voyages [.]224
What did British and American insurers insure against? Simply put,
the insurers sold "all risks" marine insurance to the slave traders. Under
the typical contract, insurers agreed to indemnify slave traders if specific
perils2 25caused traders to lose slave ships, cargo (slaves), voyages, or
crews. In addition, if an exclusion clause did not appear in the contract,
underwriters also agreed to indemnify slavers when "all other Perils,
Losses and Misfortunes... shall come to the Hurt, Detriment or Damage
of the said Goods and Merchandizes and Ship [.],,226
Lloyd's began in Edward Lloyd's Thames-side coffee house in Tower Street in the City of
London. Although the exact date of its establishment is unknown, evidence exists that
Lloyd's coffee house was well known in London business circles by 1688. Lloyd himself
was not involved in insurance but provided premises, reliable shipping news and a variety
of services to enable his clientele of ships' captains, merchants and rich men to carry on
their business of insuring ships and their cargoes. The wealthy individuals in the coffee
house would each take a share of a risk, signing their names one beneath the other on the
policy together, with the amount they agreed to cover. For this reason they were known as
'underwriters.' Id.
222. See also History of Auto Insurance, supra note 206 (noting that, "In 1769, under-
writers took their informal arrangement and [formally] founded Lloyd's of London. [In]
1734, the official list of vessels and values known as the 'Lloyd's List' was published. [It is
still] the leading shipping list in the maritime insurance industry.").
223. See Tatsha Robertson and Ross Kerber, Slave Trade Gets a Fresh Look-New
Englanders Surprised by Their Ties to the Painful Practice, STAR. TRIB. MINNEAPOLIS-ST.
PAUL, Aug. 8, 2000, at 9E.
224. Id.
225. See ELIZABETH DONNAN, II DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE HISTORY OF
THE SLAVE TRADE TO AMERICA 623-24 (Octagon Books, Inc. 1932), to review a 1794 slave
trade marine insurance contract. That year, Lloyd's of London sold a policy to cover a
slave ship and her voyage "from Liverpool to the Coast of Africa, during her stay of trade
there and at and from thence to her port or ports of discharge[.]" The policy covered
specific risks "of the Seas, Men of War, Fire, Enemies, Pirates, Rovers, Thieves, Jettizons,
Letters of Mart and Counter Mart, Surprizals, Takings at Sea, Arrest, restraints and De-
tainments of all Kings, Princes and People, of what Nation, Condition or Quality soever:
Barretry of the Master and Mariners." Id.
226. Id. at 624.
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Did the standard "all risks" marine insurance contract include "com-
mercial terrorism" as a risk insured against? The answer is no, although
much later commercial property and terrorism insurance evolved from
marine insurance. Slave traders were extremely concerned about terror,
which manifested itself in the form of slave insurrections on both ships 227
and land.228 Consequently, slavers purchased or tried to purchase cover-
age for insurrections.229 Arguably, this was a very inefficient use of capi-
tal; slavers should have expected intermittent episodes of "terrorism" as
part of the cost of doing business. Besides slave revolts seldom produced
substantial casualties or financial losses.23 °
227. E.g., Bernard Bailyn, Considering the Slave Trade: History and Memory, 58 THE
WILLIAM AND MARY QUARTERLY, 1 (2001) at http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/
wm/58.1/bailyn.html (last visited on Jan. 16, 2004).
[S~lave rebellions occurred on approximately 10 percent of all slave ships, [ten] percent of
the slaves on such voyages were killed in the insurrections (which totals 100,000 deaths,
1500-1867), and the fear of insurrection increased shipboard staffing and other expenses
on the Middle Passage by 18 percent. [T]he incidence of revolts did not increase with the
decline in crew size, hence that slave-centered factors determined the uprisings. [Also]
shore-based attacks on European slave ships were twenty times more likely in the Senegal
and Gambia River areas than elsewhere in Atlantic Africa. Id.
228. See, e.g., Kendall Clark, Patrols and Privilege, at http://monkeyfist.com/articles/
813 (last visited April, 29, 2002) (reviewing SALLY E. HADDEN'S, SLAVE PATROLS: LAW
AND VIOLENCE IN VIRGINIA AND THE CAROLINAS (Harvard University Press, 2001)).
In the colonial period, white settlers feared both widespread slave insurrection, perhaps
the first mass, apocalyptic terror of American culture, and invasion or attack by competing
colonial powers. The militia system could not respond to both threats simultaneously.
Slave patrols were developed as a kind of supplementary force. African slaves were thus
the first in a series of social groups suspected of 'fifth columnist' activity - the first moment
in a long American tradition of paranoia and demonization, one that's active today in the
detainment of hundreds if not thousands of persons, held without trial, since the September
lth attacks. Of course white settlers had reasons to fear insurrection, reasons which were
embedded in a context of systematic injustice. Slaves were justified in trying to overturn
oppression, despite white claims about Africans being a race of natural slaves. [T]hree
insurrections demonstrated the resolve and determination of slaves: the Stono Rebellion
[of] 1739 and the insurrections of Denmark Vesey [in] 1822 and Nat Turner [in] 1831. (em-
phasis added) Id.
229. See JAY COUGHTRY, THE NOTORIOUS TRIANGLE 99, n.104 (1981) (illustrating
that "[u]nderwriters generally included an insurrection clause in the standard rate, but an
equally common loophole greatly reduced its usefulness. The standard terminology was
'warranted free from average by insurrection under 5 percent."'), and RAWLEY, supra note
217, at 260 (writing that "[plolicies ordinarily excepted losses by insurrections under 10 per
cent of the whole value. A Bristol voyage in 1748 insured at 8 per cent; another in 1762 at
12; and a third in 1792 at only 3.5 per cent. The slave trade, it is plain was a business
fraught with more than normal risks, [like] slave mortality and insurrection.").
230. Id. ("Knowing from long experience that shipboard slave revolts seldom re-
sulted in extensive slave losses, insurance companies limited their liability to losses of at
least 5 and sometimes 10 percent of the total number of slaves on board.").
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More significant, it was slavers, themselves, who created the very con-
ditions, which caused slaves to revolt and terrorize their captors.231
Again, the transatlantic slave trade was essentially three-hundred-plus
years of commercial terrorism, which British and American merchants
practiced with vigor and with substantial assistance from insurance com-
panies and investors. Yet, slave traders insured themselves and their
property against the very horrors that they practiced so ruthlessly, sys-
tematically and diligently against innocent men, women and children.
Furthermore, as discussed more thoroughly in Part IV, British and Amer-
ican marine insurers readily insured slaver traders from all types of risks,
including the terror accompanying slave insurrections. 32
B. The Regulation of British Insurers During the Transatlantic Slave
Trade
The earliest marine insurance contract in England dates from 1555.233
Seven years later - in 1562 - the transatlantic slave trade began, termi-
nating officially nearly three hundred and twenty years later in the late
nineteen century.234 Undeniably, during this entire period, British under-
231. Id. ("Slaves [were] unwilling and, at times, uncooperative passengers; elaborate
security measures were necessary in order to keep them from sabotaging the ship or elimi-
nating their captors altogether. Escape and revolt attempts plagued unwary captains[.]").
232. It is important to state at this point out that - although British and American
insurers were the major players in the slave trade - other European insurers also sold
insurance policies to the slave traders, for example, see FRANK C. SPOONER, RISKS AT SEA
- AMSTERDAM INSURANCE AND MARITIME EUROPE, 1788-1780, 151 n. 128 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 1983) ("In March 1776, a relevant case of revolt on board [a ship] was decided
by the Admiralty court, Marseilles: [T]he slaves were considered to be merchandise; the
insurance policy included navigation to the Guinea coast and so it was construed that the
cargo should consist of slaves; and the revolt took place as sea, so the underwriters were
liable.").
233. See THE AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, THE HISTORY OF MARINE
INSURANCE LAW, n. 11 and accompanying text at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/
publications/reports/91/ch5.html (last visited May 6, 2002); ALEX L. PARKS, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF MARINE INSURANCE AND AVERAGE 6 (Cornell Maritime Press, 1987).
234. Even after the English Parliament "formally abolished and enacted the Abolition
of the Slave Trade Acts in 1807 and in 1833, the "illegal" trafficking in slaves continued
into the very late nineteenth century. Therefore, Parliament enacted additional statutes to
address the so-called "illegal slave trade." See THE SLAVE TRADE (EAST AFRICAN
COURTS) ACT OF 1873, 36 & 37 VIcr. c. 59, § 3 (stating that, "All jurisdiction is hereby
conferred on the East African courts, in regard to vessels seized by the commander or
officer of any of Her Majesty's ships on suspicion of being engaged in or fitted out for the
slave trade."); The Slave Trade Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 88, § 3 (a).
Where a vessel is, on reasonable grounds, suspected of being engaged in or fitted out for
the slave trade, it shall be lawful for any commander or officer of any of Her Majesty's
ships to visit and seize and detain such vessel, and to sieze and detain any person found
detained or reasonably suspected of having been detained as a slave, for the purpose of the
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writers - along with an impressive group of world-renowned and cele-
brated investors,235 national heroes,236 philosophers,237 politicians,238
merchants239 and religious bankers240 - aided and abetted the chief par-
ticipants in the slave trade. However, underwriters arguably played the
slave trade."); The Slave Trade (East African Courts) Act of 1879, 42 & 43 Vict. c. 38, § 4
("Each of the East African courts shall have the same jurisdiction in regard to a British
vessel seized on suspicion of being engaged in or fitted out for the slave trade, and to the
persons, slaves, goods, and effects on board. Id.
235. See Tammariello, supra note 147.
The British South Sea Company founded in the early 1700s as an officially sanctioned
monopoly to furnish African slaves to Spanish American empire claimed some notable
shareholders. Among those holding slave stocks were Sir Isaac Newton, formulator of the
law of gravity; Jonathan Swift, the great Irish-born satirist; the [E]arl of Halifax, founder of
the bank of England; Daniel Defoe, author of 'Robinson Crusoe' not to mention numerous
,royals.' Id.
236. Individuals like the following two would fall into this category: Sir John Hawkins
and Sir Francis Drake. See e.g., Andrew Malone and David Munk, "Admiralty Blocks
Drake's Return From Deep," 1995 Westlaw 7641373, TIMES LONDON (Jan. 15, 1995) (stat-
ing that the "[P]lan to raise the body of Sir Francis Drake for burial alongside other heroes
at Westminster Abbey are being scuppered. [His] work as a slave-trader and plunderer is
an embarrassment despite the fact that he robbed for England and the Queen [Elizabeth
I]"); John Young, Shipbuilder Who Launched the British Empire," 1999 Westlaw 8014846,
TIMES LONDON, at 16, (Aug. 9, 1999) (noting, "Sir John Hawkins made his fortune in the
slave trade.").
237. E.g., Melvyn Bragg, "Slavery Is No Simple Black and White Issue," 1998 Westlaw
4809304, TIMES LONDON, at 18, (Jan. 12, 1998) (reporting, "It is important to give the past
its due. [Sir John] Locke, the philosopher of Liberty; [and] [Sir John] Newton, the discov-
erer of new worlds invested in the slave trade.").
238. E.g., A Bristol Hero, supra note 219, at A30 (stating, "[T]his southwestern port
city is only just beginning to come to terms with the way Edward Colston made his money
- the slave trade. The 18th-century merchant and member of Parliament now polarizes
residents of Bristol, which for more than a century was one of Britain's main slave-trading
ports.").
239. Tammariello, supra note 147.
All slave captains were, essentially, murderers. As the traveler William Baikoe put it after
a journey to Africa in the 1850s: 'There is no captain who has carried slaves who has not
been, directly or indirectly, guilty of murder (for) a certain number of deaths are always
allowed for'. The same holds true of the European-based merchants who financed and
organized the traffic.' Id.
240. How Quakers Earned Oats, THE GUARDIAN REV., (Aug. 2, 1999), available at
1999 WL 22083414.
The involvement of Barclays bank in the slave trade (Pass Notes, July 28; Letters, July 30)
should be understood in the context of the times. In the mid-18th century, trading in slaves
was the norm. . . . Barclays bank was not founded until 1896, when 12 private banks
amalgamated to form a limited company. Barclay, Bevan and Company of Lombard
Street was one of the lead banks in this new bank. It provided roughly one third of the
capital... In 1756, the partners in Barclay, Bevan and Company were Joseph Freame and
James Barclay. James Barclay was Joseph Freame's brother-in-law. The Barclay share of
the profit of £26,165-1-11 was £8,721-13-11. Id.
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major supporting role, which ensured the success and longevity of that
terrorizing enterprise. As mentioned earlier, two reasons help to explain
insurers' predominate role: 1) transatlantic slave traders would not com-
mence such a risky enterprise without insurance; and, 2) investors would
not invest in slave ventures and voyages if the slavers did not purchase
insurance. There is an additional explanation; the business of insurance
in England was essentially unregulated.
During the three-hundred-plus years of the slave trade, underwriters
and the business of insurance were either totally unregulated or poorly
regulated in England. First, insurers were completely unregulated during
the Elizabethan era, 1562-1601.241 Quite simply, anyone could insure all
types of ventures and voyages - both legal and illegal - without worry-
ing about violating some Elizabethan public policy. In fact, the over-
whelming majority of underwriters were individual merchants2 42 who
practiced the craft on a part-time basis.243 Although a few partnerships
241. Here, the Elizabethan era is the period between 1562 - when Queen Elizabeth I
awarded the first slave-trade patent to John Hawkins, and 1601 - two years before her
death in 1603. See Mahoney v. Ashton, 4 H. & McH. 295, 1799 Westlaw 397, *13 (Md.
Gen. 1799). 'The English did not engage in this trade until 1562 .... Queen Elizabeth
[granted a patent] to an African company in the year 1585. In 1592 another patent was
granted, under which this trade to the coast of Africa was prosecuted .. " Id.; ERIC WIL-
LIAMS, CAPITALISM AND SLAVERY 30 (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1944,
reissued Russell and Russell, 1961) (noting, "Like so many Elizabethan ventures, [John
Hawkins's first slave-trading expedition] was a buccaneering - [a pirating]- expedition,"
designed to steal slaves from the Portuguese. Furthermore, after Hawkins stole the slaves
from the Portuguese, he "sold [them] to the Spaniards in the West Indies.").
242. Who were and what was the ethnicity of these merchant-insurers? See GEORGE
CLAYTON, BRITISH INSURANCE, 28 (London: Elek, 1971).
Suffice to say that Spain deserves special mention... because Barcelona was the first city
to attempt to regulate the practice of marine insurance by ordinance .... Insurance, it
seems, came to England later that to either Spain or Belgium.... It is not until the 16th
century that we find records of insurances .... That is not to say that no insurance was
conducted in England before the 16th century. It was, but by Lombard rather than English
merchants. The Lombards had come to England and established strong commercial roots
[and] forced to share common ground with the Jews for many years [until the latter were
forced] from England by Edward I in 1290. [T]he Lombards were left in sole possession of
the field of finance. .. [until] as late as the mid-16th century. Thereafter, English
merchants began to assert their position, yet they still had to fight the privileges enjoyed by
the Flemish and Hanse merchants .... It was not until... 1578, that the English merchant
could call his home his own. Id.
243. RALPH STRAUS, LLOYD'S: THE GENTLEMEN AT THE COFFEE-HousE, 19 (N.Y.:
Carrick & Evans, Inc. 1938) ("[M]arine insurance of one kind or another [was] a regular
side-line to ordinary business. Merchants had their agents for the buying and selling of
goods, and these agents, or brokers, would arrange for such insurance as was required.").
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sold marine insurance, corporate insurers were absent.245 More impor-
tant, sophisticated insurance contracts were rare. Instead, merchant-un-
derwriters and those wanting insurance gathered informally246 and
consummated simple written agreements, 247 involving slave ventures 248
and other maritime activities.
Without doubt, the underwriters embraced some moral principals and
conventions 249 to govern their business and interpersonal relations. But
Parliament's complete failure to regulate the business of insurance be-
tween 1562-1601 exposed insurance consumers - including unsuspecting
and immoral slave traders - to deceptive business practices and to cer-
tain moral hazards. For example, misrepresentation, fraud and over in-
244. NIEKERK, supra note 214, at 625 ("Although part-time insurers underwrote poli-
cies as individuals, and generally not as partners in a firm... there is evidence of private
partnerships of underwriters .. ").
245. Corporate insurance did not arrive in Britain until the mid-eighteen century.
STRAUS, supra note 243, at 31 ("[M]arine insurance in the 16th century is notably
characterised by a complete absence of corporate character."); BARRY SUPPLE, THE
ROYAL EXCHANGE ASSURANCE: A HISTORY OF BRISH INSURANCE, 1720-1970, 4-5
(Cambridge, England, 1970) ("[T]he Royal Exchange Assurance, the pioneer marine in-
surance company, was established by a Royal Charter of 22 June 1720 [along] with its sister
Corporation, the London Assurance.... [The REA's] creation marks an important stage
not only in the development of insurance [and] the business corporation in Britain.").
246. STRAUS, supra note 243, at 18.
[T]he almost complete lack of early English legislation in the matter of insurance was due
largely to its foreign origin and growth .... There were no private "offices' or public
exchanges where only insurance business was transacted and no group of citizens influen-
tial enough to persuade Parliament to pass important legislation of the kind. The only step
towards collective security before [and during] Elizabethan times seems to have been the
informal gatherings of shipowners and merchant [-insurers. Id.
247. Id. at 18-9.
In an early Insurance policy preserved amongst the Admiralty Court Paper's at the Record
Office, and dated 1547, it [reads]: 'As for the aventure that the assurers shall stande at, it is
to be understoode that this presented writinge hath as muche forse as the beste made or
dicted byll of surance which is used to be made in Lombarde Streete of London.' The
policies seem to have been simple, and of late years an increasingly large number of them
had been drawn up and attested by the Notaries of the city .... Id.
248. See, e.g., COUGHTRY, supra note 229, at 95 (stating that, "[M]arine insurance
[p]olicies on slaving vessels written in London during the 1760s were very similar to those
issued in Bristol, Rhode Island, at the turn of the century. London firms, which obviously
could not personally inspect the vessels and cargoes they were underwriting, simply re-
quired a detailed description of vessel and cargo prior to effecting a policy.").
249. See, e.g., CLAYTON, supra note 242, at 30.
[After reviewing a few Elizabethan insurance policies], one is immediately struck by the
pre-eminence and customary force of Lombard Street... [Also, there is] pointed reference
to the custom, tradition and binding force of insurance underwriting [on] that street. ...
Because this sense if custom [existed] so strongly, it follows that policies were really short.
Conventions had been established and merchants and underwriters were morally bound by
those conventions [, which explains] the brevity of the policy. Id.
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surance were rampant.250  Also, many merchant underwriters often
refused to pay insurance proceeds after a proof of a loss, because they
failed to maintain sufficient pools of capital to cover all claims.25' A sig-
nificant number of underwriters deviated from sound, customary prac-
tices and speculated or gambled252 on a variety of immoral activities, 53
including trafficking in slaves.
Recognizing that insurance fraud and other malpractices had become
so prevalent, an enterprising merchant petitioned the Privy Council 254 for
a patent to establish and operate a monopoly that would compel under-
250. See STRAUS, supra note 243, at 20 (stating that, "[Tihere was a certain amount of
misrepresentation and fraud and, while underwriting remained unorganized, [there was] no
infallible method of putting a stop to it."); CLAYTON, supra note 242, at 31-32. "[C]ertain
malpractices were prevalent to the obvious detriment of the insurance market generally.
Notable amongst these was the practice of double or over insurance, so that in the event of
a loss or damage profit would accrue." Id.
251. See, e.g., CLAYTON, supra note 242, at 31.
[Elizabethan] underwriters.., were carrying on their business with insufficient capital. The
business called for organization on a larger scale, for adequate information and for greater
technical precision in the estimation of risks and the fixing of premiums, so that insurer and
insured might both be more fully protected. Many of these requirements were completely
lacking in the 16th century .... Id.
252. See NIEKERK, supra note 214, at 625.
Being part-time insurers of risk, most [merchant-underwriters] were no doubt attracted by
the speculative possibilities offered by this business. Numerous merchants speculated on
making a profit by pocketing a part of the insurance premium paid [to cover] a certain ship
or her cargo. On occasion the premium rates were highly lucrative, and rates... between
20 and 40 per cent... were not uncommon.... For most of [the] part-time participants
there was little difference between insurance underwriting and gambling. Id.
253. See, e.g., WILLIAM WiTT BLACKSTOCK, THE HISTORICAL LITERATURE OF SEA
AND FIRE INSURANCE IN GREAT BRITAIN, 1547-1810: A CONSPECTUS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY,
23 (Manchester, Eng., 1910) (A certain George Stoddard - Elizabethan grocer as well as a
part-time underwriter, lender and gambler- wrote in his dairy that a certain individual
owed Stoddard money "for a wager layde wth hee upon a boye or girle, the wych I have
won.").
254. Most law students learn about the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council's judi-
cial function during their first year while grappling with that illusive concept - proximate
cause. See Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co., Ltd., A.C. 388, 423
(P.C. 1961) ("Wagon Mound No. 1"). "It is a principle of civil liability.., that a man must
be responsible for the probable consequences of his act." Id. But the Privy Council also
has an advisory function. See, e.g., Ledsam v. Russell, 9 Eng. Rep. 931 (1848).
The assignees of letters patent may lawfully obtain a renewal of such patents. The statute
does not authorise the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to impose terms as condi-
tions on which patents are to be renewed. The authority of the committee is limited to
reporting on matters.... In the year 1838, a petition was presented to the Queen, praying
for the extension of the term of the patent. This petition was referred to the Judicial Com-
mittee of the Privy Council, [afterward] the lords of the committee expressed an opinion
favourable to the application [.] Id.
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writers to register all insurance instruments, for a handsome fee. 5
Fiercely independent and free-market underwriters opposed the pat-
ent.256 The petitioner, however, prevailed and the Office of Policies and
Assurances opened in 1575.257 It operated for more than a century258
and instituted some practices, which American insurance commissioners
still embrace today.259
But the Office of Assurances could not prevent or reduce insurance
fraud and other malpractices. Therefore, in 1601, Sir Francis Bacon260
went before the House of Commons and sponsored a bill, which would
become England's first legislative effort to regulate the business of insur-
ance. In light of Bacon's political savvy 261 and his art of persuasion, 262
255. See NIEKERK, supra note 214, at 225 and n. 133 (stating that, "In 1574, Richard
Candler applied to the Privy Council for a patent to establish an Office of
Assurances .. ").
256. See, e.g., Veale v. Priour Hardres, 145 Eng. Rep. 492, 494 (1664) (finding for
plaintiff in an action on the case that [defendant disturbed] plaintiff in exercising the Office
of the Registership of Policies of Assurance); STRAUS, supra note 243, at 20-21 ("[T]here
was opposition from the notaries public. [They asked:] Would not the proposed patent be
an uncalled-for interference with [their] liberty [And they asserted that the] proposed Of-
fice of Assurances [would force them] into a line of action which might do [them] consider-
able harm.").
257. The exact official name of the office is not clear, as several different titles appear
in historical documents. See, e.g., Id. (referring to the establishment as "the Office of the
Registership of Policies of Assurance [which] by the statute is only an office for registering
policies of assurance."); CLAYTON, supra note 242, at 31 (referring to the establishment as
the "Office or Chamber of Assurances in1576"") (emphasis added); STRAUS, supra note
243, at 21 (referring to it as the "Office of Assurances").
258. See NIEKERK, supra note 214, at 225 and n. 137. "The Office functioned for over
a century, with the patent being renewed periodically." Id.
259. See CLAYTON, supra note 242, at 32 (Along with establishing mandatory registra-
tions with the Office, "commissioners were appointed to settle fees and disputes" and stan-
dardized or boilerplate insurance polices evolved.").
260. It is worth noting that Sir Francis Bacon was born to Queen Elizabeth I - who
never married - on January 25, 1561, just one year before the Queen gave Sir John Haw-
kins a patent to start the transatlantic slave trade and the terror that followed. See PETER
DAWKINS, DEDICATION To THE LIGHT (Warwick, England: Francis Bacon Research Trust,
1984) (Part II of the book outlines the life and times of Francis Bacon, 1561-1572; and that
part also discusses the love affair between Queen Elizabeth I and the Earl of Leicester as
well as the royal birth and adoption of Francis Bacon). See also Peter Dawkins, Sir Francis
Bacon as a Child, http://www.sirbacon.org/links/childbacon.html (last visited May 9, 2002)
(reporting that Francis Bacon's true parents were Queen Elizabeth I and the Earl of
Leicester and reporting that the Queen required "complete secrecy [regarding] her moth-
erhood if she were to maintain her public image as the Virgin Queen.").
261. Cf FREDERICK E. BIRKENHEAD, FOURTEEN ENGLISH JUDGES 6-7 (London:
Cassell & Company, 1926) (stating that, "His professional career continued to flourish, and
he became at last Attorney General. His appointment proved that he had not lost the
regard of his fellow members, for though the Commons resolved that no Attorney General
should sit in their House, a special exception was made in Bacon's favour.").
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the House enacted the Assurance Act of 1601.263 Briefly put, the legisla-
tion created a deliberative body2 64 which became known by various
names: the Court of Policies and Assurances, 65 the Court of Assur-
16267ndte oance,26 6 the Chamber of Assurance, and the Court of Commissioners
of Policies of Insurance.268
Actually, the Court of Assurance was a quasi-judicial body, functioning
more like an arbitration commission than a court of law.2 69 It had au-
thority to regulate the business of insurance, to curtail malpractices
among insurers and to hear and settle insurance disputes informally, with-
out being concerned about protecting merchant-underwriters' procedural
due process rights. More astounding, the court also could examine wit-
nesses under oath and send deviant underwriters to prison "without baile
or mainprise., 2 70 Yet, the Court of Assurance was not a success. In
truth, between the court's inception in 1601 and its demise in 1720, it had
heard less than a case per year. 71
262. See BLACKSTOCK, supra note 253, at 26-27 (presenting an extract of the speech
that Bacon delivered in the House of Common on December 7, 1601 in support of the
Assurance Bill.).
263. Assurance Act of 1601, 43 Eliz. c. 12 (1601).
264. See Lucena v. Craufurd, Eng. Rep. 630, 643-644 (1826).
The 43 Eliz c. 12, which erected 'a court for [hearing] and determining causes arising on
policies of insurance,' has indeed adverted only 'to the usage of the merchants both of this
realm and of foreign nations, when they make any great adventure, to give some considera-
tion of money to other persons to have from them assurance made of their goods, mer-
chandizes, ships, and things adventured, which course of dealing is commonly called a
policy of assurance.' Id.
To see the old English (Elizabethan) or the original version of the quoted passages, see
Straus, supra note 243, at 22; Clayton, supra note 242, at 32.
265. See Denoir v. Oyle, 82 Eng. Rep. 621 (1649) (commenting that, "[T]his case [con-
cerns a motion to show] cause why a prohibition should not be granted to the Court of
Policy for Assurances.").
266. See STRAUS, supra note 243, at 20 (referring to the quasi-judicial body as "the
Court of Assurances").
267. See CLAYTON, supra note 242, at 32 (stating that "[Tihe establishment of the
Chamber of Assurances [reduced] the burden place upon the Admiralty Court.").
268. See Delbye v. Proudfoot, 89 Eng. Rep. 662 (1692) ("The Court of Commissioners
of Policies of Insurance only extends to suits by the insured against the underwriters [.]").
269. See STRAUS, supra note 243, at 22 (stating, "As for the Court itself, there [was] a
Standing Commission, 'to be renewed yerelie as the least, and otherwise soe often' as the
Lord Chancellor or Lord Keeper of the Great Seal should determine."); CLAYTON, supra
note 242, at 32 ("The court consisted of fourteen commissioners, six of them professional
lawyers [:] 'the judge of the Admiraltie for the time beinge, the Recorder of London for
the time beigne, two Doctor of Civial Lawe, and two common Lawyers,' and eight other
commissioners who should be 'grave and discrete merchants."').
270. See Id.
271. See WILLIAM Gow, MARINE INSURANCE: A HANDBOOK 7 (2d ed. Macmillan &
Co, Ltd. 1900) (reporting fewer than sixty cases).
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Consequently, fraud, misrepresentations, gambling, and other malprac-
tices and moral hazards continued. In fact, speculative practices (bub-
bles) and speculation disguised as insurance increased substantially in
tandem with the transatlantic slave trade. Why were the insurance com-
missioners so ineffective? There are several competing explanations: the
merchant-underwriters did not respect the court's authority to regulate
insurance affairs; 272 the commissioners could regulate and resolve mat-
ters only associated with the contracts registered in the Office of Assur-
ance; and commissioners performed perfunctorily, as they were not
paid. 73
But a more serious problem undermined the commissioners' ability to
regulate the business of insurance: the Assurance Court did and could not
exercise original and exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over all insur-
ance matters, including "unregulated" private contracts and the "regu-
lated contracts" which were registered in the Office of Assurance. 7
More significant, England's common law courts even attacked the Court
of Assurances' concurrent jurisdiction over matters pertaining to insur-
ance.275 The sum effect of those attacks and other problems produced
272. See CLAYTON, supra note 242, at 32 (stating, "Unfortunately, the new court
found no favour with the mercantile community for whose benefit it was established.").
273. See generally NIEKERK, supra note 214, at 227 and nn. 142-143 (outlining the
major organizational problems undermining the Court of Assurance); STRAUS, supra note
243, at 22-23 (noting that, "During the ninety years of existence the Court of Assurance
was never a great success. Its only real importance lies in the fact that by taking no cogni-
zance of policies not registered at the Office of Assurances, it helped to maintain
Candeler's patent.").
274. See STRAUS, supra note 243, at 22 ("[The Court of Assurances'] jurisdiction was
confined to London [;] it was frequently at odds with the regular courts of law, and [there
were frequent appeals of] its decisions to the High Court of Chancery.").
275. Typically, a disgruntled party who did not want the Court of Assurance to decide
or hear an insurance-related matter petitioned a superior court for a writ of prohibition.
Simply put, the writ ordered the Court of Assurance to stop deciding the controversy or
refrain from intervening in a matter because another court had "superior" jurisdiction. To
be sure, the writ of prohibition severely reduced the Court of Assurance's ability to reduce
insurance malpractices, fraud and other immoral practices, like trafficking in slaves. See
Denoir v. Oyle, 82 Eng. Rep 621, 622 (1649) (granting a writ of prohibition because the
subject matter concerned life insurance and not merchandizing over which the Court of
Assurance has proper jurisdiction); Came and Moye's Case, 82 Eng. Rep. 1290 (1658)
(concluding that plaintiff could sue the defendant again in a common law court, even
though the plaintiff had lost his case before the Court of Assurance); Delbye v. Proudfoot,
89 Eng. Rep. 662, 663 (1692) (granting a writ of prohibition because the Court of Assur-
ance has "no jurisdiction in this case of fraud," concluding that giving the Assurances
Court such jurisdiction "would erect another Court of Equity in consequence to control
suits at law," and suggesting "that any other construction of [43 Eliz. c. 12 (1601)] would
make a clashing of jurisdictions."). See also, Johnson v. Desmineere, 23 Eng. Rep. 429
(1683) (reversing the decree of "the Court of Policies and Assurances in London [because]
the parties agreed to the matter in [as] an action on the case [in a court of law]").
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only a superficial regulation of insurance; and this was the state of insur-
ance regulation in Britain, arguably during the height, the most ruthless
and the most terrifying period of the transatlantic slave trade, 1601-1720.
To be sure, England enacted other legislation between 1720 and 1879
to regulate underwriters and to stop their abuses. For example, the
House of Commons enacted the Bubble Act of 1720276, in part, to re-
strain extravagant and unwarranted insurance practices. But it only regu-
lated corporate insurers' conduct; under the act, individual insurers still
could continue their highly questionable and speculative insurance activi-
ties.277 Twenty-six years later, the House enacted the Marine Insurance
Act of 1746,278 which placed only minimum prohibitions on wagering pol-
icies279 and treaties of reinsurance.280
For the next thirty years, Parliament did not pass any legislation to reg-
ulate British insurers. Then it enacted the Marine Insurance Act of 1774,
which required the owner of a life insurance policy to have an insurable
interest in the continued existence of the insured's life. 281 Fourteen years
later, the English government enacted the Marine Insurance Act of
276. Bubble Act of 1720, 6 Geo. I, c. 18 (1720).
277. See SUPPLE, supra note 245, at 32 (stating, "[The measure was described as 'An
Act for better securing powers and privileges, intended to be granted by His Majesty by
two Charters [to the Royal Exchange Assurance and the London Assurance] for assurance
of ships and merchandizes at sea, and for lending money upon bottomry; and for re-
straining several extravagant and unwarrantable practices therein mentioned.'"). See gen-
erally CLAYTON, supra note 242, at 53-54.
278. 28 Geo. 2, c. 37 (1745).
279. See Johnny C. Parker, Does Lack of an Insurable Interest Preclude an Insurance
Agent From Taking an Absolute Assignment of His Client's Life Policy?, 31 U. RICH. L.
REV. 71, 71 n.1 (1997).
The origins of the insurable interest doctrine can be traced to [19 Geo. 2, ch. 37, 511
(1746)] which declared in relevant part]: [N]o assurance or assurances shall be made by any
person or persons, bodies corporate or politic, on any ship, or on any goods, merchandise,
or effects without further proof of interest than the policy, or by way of gaming or wager-
ing, and, that every such assurance shall be null and void to all intent and purposes. Id.
280. See EDWIN W. KOPF, NoTEs ON ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF REINSURANCE
27, at http://www.casact.org/pubs/proceed/proceed29/29421.pdf (visited May 11, 2002).
Some under-writers found they could affect reinsurance with others. Underwriters were
accustomed to assign parts of risks to others at lower rates, and these reinsures had hopes
of finding other persons who would take parts of these risks at still lower rates. This traffic
in premium differences was so greatly abused that in 1746 it was forbidden [(19 Geo. 2, c.
37, Section 4 1746)]. Under this statute, reinsurance was permitted only if the party whose
risk was re-insured was insolvent, bankrupt or in debt and if the transaction was expressed
in the policy to be a reinsurance. The statute was more or less of a dead letter and was
repealed by 27 and 28 Vict.c 56, Section I on July 25, 1864. Id.
281. 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, 398 (1774). See also Parker, supra note 279, at 71 n.1 (noting,
"The Marine Act of 1774 is another anti-wagering statute 'for regulating insurance upon
lives, and for prohibiting all such insurances, except in cases where the person insuring
shall have an interest in the life or death of the person insured."').
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1788.282 The scope of that legislation was also very restrictive: "it re-
quired the name of the assured to be inserted in all policies"; 283 but it did
little to control underwriters' deceptive practices and immoral conduct,
like underwriting the transatlantic slave trade.
In effect, the British government did not enact any significant legisla-
tion to arrest merchant-underwriters' and corporate insurers' immoral
practices until 1807.284 That year, the government passed the first act to
abolish the transatlantic slave trade. A key provision in the Slave Trade
Act of 1807285 prohibited all insurers from underwriting and from aiding
and abetting the slave trade. In addition, the statute gave the govern-
ment and private persons broad powers to stop insurers' participation in
the horrors of the slave trade; and it imposed stiff fines on guilty insurers.
But again, when Parliament finally decided to get serious about persons'
trafficking in and terrorizing slaves - with substantial assistance from
insurers - the slave trade was two hundred and forty years old.
C. The Regulation of American Insurers During the Transatlantic Slave
Trade
At the outset, we should note: 1) marine insurance was the predomi-
nant form of underwriting in America during the transatlantic slave trade,
before and after the American Revolution;286 and, 2) both settlers and
British subjects engaged in the business of insurance in colonial America.
Among the settlers, a few wealthy merchant-shipowners used a "frac-
tional interests" system to insure their ships and cargoes. 287 They divided
282. 28 Geo 3, c. 56 (1788).
283. See Sarah Derrington, Does the Marine Insurance Act 1909 (Commonwealth) Still
Serve the Needs of the Business Community? 7 AUSTRALIA INS. L. J. 31 (1995), 1995 ILJ
Lexis 10, *5.
284. Actually, after Parliament passed the last marine insurance statute in 1788, it did
not enact another statute for the next one hundred and eighteen years. It passed the
Marine Insurance Act 1906 - [6 Edw. 7, c 41 (1906)]. In the process, it repealed all the
former marine insurance statutes and practically rewrote the whole body of marine insur-
ance law.
285. 47 Geo. 3, sess. 1, ch. 36 (1807).
286. The American Revolution is also called the American War of Independence -
the period between 1775 and 1783. The Thirteen Colonies on the Atlantic seaboard of
North America fought for and won independence from Great Britain and became the
United States.
287. See EDWIN J. PERKINS, THE ECONOMY OF COLONIAL AMERICA 88 (1980).
[In colonial America,] the leading merchants were engaged extensively in foreign com-
merce. Most mercantile fortunes were the result of profits in overseas ventures. An impor-
tant merchant probably owned a few ships outright and almost certainly took fractional
interests in other ships and their cargoes. Spreading risks through the device of fractional
interests was an early substitute for marine insurance. If one ship went down at sea, the
loss would not fall completely on the shoulders of a single merchant. Id.
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the ownership of the vessels among themselves to transfer and distribute
risks. Therefore, when various perils destroyed their ships and/or car-
goes, each merchant bore just a part of the loss. 288
Also, before and after the War of Independence, a significant number
of American settlers sold marine insurance on a part time basis. To illus-
trate, "[b]efore the Revolutionary War, individual underwriters [in Penn-
sylvania] issued policies on hulls and cargoes. '' 289 New York merchant-
underwriters underwrote shippers' business activities in that colony and
elsewhere, especially in Rhode Island.29° South Carolina was the most
commercially active southern colony,291 some of its merchants sold and
attempted to build a thriving insurance business with little success.292
"The insurance business in Rhode Island made its debut formally in 1784,
when sixteen Newport merchants [formed] . . .the Newport Insurance
Company., 293 And years before the American Revolution, private inves-
tors in Boston supported merchant-underwriters who pitched marine
insurance.294
Although the colonial merchants sold some marine insurance and
made small profits, there is general consensus that British insurers were
the major insurers as well as the primary sellers of marine insurance in
America before the War of Independence.295 Of course, this means that
288. EDWIN J. PERKINS, AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE & FINANCIAL SERVICES, 1700-
1815 284 (1994).
289. See WILLIAM H. A. CARR, PERILS: NAMED AND UNNAMED-THE STORY OF THE
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA 37 (1967) (stating, "There were about fifty
men who wrote marine insurance, almost all of them as a sideline to other business activity,
during the first decade after the war.").
290. ROBERT A. EAST, BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY
ERA 23 (Peter Smith 1964 (1938)). See CARR, supra note 289, at 37 (stating, "Next door [to
the Old Insurance Office on Fronts and High Streets in Philadelphia] was another [marine
insurance] office maintained as a sort of agency for the New York underwriters.").
291. PERKINS, supra note 287, at 95 ("The most important commercial center in the
south was Charleston, South Carolina.").
292. CARR, supra note 289, at 36 ("[Among the American settlers,] insurance was
being written only by individual entrepreneurs in America until 1735, when the Friendly
Society for Mutual Insurance was organized in Charleston, South Carolina, only to fail
fifteen years later.").
293. COUGHTRY, supra note 229, at 92.
294. See, e.g., EAST, supra note 290, at 23-24 (stating, "There was a group of marine
insurance investors established in Boston for many years before the Revolution as the
'office' of Ezekiel Price, secretary to three provincial governors. Another Boston office
was that of Edward Payne .").
295. Carr, supra note 289, at 38 ("[T]he insurance market was primarily in London,
because the American underwriters, joining together in a syndicate, could not write more
than $25,000 coverage. The London underwriters were able to cover very large risks.").
See also Julia Hollister, The Changing Skyline of Insurance Careers, CALIFORNIA JOB
JOURNAL, Nov. 26, 2000 available at http://www.jobjournal.com/article full-text.asp?ar-
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British firms were the primary underwriters for American merchants who
participated in the slave trade, from the very beginning to the height of
that terrorizing enterprise.296 After the Revolution, however, American
firms became the chief marine underwriters in the new nation.
In fact, the very first stock, marine insurance company the Insurance
Company of North America (INA) began in 1792. A group of investors
gathered in Independence Hall in the same room "[where] the Declara-
tion of Independence had been signed and the federal Constitution
drafted five years earlier, 297 and agreed to start the company. As of this
writing, INA still exists as part of CIGNA insurance group.298 And like
their British counterparts before the Revolution, INA and other Ameri-
can underwriters secured the bulk of the insurance business in this coun-
try after Independence.299 Most definitely, American insurers' assumed a
variety of risks associated with maritime commerce, including underwrit-
ing the transatlantic slave trade.3"'
tid=66.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2003) (noting, "Marine insurance in the colonies was han-
dled largely by companies in the mother country until after the Revolution."); Robert D.
Wurtz, A Short History of Insurance or How Long Have They Been Getting Away With
This? http://www.aegis-corporation.com/aegis/articles/historyofinsurance.html (visited
May 12, 2002) (stating, "The American colonies, prior to the Revolution, were generally
insured by British underwriters employing agents in major maritime cities.").
296. See COUGHTRY, supra note 229, at 92 (writing, "Prior to 1750, Rhode Island voy-
ages were underwritten, for the most part, outside the colony. London houses seem to have
been the chief underwriters. The London houses of Hayley and Hopkins and Tomlinson
and Trecothick handled many Rhode Island African risks before 1776.").
297. See CARR, supra note 289, at 41 (noting, "The meeting was' held in the east room
of the State House, better known today as Independence Hall. INA was born, the first
stock marine company in the United States.").
298. See About Cigna History, available at http://www.cigna.com/general/about/his-
tory/roots.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2003).
CIGNA was formed in 1982. Our name mixes the letters INA and CG together. Like a
strong and healthy tree, CIGNA has deep roots. The histories of our two main predeces-
sors, the Insurance Company of North America (INA) and Connecticut General Life In-
surance Company (CG), reach back to earlier centuries. INA was founded in 1792 in
Philadelphia after meetings in Independence Hall. The organizers were merchants and
other prominent citizens who sought to protect ships, cargoes, warehouses and homes
through a company offering marine and fire insurance. Id.
299. See, e.g., MARQUIS JAMES, BIOGRAPHY OF A BUSINESS, 1792-1942: INSURANCE
COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA (1942) (noting that, "During the first decade after the war
the Philadelphia underwriting community grew to a body of some fifty firms or individual
mostly shipping men themselves. They offered considerable competition to the agents of
the London companies, which cut rates to meet the challenge.")
300. Part IV carefully explores and documents this point more thoroughly. But see
Joseph N. DiStefano, No Slave Coverage: Insurer Says Ace Ltd. Has Found No Evidence
that Insurance Company of North America Ever Wrote Policies On Slaves or Slave Ships?
Scholars Are Skeptical, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May 9, 2002, at C1, available at 2002 WL
19585666 (This article outlines the debate about whether INA marine-insurance division,
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Therefore we ask: was the business of insurance regulated in colonial
and post-colonial America? The answer is no. When Americans partici-
pated in the slave trade from the mid-seventeenth to the early eighteenth
centuries, "the underwriting of marine insurance was a strictly voluntary
practice .. ..""' Merchant-underwriters only had to cooperate among
themselves and adhere to customary business practices. Or, stated an-
other way, they regulated themselves, for American state and federal
governments would not begin to regulate the business of insurance until
the early-to-mid nineteenth century.30 2 But unquestionably, the failure
of governments to regulate insurers produced numerous abuses, crimes
and deceptive practices. 30 3 More important, the failure to regulate also
permitted insurers to engage in all sorts of immoral conduct like gam-
bling3"4 and helping slave traders to terrorize, kidnap, murder and en-
slave millions of African men, women and children.
in particular, insured the transatlantic slave trade. Id. A definitive answer is still pending.
But the charge remains: "'It's absolutely impossible that they were not insuring some trip
that belonged to the slave trade. They were the major insurers of maritime trade in the
British West Indies,' said Walter Licht, associate dean of history at the University of Penn-
sylvania."). Id. See also This Month in CIGNA History: December?Serving a Global Econ-
omy Since 1792, available at http://www.cigna.com/general/about/history/december.html
(last visited Nov. 29, 2003) ("The last month of the year is filled with firsts in CIGNA's
international history. Although the underwriting was done in Philadelphia, the policies
written that first December were made on ships and property destined for international
ports. They included the West Indies.").
301. EAST, supra note 290, at 23.
302. See generally Lissa L. Broome and Jerry W. Markham, Banking and Insurance:
Before and After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 25 J. OF CORP. L. 723, 728 (2000) (outlining
Massachusetts's, New York's and Pennsylvania's first attempts to regulate insurers in the
early-to-mid nineteenth century). To repeat, federal efforts to regulate insurers did not
occur during the transatlantic slave trade, barring the explicit anti-insurance provisions in
the federal abolitions of slave trade acts. And, of course, the Supreme Court declared in
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183-185 (1868) that the federal government could not regulate
the business of insurance, as it was a state matter.
303. Cf. Id. (documenting that "some abuses" accompanied insurers' and underwrit-
ers' successes in early America).
304. See EAST, supra note 290, at 69-70 ("[The War of Independence] stimulated the
organization of marine insurance groups in Boston and other New York seaports. Rates
were so high that it was little more than a gambling proposition, with the cards stacked in
favor of the underwriters.").
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PART IV. BRITISH AND AMERICAN INSURERS As AIDERS AND
ABETTORS OF COMMERCIAL TERRORISM DURING THE
TRANSATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE
A. Insurers as Aiders and Abettors of Terrorism Before the Enactment
of Anti-Slave Legislation
The general allegation that American and British underwriters helped
slave traders to practice commercial terrorism appears throughout this
article. At this point, it is appropriate to ask: specifically, how did
merchant-underwriters and insurance companies aid and abet the slave
traders? The first and most obvious form of substantial assistance has
been mentioned before: For a premium, American and British underwrit-
ers sold marine insurance and accepted "all perils" associated with slave
trafficking.3" 5 They agreed to reimburse shipowners, slave traders and
slave owners, when a covered peril caused a financial loss. More aston-
ishing, when slave traders could not afford to pay exorbitant or even rea-
sonable premiums, which was okay. Insurers simply loaned the money to
pay the premiums.3 °6 That arrangement nearly always ensured the avail-
ability of marine insurance to underwrite slavers' terrorism.
Also, it was common for captains and crew members on slave ships to
receive a few "privilege slaves" instead of money as compensation; 30 7
therefore, before a voyage, marine underwriters or their agents agreed to
insure crew members' property and to make reimbursements if the "priv-
ilege slaves" died before or after reaching the final destination.30 8 Fur-
305. See Lockett v. Merchants' Ins. Co. of New Orleans, 10 Rob. 339 (1845) available
at 1845 WL 1472, *1 (La.).
This was an action to recover $10,000, the insurance upon fifteen slaves. The policy pro-
vides that the company take upon themselves the risks of 'takings at sea, arrests, restraints,
and detainments of all kings, princes, or people of what nation, condition or quality soever,
barratry of the master or mariners, and all other perils, losses, or misfortunes that have or
shall come to the hurt, detriment or damage of the said goods and merchandize, or any
part thereof, to which assurers are liable for.' Id.
306. See COUGHTRY, supra note 229, at 100-01 (stating that "Marine insurance was an
expensive but vital prerequisite of any maritime trading venture [S]Ilaver insurance [was] a
burdensome expense. Insurance companies recognized the financial strain that such an
investment would cause, and made it a common practice to provide their customers with
loans to cover all of part of the premium.").
307. See, e.g., ELIZABETH DONNAN, DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE HISTORY OF
THE SLAVE TRADE TO AMERICA 247 (Vol. 3 1965). "Captain Briggs went off and viewed
his slaves [which included] a great proportion of privelege and males slaves [We offered] to
sell his privelege free of [c]ommission.") Privelege is defined as "slaves belonging to [the]
captain, doctor, and mates. The usual proportion for the captain was four of every 104
[slaves] carried." Id. at 247 n.3.
308. See, e.g., Robertson v. Ewer, 99 Eng. Rep. 1011 (1786).
This was an action on a policy of insurance on the ship 'Dumfries' from London to the
coast of Africa, during her stay and trade there, and at and from thence to her port or ports
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thermore, captains and other crewmembers often died at sea from a
variety of perils slave insurrections, diseases, and natural causes.3"9 For
that reason, they would instruct an agent to secure life insurance before a
voyage commenced. Of course, underwriters would readily take the pre-
miums, promising to pay proceeds when the insured died. But after the
insured's death, insurers often refused to compensate beneficiaries or
survivors.310
Arguably, the ability to contract for life and property insurance helped
to motivate a large number of captains and seamen those looking for
both adventure and a modest amount of financial security to participate
in the slave trade. Seamen, however, certainly knew that slave voyages
and trade were exceptionally risky311 commercial enterprises, especially
since both involved murdering, shackling, maiming, terrorizing and en-
slaving millions of uncooperative innocents. Also, the evidence is incon-
trovertible. The ability to purchase insurance encouraged many
otherwise reluctant merchants and squeamish investors to participate in
the odious trade. They appreciated the obvious: the slave trade was a
combination of terrorism, abnormally dangerous natural conditions, and
of discharge in the British West India Islands [and it] was brought to recover the amount of
[seamen's] wages and provisions, in consequence of her detention under the embargo at
Barbadoes. Id.;
Webster v. De Tastet, 101 Eng. Rep. 908 (1797).
The plaintiff [was] hired to go as a mate in a ship from the coast of Africa to the Havana,
for which he was to receive wages at the rate of 51. per month, and three privilege slaves
free of expense on the ship's arriving at the port of sale - directed the defendant, who was
his agent at Liverpool, to get an insurance on his privilege[.] Id.
309. See, e.g., Freeland v. Glover, 103 Eng. Rep. 177, 178 (1806).
A ship [was] on an African voyage [The] commander wrote a letter to his owners, mention-
ing an attack on her [by] natives, who killed the captain and several of the crew, and
wounded others; [after] a fever the crew were reduced to five. This was an action on a
policy of insurance. [T]he only question was whether material information had been con-
cealed from the underwriters [at the inception of the contract.] Id.
310. See King v. Glover, 127 Eng. Rep. 603, 603 (1806).
This was an action by the Plaintiff as widow and representative of her husband - Capt. Ch
King - who commanded the ship 'John' [and was] employed in the slave trade [The suit]
was commenced by her for the recovery of a loss upon a policy of insurance effected by her
husband 'on his commissions, privileges, &c. as may be hereafter valued.' Id.
311. See RAWLEY, supra note 217, at 186 (explaining that "[t]he slave trade, it is plain,
was a business fraught with more than normal risks, from slave mortality and insurrection,
as well as from war, privateers, and pirates. The cost of conducting business was large, in
procurement of cargo ships and in securing insurance."); Herman E. Krooss and Charles
Gilbert, The Rise of the All Purpose Merchant, AMERICAN BUSINESS HISTORY, Jan. 22,
2002, (Lecture 3), at 8 (stating, "The [transatlantic slave] trade was more than ordinarily
risky and not as common as other voyages."). This same information appears in Herman
E. Krooss and Charles Gilbert, AMERICAN BUSINESS HISTORY (Englewood Cliff, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1972), chap. 3.
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ultra-hazardous activities. Accordingly, insurers had to cover those perils
before ordinary investors and merchants would participate.
There is a final important point. American and British insurers and
their agents also participated directly in the slave trade horrors, ergo they
committed terrorism. And that participation manifested itself in at least
two forms. First, many wealthier merchants like the D'Wolfs3"2 in colo-
nial and post-colonial America were "all purpose" merchants. They
owned ships; they were part-time underwriters; they sold goods to stock
ships; and they financed voyages and ventures independently.313 Conse-
quently, those versatile merchants had business options. As reported ear-
lier, they could aid and abet slave traders by selling insurance to them.
As merchants-insurers-shipowners, they could participate directly in the
horrors and riches of the slave trade. More often than not, they exercised
the latter option3 4 by fitting slave ships, hiring captains and crews, and
giving their representatives the means to capture, terrorize and sell
innocents.315
Second, enslaving and torturing blameless Africans on large planta-
tions is the other way that underwriters participated directly in the slave
trade. Simply put, underwriters owned plantations and employed agents
to manage those businesses. In fact, insurers- with their agents' assis-
tance- designed, financed and implemented various forms of terrorism
312. See, e.g., Robertson and Kerber, supra note 223, at 9E (finding "nowhere did the
slave-trading business flourish more than in the seaports of Rhode Island. Three genera-
tions of D'Wolfs [made] 88 voyages and [became] the nation's leading slave traders.
[M]any of the ships that carried [slaves to southern plantations] were owned by Northern
merchants like the D'Wolfs [who] built entire industries, from rum distilleries to insurance
companies.").
313. See Herman E. Krooss and Charles Gilbert, The Rise of the All Purpose
Merchant, AMERICAN BUSINESS HISTORY, Jan. 22, 2002, (Lecture 3), at 8, 13 (emphasizing
that "[m]any of the wealthier and more successful merchants owned several ship as well as
shares of others. Many merchants regarded marine insurance as so closely related to their
main activity that they were almost continually involved in this activity.").
314. See, e.g., COUGHTRY, supra note 229, at 92-94.
The insurance business in Rhode Island made it debut formally in 1784, when sixteen New-
port merchants subscribed to a marine insurance company. Out of this fledging syndicate
emerged the Newport Insurance Company [which] accepted risks on eighty-one voyages.
[N]early 21 percent covered slave vessels, their cargoes, or 'private ventures' in the African
trade. Prominent among the new subscribers was James D'Wolf, a leading merchant and
slave trader. [M]any of the slave vessels insured by the firm belonged to company under-
writers. Id.
315. Cf RAWLEY, supra note 217, at 216-217.
Of a different nature was the slaving of John Dawson, 'possibly the world's leading slave
trader.' Dawson's slaving enterprise involved ownership of many ships, use of large ves-
sels, investments of huge amounts of capital, and maintaining agents in different parts of
Africa. Of the whole Liverpool investment in ship, outfitting, and cargo, [a governmental
official] estimated that Dawson owned (including insurance at 6 per cent) one-seventh. Id.
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to control slaves, to help maximize substantial returns on the insurers'
investments. To be sure, a variety of insurers- including merchant-un-
derwriters, insurance companies and the esteemed subscribers at the
prestigious Lloyd's of London - owned plantations, or had substantial
shares or other interests in those institutions.
To illustrate, consider the conduct of John Julius Angerstein the pur-
ported "founder"'3 1 6 of the "new" Lloyd's of London.3 1 7 Angerstein was
perhaps the most savvy, highly regarded and extremely adept underwriter
at Lloyd's. 31 8 For years, he underwrote the maritime activities for a vari-
ety of merchants, including slave traders, 319 but that "man of such integ-
rity,",320 also effected, sanctioned, and financed directly the enslavement
and terrorization of African slaves. Put simply, Angerstein along with
other underwriters at Lloyd's owned a significant share of a large planta-
tion in Grenada.321  He made a fortune as an underwriter and a slave
316. See STRAUS, supra note 243, at 105 (stating "[i]t would be incorrect to call [John
Julius Angerstein], as he has been called, the real founder of Lloyd's [;] but he must be
accorded one of the two or three most honorable places in its history [.]").
317. See NIEKERK, supra note 208, at 628-629.
[T]he body of reputable and specialist underwriters and insurance brokers Lloyd's Coffee-
House in the eighteenth century also attracted a large number of speculators and gamblers.
[Therefore,] a group of underwriters and brokers [decided to break away] in 1769. Al-
though [the break-away group] continued to attract a large clientele, the old Lloyd's soon
experienced a drop in business and by 1785 it had disappeared. The leading figures in the
establishment of the new Lloyd's in the Royal Exchange [was] John Julius Angerstein, a St.
Petersburg-born merchant of German extraction. Id.
318. See STRAUS, supra note 243, at 104 (explaining that "[t]he Angersteins were
merchants. [Alt an unusually early age [Julian] showed not only great commercial aptitude
but also a general character of the most sterling kind. [H]e soon made his mark in the
marine insurance world.").
319. See Id. (finding "[i]n the course of forty years Angerstein amass a considerable
fortune. Such was his reputation for business acumen and stability that '[insurance] poli-
cies sanctioned by his subscription speedily acquired so great an authority that they were,
by way of distinction, called 'Julians."').
320. Id.
321. See Dan Byrnes, THE BLACKHEATH CONNECTION: A WEBSITE BOOK. Chapter
42, http://whatson.northnet.net.aulusers/blackheath/thebc43.html (visited May 23, 2002)
(emphasizing "[t]he agreement amongst Lloyd's historians is that Angerstein, who also had
a West Indies plantation interest, developed a 'cabal' of underwriters."); Joan Anim-Addo,
LONGEST JOURNEY: A BLACK HISTORY OF LEWISHAM, 42-45 (London: Deptford Forum
Publishing, 1996) (reporting the John Julius Angerstein owned a third share in a slave
estate on the island of Grenada).
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owner,32 2 a level of wealth that caused substantial intra-familial conflicts
and a major legal battle after his death.323
More important, that Angerstein was part owner of a coercive planta-
tion in Grenada is quite telling. Grenada is renowned for being a place
where slave owners subjected free men and women to some of the most
horrendous conditions and prolonged terrorism in the Western Hemi-
sphere.324 In fact, it was not beyond a Grenadian plantation owner to
track a runaway slave to a free country; and while there the owner would
ask a court to force the runaway to return to the terror, subjugation, and
horrific conditions in Grenada.32 5
Undeniably, the well-regarded John Julius Angerstein and similarly sit-
uated underwriters practiced some of the worse forms of commercial ter-
rorism. 326 More noteworthy, those otherwise highly esteemed, learned
and refined underwriters at Lloyd's of London knew exactly what they
322. See STRAUS, supra note 243, at 104. See also, Simon Edge, Charles Saatchi Paid
GBP 1 Million For This Sculpture. You Could Buy The Original Toy For GBP 14.99. So
Who's The Fool? THE EXPRESS, May 2, 2000, (finding "[The British] National Gallery was
started in 1824 from the private collection of a financier called John Julius Angerstein.").
323. See, e.g., Angerstein v. Martin, 37 Eng. Rep, 1087, 1088 (1823).
The testator [John Julius Angerstein] died on the 29th of January 1823, leaving John [Julius
Williams] Angerstein his only son; The testator at the time of his death possessed a very
large personal estate. The bill was filed by John [Julius Williams] Angerstein, within a year
after the death of the testator, against his children. [In the will, they were listed as] the
tenants for life in remainder. Id.
324. Cf Andrew Purvis, Travel: Eat With the Locals? Yum!, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Dec. 12, 1999, at 23 (stating, "[E]at as the locals did 200 years ago, when armadillo, sea
eggs and breadfruit stew were eaten by plantation slaves so undernourished that they took
whatever sustenance they could get. It may be a part of Grenada's culinary history, but
perhaps it is a history some people wish to forget."); Ottobah Cugoano, NARRATIVE OF
THE ENSLAVEMENT OF OTrOBAH CUGOANO, A NATIVE OF AFRICA, 120-121 (Published
by himself, 1787), available at http://docsouth.unc.edu/neh/cugoano/cugoano.html.
I was early snatched away from my native country, with about eighteen or twenty more
boys and girls, as we were playing in a field [W]e were kidnapped, and as we were decoyed
and drove along, we were soon conducted to a factory, and from thence, in the fashionable
way of traffic, consigned to Grenada. Some of us attempted, in vain, to run away, but
pistols and cutlasses were soon introduced, threatening, that if we offered to stir, we should
all lie dead on the spot. Id.
325. Cf. Williams v. Brown, 127 Eng. Rep. 39, 40 (1802).
The Plaintiff was a Negro [;] in November 1797, [he] entered at London on board the '11
Holderness,' bound for Grenada, as an ordinary seaman. On the arrival of the '11 Holder-
ness' at Grenada the Plaintiff was claimed as a runaway slave by Mr. Hardman his former
master, and delivered to him. When the Plaintiff was claimed in Grenada as a runaway
slave, he was not only liable to be remanded to slavery, but by the laws of the island he was
amenable to severe punishment for this desertion. Id.
326. See Charles Royster, THE FABULOUS HISTORY OF THE DISMAL SWAMP COM-
PANY: A STORY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON'S TIMES (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1999)
(reporting that "diverse men had come to Lloyd's [of London] like [John Julius] Anger-
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were doing. Like their clients who trafficked in human cargoes, Anger-
stein and other underwriters at Lloyd's subjected innocents to continual
and unimaginable terror and misery to guarantee wealth and commercial
advantage.
B. American and British Legislative Efforts to End the Terrors of the
Transatlantic Slave Trade
A few weeks after the destruction of the World Trade Center and the
attack on the Pentagon, the Bush II administration "unleashed the first
stage of its financial war on terrorism." '32 7 The Administration ordered
U.S. banks to freeze the assets of a variety of organizations and individu-
als, especially the principals, aiders and abettors who were allegedly re-
sponsible for the September 11th attacks.3 28 Within six weeks of those
fatal attacks, Congress passed the Antiterrorism-Patriot Act of 2001.329
Put simply, the Patriot Act gives the government controversial 330 and
broad powers to stop all forms of terrorism: federal officials can arrest,
prosecute, punish and seize the property of alleged terrorists and their
aiders and abettors.331 Actually, since the mid-1980s, Congress has en-
stein a rapidly rising young man, cutting an ever bigger figure in the Canada trade and the
African slave trade [.1").
327. See Laurie P. Cohen, Glenn Simpson, Mark Maremont and Peter Fritsch, Aiding
and Abetting: Bush's Financial War On Terrorism Strikes at Islamic Charities, WALL ST. J.
Sept. 25, 2001, at Al.
328. See David L. Green, U. S. Freezes Bin Laden Assets? Bush Acts to Cut off Flow
of Money to Militant, Associates Foreign Banks Warned President Describes Executive Or-
der as Part of War on Terror, THE BALT. SUN, Sept. 25, 2001, at Al (noting that "President
Bush warned foreign banks that he would freeze their assets and halt their financial trans-
actions in the United States... [He also declared that the U.S. government will] deal with
them, just like we intend to deal with others who aid and abet terrorist organizations."').
329. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) - "Uniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (Patriot
Act) Act of 2001." See also, 148 CONG. REC. S2916-01, (daily ed. April 18, 2002) (Com-
ment of Mr. Kyl.).
330. See, e.g., Tom Brune, Terror Measures Draw Legal Challenges, NEWSDAY, Jan.
30, 2002, at A14.
A lawyer for the [Global Relief Foundation] filed a lawsuit in Chicago Monday to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of a provision of the antiterrorism law, known as the USA Pa-
triot Act, allowing the government to freeze the assets of a group suspected of aiding
terrorists .... 'The blocking of the foundation's [assets, seizure of its documents and subse-
quent public statements by the federal government accusing it] of ties to terrorism have
violated the constitutional rights of this U.S. corporate citizen,' he said in a statement. Id.
331. Cf. James V. Grimaldi, An Arab American Charitable Connection That Might Be
Too Close for Comfort, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2001 at E6 (explaining that "[tihe Antiter-
rorism Act of 1992 contains a provision that permits torts from terrorist activity to be
actionable even if they occurred in a foreign country. Put another way, if [a terrorist kills
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acted a number of antiterrorism statutes,33 2 because many legislators be-
lieve that terrorism is a serious problem requiring radical measures.
Similarly, during the late 1700's and with a substantial less sense of
urgency,33 3 members of the Senate and House decided that the terrors,
horrors, and inhumanity of the transatlantic slave trade had to end.
Therefore, after colonial merchants had participated in the slave trade for
more than a century, and about twenty years after the Declaration of
Independence, Congress enacted the first anti-slave trade legislation: The
Slave Trade Act of 1794.334 In relevant part, it stated: "[n]o citizen or
citizens of the United States ... shall cause any ship or vessel to sail from
any port . . . for the purpose of carrying on any trade or traffic in
slaves .... [And] all and every person so ... aiding or abetting therein,
shall severally forfeit and pay the sum of two thousand dollars .... "335
Four years later Congress approved the Slave Trade Act of 1798.336
That statute prohibited slave trafficking in the newly established Missis-
sippi Territory; and, it also prevented anyone from aiding or abetting that
commercial activity. 337 As punishment for violating the act, the govern-
ment could seize and free the captives, and force each principal, aider and
your son overseas], you could sue the perpetrators or people who aided and abetted the
killers for compensation for your loss.").
332. See The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 - Pub. L.
No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 853 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C. (1994)) (en-
acted in part to provide U.S. victims of international terrorism with a civil cause of action.);
The Antiterrorism Act of 1987 - Pub. L. No. 100-204, 101 Stat. 1407 (1987) (codified at 22
U.S.C. §§ 5201-5203 (1994)) (enacted solely to impose restrictions on the Palestinian Liber-
ation Organization (PLO) by prohibiting U.S. citizens from "receiving anything of value
except information material from the PLO." Id. § 5202. This act also made it unlawful to
establish "an office or other facilities" that furthered the interests of the PLO.) Id.; The
Antiterrorism Act of 1990- Pub. L. No. 101-519, 104 Stat. 2250 (1990) (codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2332, 2333-2338 (1994)); The Antiterrorism Act of 1992 - Federal Courts Ad-
ministration Act, Pub. L. No. 102-572, §§ 1001-1003, 106 Stat. 4506, 4520-24 (1992)
(amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-2338 (1994) (enacted to create a cause of action for U.S.
victims of international terrorism).
333. Cf. Editorial? Proceed With Caution, DENVER POST ,Oct. 26, 2001, at B6 (report-
ing that when "[v]iewed against the normal glacial pace of legislation, Congress acted with
break-neck speed too speedily, some civil libertarians say to grant Attorney General John
Ashcroft new tools [Under the USA Patriot Act] in the war against terror.
334. 3d Cong., ch. 11 (1st Sess. 1794).
335. Id. at §§ 1-2.
336. 5th Cong., ch. 28 (2d Sess. 1798).
337. Id. at § 7 ("[It] shall not be lawful for any person or persons to import or bring
into the Mississippi territory, from any port or place or to cause or procure to be so im-
ported or brought, or knowingly to aid or assist in so importing or bringing any slave or
slaves.").
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abettor to pay three hundred dollars for each slave.3 38 Congress soon
discovered, however, that the Acts of 1794 and 1798 were impotent, even
though both acts clearly banned all principals and their secondary sup-
porters from terrorizing, intimidating and enslaving innocent Africans.
Clever lawbreakers - driven by excessive financial greed -soon learned
how to circumvent the prohibitions under both statutes. For example,
American merchant-slavers started purchasing the services of foreigners
and foreign ship owners.
Therefore, within three years of passing the 1798 act, Congress ratified
two additional statutes. The Slave Trade Act of 1800... prohibited Amer-
ican citizens and foreign residents from securing a property interest in
any slave trade vessel.340 Furthermore, it outlawed American citizens'
voluntary service on slave ships.3 41 What were the penalties for violating
this act? First, the Act of 1800 authorized the U.S. Navy to seize and
secure the vessels and cargo except the slaves as prizes.342 More aston-
ishingly, for the first time in three-hundred-plus years, a person could go
to prison for practicing this form of commercial terrorism.3 43 The individ-
ual could also receive a stiff fine.3 4 4 Finally, Congress enacted the Slave
Trade Act of 1803; 3 4 1 it was designed especially to deter and punish mas-
ters and captains who served on slave ships.3 4 6 That legislation also al-
338. Id. ("[E]very person so offending, and being convicted before any court within
the said territory, shall forfeit and pay, for each and every slave so imported or bought, the
sum of three hundred dollars; and every slave so imported or bought, shall become entitled
to, and receive his or her freedom.").
339. 6th Cong., ch. 51 (1st Sess. 1800).
340. Id. at § 1 ("[It] shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United States, or [for]
other person residing within the United States to have any right or property in any vessel
employed in the transportation of slaves from one foreign country or place to another.").
341. Id. at § 2 ("[It] shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United States, or [for]
other person residing therein, to serve on board any vessel of the United States employed
in the transportation of slaves from one foreign country to another [.]").
342. Id. at § 4 ("[It] shall be lawful for any commissioned vessels of the United States
to seize and take any vessels employed in [the slave] trade business or traffic; and such
vessel, together with her tackle, apparel and guns, goods and effects, other than slaves shall
be condemned for the use of the officers and crew of the vessel making the seizure.").
343. Id. at § 2 ("[Any] citizen or other person [who] voluntarily [serves on a slave-
trade vessel] shall be liable to be indicted, and [shall] be imprisoned not exceeding two
years.").
344. Id. ("[On] conviction, [the guilty party] shall be liable to a fine not exceeding two
thousands dollars.")
345. 7th Cong., ch. 10 (2d Sess. 1803).
346. Id. at § 1 ("[No] master or captain of any ship or vessel, or any other person, shall
import or bring any [N]egro, mulatto or other person of colour into any port of place of the
United States.").
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lowed the government to impose hefty fines. If convicted, the criminals
had to pay one thousand dollars for each slave on the ship.347
But attempts to enforce those initial anti-terrorism acts were highly in-
effective; consequently, slave traders, along with their aiders and abet-
tors, continued to terrorize murder and kidnap persons unwilling to live
in bondage. Then, with the same pronounced sense of urgency and deter-
mination that it displayed when enacting the Patriot Act of 2001,348 Con-
gress passed the comprehensive Slave Trade Act of 1807."4 9 Like the
Patriot Act, the Act of 1807 was a comprehensive anti-terrorism statute,
one designed to totally abolish the horrors of the transatlantic slave trade.
Among its many provisions, the 1807 act gave the federal government
broad authority to gather intelligence and conduct surveillances. 350 Fed-
eral officials also received other sweeping enforcement powers under the
act: 1) the clout to search, seize and make use of suspects' tangible and
intangible property,351 2) the authority to hunt, deter, detain, arrest and
prosecute terrorists,352 and 3) the power to fine and send convicted slave
traders to prison for terrorizing and enslaving innocent civilians. 3  More
347. Id. ("[If] any captain or master [violate this statute], he shall forfeit and pay the
sum of one thousand dollars for each and every [N]egro, mulatto, or other person of col-
our... brought or imported ... ").
348. See Lubet, supra note 148, at 21.
In nearly every public pronouncement, the Bush administration has emphasized that this
will be a 'different kind of war' [against our enemy,] an international terrorist network ....
[B]ut it turns out that it is not completely unprecedented. History has seen at least one
other protracted military campaign against as murderous international network that vic-
timized innocent civilians. We can draw an analogy between 19th Century slave traders
and 21st Century terrorists, and not only because both targeted innocent populations. To
defenseless men and women in chains, what was slavery if not a form of terror?" Id.
349. Act of Mar. 2, 1807, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426.
350. Id. at § 7 ("And it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, and he is
hereby authorized, to cause any of the armed vessels of the United States to be manned
and cruise on any part of the coast of the United States, or territories where he may judge
attempts will be made to violate the provisions of this act.").
351. Id. ("And the proceeds of all ships and vessels [including] the goods and effects
on board of them, which shall be so seized, prosecuted and condemned, shall be divided
equally between the United States and the officers and men who shall make such seizures
[and distributed as prize].").
352. Id.
[The President of the United States may] instruct and direct the commander of armed
vessels of the United States to seize and bring into any port of the United States all ships or
vessels of the United States, wheresoever found on the high seas .... [And] the captain,
master, or commander of very such ship or vessel . . .shall be deemed guilty of a high
misdemeanor, and shall be liable to be prosecuted before any court of the United States,
having jurisdiction. Id.
353. Id. at § 5.
[If] any citizen or citizens shall take on board and ship or vessel any [N]egro, mulatto, or
person of colour, with the intent to sell him, her, or them [as] a slave such offender shall be
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important, the Act of 1807 like it precursors and the Patriot Act of 2001
gave federal officials far-reaching authority to capture, prosecute and
punish aiders and abettors. The government could punish 1) secondary
supporters who helped to prepare slave voyages and ventures,354 and 2)
those that gave substantial assistance during the voyages and ventures.355
Did the American anti-slave trade statutes clearly target insurance
companies and outlaw their immoral and offensive activities? The an-
swer is no. The explanation, however, it not complicated. As reported
earlier, the "all purpose" merchants comprised the vast majority of the
business community in America, immediately before and years after In-
dependence. To repeat, they owned and fitted ships, sold and bought
slaves, and underwrote the slave trade. Therefore, under every act, Con-
gress explicitly targeted all merchants, including those who sold insurance
to the commercial terrorists. Without doubt, in light of their undeniable
involvement in the slave trade, the "all purpose" merchants were either
amateur terrorists, or recreational aiders and abettors of terrorism.
The British Parliament, on the other hand, focused its attention imme-
diately and carefully on stopping merchant-underwriters and insurance
companies from financing the slave trade. By now, the reason should be
fairly obvious: when Britain enacted its first anti-slave trade legislation
An Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, 1807,356 its insurers had
been underwriting the terrors of the slave trade for more that two-and-a-
half centuries.357 As a consequence, members of the Houses of Lords
and Commons understood better than members of the United States
deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor, and [after conviction] shall suffer imprisonment for
not more than ten years nor less that five years, and [shall] be fined not exceeding ten
thousand dollars, nor less than one thousand dollars. Id.
354. Id. at § 3 ("[All] and every person so building, fitting out, equipping, loading, or
otherwise preparing or sending away any ship or [in] any ways aiding or abetting therein
shall severally forfeit and pay twenty thousands dollars.") (emphasis added).
355. Id. at § 4 ("If any citizen or citizens of the United States, or any person shall take
on board, receive or transport from any of the coasts or kingdoms of Africa or shall be in
any ways aiding or abetting therein, such citizen or citizens, or person pay five thousand
dollars.") (emphasis added.).
356. An Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, 1807, 47 Geo. III, c. 36, Sess. 1
(Eng.).
357. Cf. William Wood, ELIZABETHAN SEA-DOGS; A CHRONICLE OF DRAKE AND His
COMPANIONS, 59-60 (Yale Univ. Press, 1918).
Shakespeare's 'Putter-out of five for one' was a typical Elizabethan speculator exploiting
the riskiest form of sea-dog trade Marine insurance of the regular kind was a very different
thing. It was already of immemorial age .... Lloyd's [of London] had not been heard of.
But there were plenty of smart Elizabethan underwriters already practicing the general
principles which were formally adopted two hundred years later, in 1779, at Lloyd's Coffee
House. A policy taken out on the Tiger immortalized by Shakespeare would serve as a
model still. Id.
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Congress that insurance played an indispensable role in financing the
fears, intimidation, and gruesome destructiveness of the slave trade. Par-
liament also knew that to end the terrorism, they would have to do what
the Bush administration did after the September 11th terrorists attacks
impose fines, prosecute, and send both principals and secondary support-
ers to prison and launch a serious attack "on the financial foundation of
the global terror network., 35
8
The language of the British 1807 Act, therefore, is very expansive and
clear: "[i]t shall be unlawful for any of His Majesty's Subjects, or any
Person, or Persons resident within the United Kingdom, or any of the
Colonies... to carry away or remove, or knowingly and willfully to pro-
cure, aid, or assist in the carrying away or removing as Slaves ... any of
the Subjects or Inhabitants of Africa[.] ' ' 359 More significant, it stated:
"[Firom and after [May 1, 1807], all Insurances whatsoever.., in respect
to any of the trading, dealing, carrying, removing, transshipping [of
slaves].., shall be... prohibited and declared... unlawful."36  What were
penalties for violating the 1807 anti-insurance provision? They were only
monetary and nominal. Consequently, they were not sufficiently effec-
tive to stop insurance underwriters' secondary activities.361
Consequently, seventeen years later, Parliament passed the Slave
Trade Act of 1824.362 The Act contained exceptionally sweeping and un-
precedented enforcement measures to stop slave traders' terrorism and
the vital financial assistance that they received from insurers. First, the
act declared "[i]t shall not be lawful ... for any persons [to insure or to
contract for the insuring of any slaves, or any property, or other subject
matter relating] to the dealing, trading, purchase, sale, barter or transfer
of slaves., 3
6 3
Then British legislators strengthened the civil-penalty provision, which
appeared in the Act of 1807. The new provision stated in relevant part:
"if any person shall knowingly and willfully insure or contract for the
insuring of any slaves, . . . [or any subject matter related to the slave
358. David L. Green, U. S. Freezes Bin Laden Assets? Bush Acts to Cut off Flow of
Money to Militant, Associates Foreign Banks Warned President Describes Executive Order
as Part of War on Terror, THE BALT. SUN, Sept. 25, 2001, at Al.
359. An Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, 1807,47 Geo. III, Sess. 1, § 3 (Eng.).
360. Id. at § 5.
361. Id. If any of His Majesty's Subjects, or any Person within this United Kingdom
shall knowingly and willfully subscribe, effect, or make, or cause or procure to be sub-
scribe, effected or made any such unlawful Insurances or Insurance, he or they shall forfeit
and pay for every such Offense the Sum of One hundred Pounds for every such insurance;
and also Treble the Amount paid or agreed to be paid as the Premium of any such insur-
ance. Id.
362. The Slave Trade Act, 1824, 5 Geo. 4, c. 113 (1824) (Eng.).
363. Id. at § 2.
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trade], .. . the person so offending, and .. .their aiders, and abettors
shall... pay for every such offense the sum of one hundred pounds...
for every such insurance contract ... and treble the amount of the pre-
mium of any such insurance or contract for the same .... [And] every
such insurance shall be absolutely null and void. 364
Finally, Parliament inserted an astonishingly broad criminal-sanction
clause to communicate that the British government was extremely serious
about stopping slave traders' as well as their aiders' and abettors' horrify-
ing and appalling commercial activities. In its most pertinent part, the
criminal-penalty provision stated "[i]f any persons shall deal or trade in,
purchase, sell, barter, or transfer, or contract for dealing or trading... in
slaves,.., or shall knowing and willfully insure or contract for the insur-
ing of any [slave], . . . the person or persons so offending, and their
procurers, counselors, aiders, and abettors ... are hereby declared to be
felons, and shall be transported beyond seas for a term not exceeding
fourteen years, or shall be confined and kept to hard labour for a term
not exceeding five years, nor less than three years, at the discretion of the
court before whom such offender or offenders shall be tried and
convicted. 3 65
Did the Slave Trade Act of 1824 immediately terminate slave traders'
and underwriters' terrorism? The answer is a reverberating no. In fact,
over the next fifty-five years, Parliament had to enact four additional stat-
utes366 to stop merchants' chilling, outrageous and painful savagery.
What did British underwriters do after Parliament enacted an array of
anti-terror legislation? Like their American counterparts, they continued
to aid and abet terrorism.
364. Id. at § 8 (emphasis added).
365. Id. at § 10 (emphasis in the original).
366. See The Slavery Abolition Act, 1833, 3 & Will. 4, c. 73 § 12 ("After 1st August
1824, all slaves in the British colonies shall be emancipated, and slavery shall be abolished
throughout the British possessions abroad."); The Slave Trade Act, 1843, 6 & 7 Vict. c. 98
(confirming that Parliament established this "act for the more effectual suppression of the
slave trade." It reads in pertinent part: "All the provisions of the Slave Act [of] 1824 shall
be deemed to extend and apply to British subjects wheresoever residing."); The Slave
Trade (East African Courts) Act of 1873, 36 & 37 Vicr. c. 59, § 3 ("All jurisdiction is
[hereby] conferred [on the East African courts], in regard to vessels seized by the com-
mander or officer of any of Her Majesty's ships on suspicion of being engaged in or fitted
out for the slave trade."); The Slave Trade (East African Courts) Act of 1879, 42 & 43 Vict.
c. 38, § 4 (This was an act to amend the Slave Trade (East African Courts) Act of 1873. It
stated in relevant part: "Each of the East African courts shall have the same jurisdiction in
regard to a British vessel seized on suspicion of being engaged in or fitted out for the slave
trade, and to the persons, slaves, goods, and effects on board thereof.").
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C. Insurers as Aiders and Abettors of Terrorism After the Enactment
of Anti-Slave Trade Legislation
As of this writing, a significant political and financial controversy is
brewing in the United States; it involves charges that defunct and pres-
ently viable American insurance companies made huge profits by financ-
ing the terror, wretched conditions and human degradation, which were
major pillars of the transatlantic slave trade. As reported earlier, the In-
surance Company of North America (INA) presently CIGNA formed in
Philadelphia in 1792. It was the first major marine-insurance, stock com-
pany in America. Therefore, legal and business historians, slave descend-
ants and an array of lawyers are asking "did INA ... profit from slavery
by insuring masters against the loss of their slaves"?36 7 According to
INA officials, the answer is no. As mandated under a newly enacted Cali-
fornia's statute, INA's archivists examined the company's historical
records. The company reported: their research did not uncover any "evi-
dence [that INA] ever insured slaves or slave ships ... [or that even one
of its prominent insureds'] ships carried slaves., 368
Arguably, the Insurance Company of North America and its archivists'
conclusions are highly unsound at best and at worse disingenuous. To
repeat, the U.S. Slave Trade Act of 1794 clearly prohibited all shipowners
from taking on board, receiving, or transporting any humans as slaves;
and, it also forbade any person or business from aiding and abetting such
activities in any manner.369 Yet, thirteen years after Congress passed the
1794 act and just five weeks before Congress enacted the fourth anti-slave
trade act in March of 1807, INA deliberately ignored the intent and spirit
of those anti-terror statutes, broke the law, and insured a ship named
367. DiStefano, supra note 300, at Cl (noting that "[i]n recent years, activists in the
slavery reparations movement [want] U.S. corporations to pay damages to slave descend-
ants [and they repeat the charge that INA 'insured many of the American slave traders.']
They hoped to learn more about INA's role through California's Slavery Era Insurance
Policies Act, which requires insurers doing business in the state to report old slave
policies.").
368. DiStefano, supra note 300, at C1.
Ace Ltd bought INA two years ago .... [Recently], California released a summary of
Ace's findings. Ace said that its hired archivists and historians, whom it declined to name,
found INA 'did not write or carry any life insurance policy written on the life of a
slave.' . . . Ace ['s] spokeswoman Lisa Fleishman-Hicks says archivists compared INA
marine insurance records with a Harvard University list of 27,000 slave ships and 'deter-
mined that it did not write or carry any policies on known slave vessels.' (emphasis added)
Id.
369. 3rd Cong., ch. 11, §§ 1-2, 4 (1st Sess. 1794).
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Margaret.37 °  She was illegally transporting slaves among other
contrabands.371
Certainly, the Insurance Company of North America was not the only
insurer that continued to aid and abet the terrorization and trafficking of
slaves after Congress outlawed such inhumanity.372 For example, three
years after members of the House and Senate ratified the comprehensive
Slave Trade Act of 1807, the Union Insurance Company of South Caro-
lina intentionally violated that statute's aiding and abetting provision.
The company insured the slave ship, San Carlos.37 3 In fact, Union knew
the ship's voyage would take it to the coast of Africa, where the British
Navy was patrolling in order to stop slave traders from committing any
further terrorist acts, such as capturing, branding, and shackling innocent
humans and forcing them into disease-infested and life-threatening hulls
of ships.
370. Schwartz v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 6 Binn. 378, 388 (Pa. 1814).
This action was brought by I. F. Schwartz and A. I. Schwartz on a policy of insurance for
20,000 dollars made the 19th January 1807, on the ship Margaret valued at 25,000 dollars, at
and from Batavia to Baltimore, with the usual liberty of touching and trading for refresh-
ments, warranted American property, proof to be made in Baltimore only, premium 7 1h
per cent. Id.
371. Id. at 378.
The Margaret, belonging to the plaintiffs who were American citizens, sailed from Balti-
more on her outward voyage in March 1804, laden principally with gunpowder and other
contraband articles. Afterwards [and] under [the] date of 9th November 1806, [the plain-
tiffs] wrote that the return cargo would probably amount to 73,000 dollars, and requested
insurance to be made accordingly. The rest of the cargo belonged to Arnold; but in order
to cover it from British capture, the whole cargo was apparently to belong to the plaintiffs;
in March 1807, the ship sailed from Batavia bound to Baltimore, having Arnold, his daugh-
ter, and six slaves on board as passengers. (emphasis added) Id.
372. See also McCargo v. New Orleans Ins. Co., 10 Rob. 202, 314 (La.) (recounting
that "[t]he petitioner allege[d] that defendants did, by a policy dated at New Orleans, the
16th November, 1841,.. .[insure] from Norfolk to New Orleans, [twenty-six] slaves belong-
ing to him, valued at $800 each, shipped on the brig Creole."); Lockett, 10 Rob. at 339
(explaining "[t]his was an action to recover $10,000, the insurance upon fifteen slaves, val-
ued equally, at and from Richmond to New Orleans, shipped on the brig Creole, on the
same voyage as those insured in the case of McCargo v. The New Orleans Ins. Co., 10 Rob.
202 (La.), [it appears there were 135 slaves on board].).
373. See Henry Messonier v. Union Insurance Company, of Charleston, 13 Rich. 155,
156 (S.C. Const. App.).
This was an action on two policies of Insurance, dated the 13th and 15th September, 1810
on the Spanish brig San Carlos and her cargo. On the cargo, valued, from Teneriffe to the
coast, at thirty-three and a half per cent more than the costs, and valuing the return cargo,
viz: each slave at $150, other articles at costs and charges, insured to sail from Teneriffe to
the coast of Africa, and during her stay and trade there for four months, and from thence
to the Havanna. Id.
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Nevertheless, Union insured the San Carlos anyway. More telling, the
insurer forced the slavers to pay excessively high premiums,374 because
the company knew the likelihood of a seizure was substantial.375 Without
doubt, Union's action was a bold, calculated and cold-blooded business
decision. More astoundingly, Union underwriters committed a crime by
purposefully violating both the "aiding and abetting" and the anti-insur-
ance provisions of the British 1807 Slave Trade Act. And although Union
Insurance was incorporated in South Carolina, the insurer certainly knew
and fully embraced insurance customs in London; 376 therefore, arguably,
it was completely aware of Parliament's strong opposition to any native
or American insurers' continued participation in that odious and terror
ridden trade.
British underwriters also continued to aid and abet slave trafficking
and the torturing of innocents long after Parliament enacted various anti-
slave trade statutes. To illustrate, consider the behavior of underwriters
who practiced their profession on the world-renowned Lombard Street,
the heart of London's financial district and the home of Lloyd's of
London. Merchants in the London firm of Pinto, Perez and Associates
needed insurance. On June 9, 1854, they approached some British under-
writers and purchased marine insurance to cover the Newport, whose
voyage would carry it from London to Ambriz, then, to ports on the coast
of Africa.3 77 The underwriters wrote the agreement on a standard Lom-
bard Street application form; and they agreed that the policy would con-
tain the usual all-risks clause.378
374. Id. at 158 (showing how "[the plaintiff] further proved, that seventeen and a half
per cent was the highest premium paid in August, 1810, and that in consequence of the zeal
and activity of the British, to prevent the slave trade, it rose in the December following, to
thirty-five per cent.").
375. Id. at 156 (recounting that "[t]he policies contained the following clause: 'It is
further agreed, that no abandonment of the neutral property shall take place in case of
capture or detention by the British, until it be condemned, and the proceedings of the
Court and sentence of condemnation be produced to substantiate the loss."').
376. Cf. Union Bank of South Carolina v. Union Ins. Co. 1 Dud. 171 (S.C. App. Law
1838). The policy, in ascertaining and fixing the liabilities which the underwriters assure,
refers to the 'laws and usages of trade in the city of London, and no other.' On such a
contract, it would be enough to say, that the general average must be fixed according to the
laws and usages of trade in the city of London [.1 ... The custom of the city of Charleston is
in exact conformity to [the English] rule." Id.
377. See Lozano v. Janson, 121 Eng. Rep. 61, 62 (1859).
378. Id. at 61-2.
Touching the adventure and perils which we the assurers are contented to hear and do take
upon us in this voyage, they are of the seas, men of war, fire, enemies, pirates, rovers,
thieves, jettisons, letters of mart and counter mart, surprisals, takings at sea, arrests, re-
straints and detainments of all kings, princes and people, of what nation, condition or qual-
ity soever, barratry of the master and mariners, and of all other perils, losses and
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Significantly, the London insurers did not even attempt to exclude
"seizure from trafficking in slaves" as a peril insured against; and that
oversight or indifference speaks volumes. In 1854, the British Navy still
patrolled various coasts attempting to stop the terror of the slave trade.
In the process, the Navy seized the Newport on suspicion that it was ille-
gally engaged in the slave trade. 379 But, it should be stressed that some
Lombard Street underwriters certainly did exclude "seizure for slave traf-
ficking" as a peril insured against.38° They fully understood Parliament's
determination to stop underwriters from aiding and abetting the horrors
of the slave trade.
Yet, those astute insurers still violated the civil and criminal provisions
appearing in those anti-terror statutes. How? Like many other Ameri-
can and British insurers, they boldly and intentionally gave indispensable
loans to slave traders throughout the centuries of the trade. Further-
more, they even helped slave traders evade the anti-terror statutes.381
More egregious, American and British insurers continued to give all
forms of substantial financial assistance to traders who savagely terror-
ized innocents. Even more telling, that assistance continued for at least
seventy years after Congress and Parliament enacted numerous statutes
that prohibited such activities.382
misfortunes that have or shall come to the hurt, detriment, or damage of the said good's
and merchandize, and ship, &c. or any part thereof. Id.
379. Id. at 67-68.
380. See Heath v. Durant, 152 Eng. Rep. 1268, 1269 (1844).
It was agreed between the defendant and the plaintiffs that the policy and the risks .insured
against, [should not include capture], except in case of war; and that the ship was not ar-
rested or detained in war .... [This] assumpsit on a policy of insurance on goods, by the
ship Virtuosa Maria Aldina, from Geneva to the Brazils, and thence to the coast of Africa.
This vessel was in fact taken by the authority of the Portuguese government, in time of
peace, on the alleged ground of her being concerned in the slave trade. Id.
381. See COUGHTRY, supra note 229, at 100 (stating that, "American insurance com-
panies even helped [African slave traders to] evade the laws against the slave trade from
1788 on, by allowing owners to sell their vessels along with slaves. [Underwriters] then
extended coverage to a new vessel for the captain to pilot home.").
382. See ELTIS, supra note 157, at 277-78
Insurance costs during the illegal slave trade varied enormously. In the Cuban traffic be-
tween 1821 and 1836, rates were normally 15 to 30 percent of total outset costs. For the
Brazilian traffic in the first decade or so after total abolition, rates were lower ? 11 percent
to 15 percent, though in 1813 and 1816 when the navy was capturing ships somewhat indis-
criminately, rates were temporarily in the 30 percent to 40 percent range. Id.;
THOMAS, supra note 148, at 568 (noting that, "President Thomas Jefferson signed a bill in
1807 that made it illegal to import any person of color into the United States as a slave.
Shipbuilders from Baltimore even continued constructing slave ship, and underwriters still
insured those ships."). See also A VIEW OF THE PRESENT STATE OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE
TRADE: PUBLISHED BY DIRECTION OF A MEETING REPRESENTING THE RELIGIOUS SOCI-
ETY OF FRIENDS IN PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 146, at 6 (proclaiming that, "Notwithstand-
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PART V. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN
COURTS' DECISIONS - "UNCLEAN HANDS," ACCESS To
COURTS AND THE UNENFORCEABILITY OF
ILLEGAL CONTRACTS
Shortly after the attacks of September 11th "Senate Republicans ...
tried to speed up consideration of President Bush's judicial nominees...
by casting the need for more judges as critical in the fight against terror-
ism." '38 3 Certainly, whether more judges are needed to struggle against
terrorism is highly debatable, even though there are pressing and legiti-
mate concerns about future terrorists' attacks within the borders of the
United States. Nevertheless, it is very likely that federal and state judges
will play increasingly crucial roles, such as defining the outer limits of
alleged terrorists' and their abettors' civil liberties, and deciding whether
government can violate those rights and liberties under the guise of pro-
tecting the public from terrorism.
In fact, after September 11th the attorney general lobbied Congress to
establish special-purpose courts to help fight terrorism.3 84 For some
members of Congress, the press and the public, creating such powerful
tribunals would only "trim back civil liberties" '385 and guarantee "incom-
plete justice." '38 6 In addition, critics of the administration's plan correctly
note: Like terrorists who generate fear and prevent innocent citizens
ing the prohibitory act of America, which was passed in 1807, ship bearing the American
flag continued to trade for slaves until 1809[.]").
383. See Joan Biskupic, GOP Slows Foreign Aid Bill to Speed Judicial Choices, USA
TODAY, Oct. 22, 2001, at 4A (reporting "[1]aw enforcement is going to suffer' unless the
Senate's pace in deciding judicial nominations picks up, says Sen. Orrin Hatch, R-Utah ...
Hatch noted that some federal judges could end up handling key cases related to
terrorism.").
384. See Neil A. Lewis, Congress Says It Won't Rush on Anti-Terror Bills, Denver
Post, Sept. 25, 2001, at A16 (reciting that "[Attorney General John] Ashcroft said Congress
should give authorities 'the tools necessary to identify, dismantle, disrupt and punish ter-
rorist organizations before they strike again.' The administration's package would allow
courts to use information gathered by foreign governments even if it was obtained by
methods that would not meet U.S. constitutional standards."').
385. Cf. Some Rights and Wrongs of Anti-Terrorism Laws, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 3,
2001, at B6. Requests to trim back civil liberties imply that terrible events could have been
prevented, or that existing laws and procedures were part of the problem. Neither case has
been made, especially against such a disciplined foe as the Sept. 11 terrorists. Every at-
tempt to remove judicial scrutiny or eliminate the need for a court order ought to be
viewed with grave suspicion. Id.
386. Editorial, Trimming the Tribunals, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 23, 2002, at A18 (reporting
"[ilt's a welcome sign that President Bush is softening the worst ingredients of military
tribunals. This roughshod justice for terrorists and captured soldiers may come closer to
American and international norms of fairness. Even with [the] changes, tribunals still
amount to incomplete justice.").
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from exercising fundamental freedoms and rights, governments which
definitely includes courts have a long history of doing the same.38 7 Or
put differently, in the name of protecting innocent citizens and their fun-
damental rights, judicial bodies have violated those very rights, by ignor-
ing settled principles of law and by refusing to protect citizens from the
terror and tyranny of the state.388
More important, courts have a long history of re-victimizing wittingly
or unwittingly already traumatized persons, by aiding and abetting the
principal wrongdoer. 389 Fairly often, the culprits are violent persons who
have a strong propensity to terrorize innocents. How can courts aid and
abet terrorists and terrorism? Among other means, judges can give ter-
387. Cf Some Rights and Wrongs of Anti-Terrorism Laws, supra note 385, at B6.
Congress best serves the American people by going slow, with a tough, skeptical attitude
about undoing U.S. civil liberties in the name of fighting terrorism. Our whole system of
government is built around a system of checks and balances. The role of the judiciary
cannot be diminished in the name of expediency. The role of Congress for oversight has
never been more important. Legal protections 225 years in the making must not be subject
to the whims of patriotic emotions [and] vengeful passions. Id.
388. Cf. J. Edgar Hoover, Civil Liberties and Law Enforcement: The Role of the FBI,
37 IOWA L. REV. 175, 175, 179 (1952) (noting "[wie can have the Constitution, the best
laws in the land, and the most honest reviews by the courts but unless the law enforcement
profession is steeped in the democratic tradition, maintains the highest in ethics, .... civil
liberty will continually and without end be violated.). But this is wholly unnecessary. This
nation was founded on the historic principle that the individual must be protected from the
tyranny of the State. Washington, Franklin and Madison witnessed the terror of a govern-
ment of men.").
389. Cf. Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 812-813 (1765)
A power to issue such a warrant as this, is contrary to the genius of the law of England.
The warrant is to seize all [of] plaintiff's books and papers without exception, and carry
them before Lord Halifax. What [right does] a Secretary of State [have] to see all [of] a
man's private letters of correspondence, family concerns, trade and business? These war-
rants are not by custom; they [date] no farther back than 80 years [.] [M]ost amazing, they
have never before this time been opposed considering the great men that have presided in
the King's Bench since that time [.] [B]ut it was reserved for the honour of this Court
which has ever been the protector of the liberty and property of the subject to demolish
this monster of oppression, and to tear into rags this remnant of Star-Chamber tyranny.
Id.; Rex v. Flower, 101 Eng. Rep. 1408, 1412 (1799) ("In the Act of the 16th Car. 1, c. 10,
for abolishing the Court of Star-Chamber, one of the reasons stated is [:] [T]hat all matters
examinable before them, may have their proper remedy and redress, and their due punish-
ment and correction by the common-law of the land, and in the ordinary course of justice
elsewhere.") (emphasis added). See also The Star Chamber, http://hanibal.hannotations.
com/chamber.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2003).
The Star Chamber was the historical meeting place for the King of England's councilors.
Over the years its power increased and during the reign of Henry VIII, it became more of a
political weapon. Things got even worse during the reigns of James I and Charles I until
the Court of Star Chamber was abolished in 1641. By then, the court had become so hated
that the term Star Chamber is now synonymous with an arbitrary and oppressive tribunal,
one frequently used for political ends. Id.
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rorists and secondary supporters with their "unclean hands, 39 0 access to
courts of equity, where the wrongdoers can petition for a declaration of
rights, or for equitable remedies under various contracts. Or civil judges
who sit in courts of law can simply ignore settled principles of law and
issue highly strained, novel rulings in favor of terrorists and their
abettors.
Again, Part VI presents a discussion of how American and British civil
courts helped slave traders and their abettors to terrorize and violate the
human and civil rights of innocent people. Of course, much of that dis-
cussion will focus on how learned judges protected the terrorists' right to
make and enforce all sorts of illegal commercial, service and financial
agreements, especially insurance contracts. But more important, Part VI
presents arguably compelling evidence to support the assertion: the ter-
rors, horrors and inordinate longevity of the transatlantic slave trade
would never have occurred if British and American courts had simply
refused to protect slavers' and their abettors' right to form and enforce
contracts. This part attempts to establish a firm foundation for that
discussion.
A. Settled English and American Common-Law Rules Against the
Formation of Illegal Commercial Contracts
Very likely, many jurists and most law students -who enrolled in the
first-year contracts course during the 1990's - are familiar with the gut-
wrenching case of Baby M.391 In early 1985, a physician artificially in-
seminated Mary Beth Whitehead, using William Stern's sperm. Earlier,
Mary Beth and Stern formed a $10,000 surrogacy contract, in which Mary
Beth agreed to accept artificial insemination, to conceive a child, to carry
that child to term, and to surrender the child to the biological father
(Stern) immediately after its birth. Mary Beth carried the child to term in
1986, but she decided to return the money, keep the baby and breach the
contract. Stem sued, and, ultimately prevailed in New Jersey's Supreme
Court in 1988.392
390. See, e.g., Andersons v. Moncrieff, 3 Des. 124, 3 S.C. Eq. 124 (S.C. Nov. 1810)
(No. XXIII) (declaring that "[a] party coming into court, to ask equity, must come in with
clean hands.").
391. In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
392. Id. at 1259. [W]e have concluded, independent of the trial court's identical con-
clusion, that Melissa's best interests call for custody in the Sterns. [However, it] seems to
us that given her predicament, Mrs. Whitehead was rather harshly judged both by the trial
court and by some of the experts. She was guilty of a breach of contract, and [breach of] a
very important promise [;] but we think it is expecting something well beyond normal
human capabilities to suggest that this mother should have parted with her newly born
infant without a struggle. Id.
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To put it mildly, the Supreme Court of New Jersey received a tremen-
dous amount of criticism from the public and the legal community nation-
wide.3 93 Why? Then, as now, the law in New Jersey was painfully clear:
"surrogacy contracts are illegal." They violate the state's adoption stat-
ute; they are "akin to baby selling, '394 and they "violate public policy. '395
More important, in its decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court admitted
that "the payment of money to a 'surrogate' mother was illegal, perhaps
criminal, and potentially degrading to women., 396 Yet, the court com-
pletely ignored a settled principal of law in New Jersey: illegal contracts
are void from their inception.397
As every first-year law student eventually learns, the common-law rule
that the New Jersey Supreme Court so cavalierly contravened dates from
an ancient period,398 one that unquestionably predates the reign of
Queen Elizabeth I in the mid-sixteenth century. In fact, even during the
Elizabethan era, the rule regarding the unenforceability of illegal con-
tracts was settled English law. For example, in Fish v. Sadler,3 99 the court
declared rather inelegantly: "when the unlawful act [begins], the illegal
agreement afterwards . . . is unlawful also."4 ° A shorter, somewhat
clearer statement of the same principle appears in Rex v. Allen:4 ° ' "the
393. See, e.g., Golnar Modjtahedi, Nobody's Child: Enforcing Surrogacy Contracts, 20
WHITTIER LAW REV. 242, 274 (1998) (noting that, "The Baby M. court's rationale was
essentially a 'parade of horribles' argument that women would start giving their children to
the highest bidder without regard to what they are like."); Ilana Hurwitz, Collaborative
Reproduction: Finding the Child in the Maze of Legal Motherhood, 33 CONN. LAw REV.
127, 180 (2000) (stating, "The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision drew criticism for the
court's perceived bias in favor of the Sterns' because of their economic and educational
superiority to the Whiteheads."); Lois Gould and Robert Gould, The 'Baby M' Ruling:
Elegant, Flawed, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 10, 1988, at A-31 (reporting that, "During the Baby M
litigation, media critic had asserted that the Sterns' ability to hire several psychological
experts to testify in their favor reflected merely their wealth, not their superior parenting
skills.")
394. In re Baby M., 537 A.2d, at 1240-42.
395. Id. at 1246-50.
396. Id. at 1234.
397. Cf. Vasquez v. Glassboro Service Assn., Inc., 415 A.2d 1156, 1162-1163 (N.J
1980) (stating that, "Contracts have been declared invalid because they violate statutes,
promote crime, interfere with the administration of justice, encourage divorce, violate pub-
lic morality, or restrain trade.").
398. See, e.g., Ferrall v. Shaen, 85 Eng. Rep. 400, 401 (1669) (stating that, "[B]y all the
authorities ancient and modern, if the lender contracts for greater interest than the statute
allows [making] the agreement corrupt as the time of the loan all the assurance is void.").
399. Fish v. Sadler, 74 Eng. Rep. 165 (1589).
400. Id. at 166.
401. Rex v. Allen, 86 Eng. Rep. 738, 738 (1670).
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corrupt agreement makes the contract void."-40 2 In addition, early on,
Parliament codified the principle in various statutes,4 °3 thereby making it
applicable to the formation of illegal contracts between English subjects
within and beyond Great Britain.
40 4
Like the Supreme Court of New Jersey, colonial and all subsequent
American courts embraced the English rule against legitimizing and en-
forcing illegal commercial agreements. For instance, as early as 1804, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited a string of English court decisions in
Mitchell v. Smith,4 °5 and held: "a contract or agreement is unlawful if
it . . .encourage[s] unlawful acts or omissions."4 6 That same year, the
New York Court of Appeals underscored that view in Belding v. Pit-
kin,4 °7 stating, "[a] contract, in order to be binding, must be lawful.
Whenever the consideration . . . is unlawful, the whole contract is
void., 4 8 Several years after Mitchell and Belding, other supreme courts
adopted the same ruling,4 9 which also applies to Americans and
402. Id. ("If there be a corrupt agreement at the time of the lending of money, then
the bonds and all the assurances are void.).
403. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Vinor, 90 Eng. Rep. 750, 750 (1692) (Chief Justice Lord
Holt's ruling: "Every contract made for or about any matter or thing which is prohibited
and made unlawful by any statute, is a void contract, though the statute itself doth not
mention that it shall be so.").
404. See, e.g., Waymell v. Reed, 101 Eng. Rep. 335, 336 (1794) Chief Justice Lord
Kenyon's reaffirming: [WJhere the contract and delivery of goods are complete abroad,
and the seller does no act to assist the smuggling them into this country, such a contract is
valid, and may be recovered upon hero. But here the plaintiff [helped] the defendants to
smuggle the goods, by packing them in the manner most suitable for, and with intent to
aid, that purpose. He cannot, therefore, resort to the laws ofithis country to assist him in
carrying his contract into execution. Id.
405. Mitchell v. Smith, 1 Binn, 110, 2 Am. Dec. 417 (Pa. 1804).
406. Id. (declaring "[T]here cannot be a more express authority than [Bartlett v. Vi-
nor, 90 Eng. Rep. 750, 750 (1692)] where Lord Chief Justice Holt says: 'Every contract
made for or about any matter or thing which is prohibited and made unlawful by any
statute, is a void contract."').
407. Belding v. Pitkin, 1804 Cai. R. 147 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).
408. Id. at 149. 1
409. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Russell, 17 Mass. 258, 278 (1821) available at 1821 WL 1489,
*12 (Mass.) (citing and embracing the New York Court of Appeals' ruling in Belding v.
Pitkin); Carrington v. Caller, 2 Stew. 175 (1829), available at 1829 WL 372, *11 (Ala. 1829)
(citing the Supreme Court of Massachusetts's decision in Wheeler v. Russell and conclud-
ing: "Every contract against public policy, or adverse to the enactments of the legislature, is
illegal and void."); Cheney v. Duke, 10 G. & J. 12, available at 1838 WL 1975, *5 (Md.
1838) (citing the English case Wetherell v. Jones, 110 Eng. Rep. 82, 84 (1832) ruling: "A
contract to be void must be expressly prohibited or declared to be void, or be 'contrary to
justice, morality, or sound policy"') (emphasis in the original); Wooten v. Miller, 15 Miss.
380 (7 S. & M. 380), available at 1846 WL 1700, *4 (Miss. 1846) (holding that "[t]he princi-
ple is established beyond controversy that a contract in violation of law, or against public
policy, cannot be enforced in the courts of the country.").
20031
THE SCHOLAR
foreigners making illegal contracts beyond the shores of the United
States.41°
B. Settled English and American Common-Law Rules: Illegal
Insurance Contracts and Insurance on Illegal Voyages
Irrefutably, all verbal and written insurance agreements are "true" con-
tracts. And for centuries, the English rule regarding the unenforceability
of illegal contracts has been applied to insurance agreements. As early as
1795, Chief Justice Lord Kenyon declared in Booth v. Hodgson411 that an
insurance contract is void from its inception if it violates a statute.41 2
Also, even if arguably illegal but clearly legal provisions appear in an
insurance agreement, the entire contract is void from the outset. Why?
In Parkin v. Dick,4 13 Chief Justice Lord Ellenborough presented a simple
explanation: "the illegality of such policies is a consequence of
law .... [There are] no scales to weigh degrees of illegality. '414 And,
since the era of colonial government, every jurisdiction in America has
embraced the English rule: illegal insurance contracts are void as a matter
or law.41 5
410. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Smith, 1 Binn. 110, 119-20, available at 1804 WL 966, *7 (Pa.
1804) (citing English common law and embracing the same); Wooten at 1846 WL 1700, *5
(embracing the rule that "if the contract of a foreigner is to be completed in, or has refer-
ence to its execution in foreign country, and is repugnant to the laws of that country, he is
bound by them."); Cheney v. Duke, 10 G. & J. 12, available at 1838 WL 1975, *10 (Md.
1838) (citing and adopting Chief Justice Lord Mansfield's rulings in the often cited English
case ? Holman v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1122 (1775): "[If a contract for the sale of
goods was made in Dunkirk, France and the goods] were to be delivered in England where
they are prohibited the contract is void.").
411. Booth v. Hodgson, 101 Eng. Rep. 619, 621 (1795).
412. Id.
By the stat. 6 Geo. 1, c. 18, "certain privileges were secured to two corporations for the
purpose of insuring and lending money on bottomry.... [T]hough the Legislature thought
it right that single individuals might make insurances, they enacted that no larger capital
than that belonging to one person should be pledged to the assured, and that all policies
contrary to that Act should be void. Id.
See also Martin v. Sitwell, 89 Eng. Rep 509, 509 (1691) ("[Olne Barksdale had made a
policy of assurance upon account for five pounds premium in the plaintiffs' name, and that
he had paid the said premium to the defendant, and that Barksdale had no goods then on
board, and so the policy was void, and the money to be returned by the custom of
merchants.").
413. Parkin v. Dick, 170 Eng. Rep. 1136 (1809).
414. Id. at 1136 ("The insurance, therefore, was clearly good for all, but the prohibited
articles .... [But I cannot] separate one part of the subject-matter insured from the residue.
This contract is entire[ly], and is wholly void.").
415. See, e.g., Seton v. Low, 1 Johns. Cas. 1, available at 1799 WL 511, **4-5 (N.Y.
1799) (noting, "The treaty with Great Britain is, unquestionably, the law of the land, but it
by no means follows from thence, that the exportation of articles contraband within its
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But there is a related and equally settled English principle regarding
insurance contracts; it dates at least from the Elizabethan era. Perhaps,
Goram v. Sweeting416 states and illustrates a good application of the rule.
In 1669, Francis Goram an English merchant purchased insurance to
cover the voyage417 of a ship carrying his goods.418 John Sweeting and
others were the underwriters. 419 At the time, England was at war; and a
statute prohibited English subjects from bringing goods from an enemy
port without initially securing a license. 42" Briefly put, Goram lost his
goods during the voyage and asked the insurers to indemnity. The under-
writers refused; and Goram sued.
What was the underwriters' defense? They argued that the voyage was
illegal from its inception, because Goram did not secure a license from
the king. Most assuredly, the insurers' defense was incredible. They knew
at the outset that the voyage was illegal. Yet, they insured it anyway.
More surprising, the court accepted the underwriters' argument and
stated several variations of the same principle: 1) any "assurance ... on a
voyage [that is] prohibited by the common law.., is void"; 2)"[i]nsurance
on a voyage prohibited by [a] statute ... is illegal and void"; and, 3) "[a]n
insurance upon any goods, the exportation or importation of which is for-
bidden by the King's proclamation ... is equally void as if prohibited by
statute. 421
letter, is illegal, in such a sense as to render an insurance on them void. I do not think,
therefore, that on the ground of illegality, the underwriters are discharged."); Hallet v.
Jenks, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 210, 211, 214 (1805) (stating, "[This was an action] upon a policy
of insurance, and the only question was whether the risk insured was illegal, under the act
of Congress [The attorney for the plaintiffs in error correctly stated the law]: If the insur-
ance was upon an illegal transaction, the defendants in error have no right to recover.");
Andersons v. Moncrieff, 3 S.C. Eq. (3 Des.) 124 (1810), available at 1810 WL 300, *5 (S.C.)
(reaffirming the English rule, noting that illegal insurance contracts are void and stating
that courts will not assist those "where the suit is brought to recover against the insurer on
[an] illegal policy.").
416. Goram v. Sweeting, 85 Eng. Rep. 964 (1670).
417. See Gray v. Sims, 10 F. Cas. 1039, 1040 (C.C.D. Pa. 1814) ("It is true, that the
insurance upon the ship, is strictly an insurance upon the voyage, which, independent of
the traffic in which she is engaged, may be perfectly lawful. But, [if] the traffic be forbid-
den by the laws of this country, the voyage, connected with such traffic, becomes on that
account unlawful.").
418. Goram, 85 Eng. Rep. at 964.
419. Id. at 987.
420. Id. at 968 (" [It] is not lawful for a subject in time of war without the King's
licence to bring goods from an enemy's port, which were purchased by his agent resident in
the enemy's country, after the commencement of hostilities.").
421. Id. at 968-9.
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During the centuries of the transatlantic slave trade, other English
courts also embraced the rules 422 appearing in Goram, which are settled
under English law. These are settled principles under American law, too.
In 1814, the Federal District Court of Pennsylvania stated the rule this
way in Gray v. Sims 423 : If a vessel engages in commerce during an insured
voyage that is "contrary to the laws of this country or to the law of na-
tions," the insurance on the ship and cargo is void.42 4 A year later in
Hayward v. Blake,425 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts stated em-
phatically: "insurances upon illegal voyages are without doubt void.,
4 26
Finally, in Flanigen v. Washington Ins. Co.,427 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reaffirmed that this settled law in originated in English common-
law.
428
C. Settled English and American Common-Law: "No Legal Action
Based On Illegal Contracts"
In 1899, the Supreme Court decided McMullen v. Hoffman.4 29 Writing
for the majority, Associate Justice Rufus Peckham observed: "The au-
thorities from the earliest time to the present unanimously hold that no
422. See, e.g., Camden v. Anderson, 101 Eng. Rep. 792, 795-796 (1796) (Chief Justice
Lord Kenyon delivered the opinion and observed: "This was an action on a policy on the
ship "Albemarle. The [insurers'] objection [to] plaintiffs' recovering in this action was that
the voyage was illegal. [T]he policy in question was effected in contravention of that Act
of Parliament, as breaking in upon the monopoly granted to the East India Company; and
therefore it is void."); Tenant v. Elliott, 126 Eng. Rep. 744, 745 (1797) (reaffirming the
holding in Camden v. Anderson: "[An illegal] voyage makes the policy illegal also."); Lub-
bock v Potts, 103 Eng. Rep. 174, 176 (1806) (Chief Justice Lord Ellenborough delivered the
opinion and stated: "It is quite plain from the whole scope of the navigation laws that
colonial produce could not legally be shipped from the plantations in the West Indies to
any part of Europe except England, Wales, and Berwick. ... [Therefore,] the shipping was
illegal, and avoided the insurance on [the] voyage.").
423. Gray v. Sims, 10 F. Cas. 1039 (C.C.D. Pa. 1814).
424. Id. ("The law, therefore, considers the ship in pari delicto with the prohibited
cargo and a policy made upon her for the voyage.. .. Any other trading, therefore, would
have deprived the insured of the protection of the policy.")
425. Hayward v. Blake, 12 Mass. 176 (1815), available at 1815 WL 370.
426. Id. at 179, *3.
427. Flanigen v. Wash. Ins. Co., 7 Pa. 306 (1845), available at 1847 WL 5026.
428. Id. at 309, *4. This rule has been confused by writers not attending to the distinc-
tions of the cases. The case of vessels carrying contraband of war, are instanced - the
warranty of free goods is the ground of defence. Farmer v. Legg, 101 Eng. Rep. (1797) is
another. But that was the act of parliament, prohibiting policies on such a cargo. Another
class are where the forfeiture preceded the commencement of the voyage; but there the
owner's interest had vested in the crown. What is the illegality, which avoids the contract?
Either where the consideration of the promise was illegal, or where the thing to be done
was so. Id.
429. McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639 (1899).
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court will lend its assistance in any way towards carrying out the terms of
an illegal contract [;] ... courts will not enforce it, nor will they enforce
any alleged rights directly springing from such contract."43 Therefore, in
light of the discussion appearing in the next part about British and Amer-
ican courts' aiding and abetting slave traders, it is important to ask: Who
were the authorities? And, just how old is this rule? Does the rule pre-
date the horrors of the transatlantic slave trade?
Clearly, Justice Peckham was speaking in part about English common-
law judges.431 On the other hand, it is more difficult to determine when
the rule that bars all actions based on illegal agreements became settled
law. Arguably, the principle originated and became undisputed law in
the late eighteenth century, for two of the earliest English cases appear-
ing in the McMullen decision date from the late 1700s.4 32 The first one is
Holman v. Johnson.4 33 In that decision, Justice Lord Mansfield stated
emphatically: "no [c]ourt will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause
of action upon an immoral or an illegal act." '43 4 In Booth v. Hodgson,43 5
Chief Justice Lord Kenyon held: "it is the great duty of every court of
justice to administer justice as well as [it] can between the litigating par-
ties .... [But it] is a maxim in [English] law that a plaintiff must [show]
that he stands on ... fair ground when he calls on a court of justice to
administer relief to him.",436 It should be observed that Booth involved a
dispute over an illegal insurance agreement.
Before Booth, Chief Justice Lord Mansfield wrote many majority opin-
ions in the 1700s; and, in several he and Lord Kenyon consistently ruled:
courts will not hear controversies or award remedies if an action and al-
lege injuries arose out of illegal 437 or immoral438 contracts, transactions
430. Id. at 654.
431. Id. ("It is stated that Lord Kenyon once said, by way of illustration, that he would
not sit to take an account between two robbers on Hounslow Heath, and it was questioned
whether the legend in regard to the highwayman did not arise from that saying. It seems,
however, that the case was a real one.").
432. Id. at 655.
433. Holman v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (1775).
434. Id. at 1121.
435. Booth v. Hodgson, 101 Eng. Rep. 619 (1795).
436. Id. at 621.
437. See Faikney v. Reynous, 96 Eng. Rep. 366, 367 (1767) (Chief Justice Lord Mans-
field's ruling: "Where a thing is prohibited by Act of Parliament, it is void as between the
parties, and no Court of Justice will allow a man to recover for what is made unlawful to be
done."). See also Steers v. Lashley, 101 Eng. Rep. 435, 436 (1794) (Chief Justice Lord
Kenyon's ruling: "[If one knows that a contract is illegal,] he cannot be permitted to re-
cover on the bill in a court of law.").
438. See Biggs v. Lawrence, 100 Eng. Rep. 673, 675 (1789) (Chief Justice Lord Ken-
yon's holding: "Where a contract is made for smuggled goods, a party cannot come into a
Court of Justice to recover on it. A person suing in a court of law must disclose a fair
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or conduct. Therefore we ask: was Lord Mansfield the author of this very
important "ancient" maxim? Even though "his work in developing and
explaining the commercial law . . . has ensured him a foremost place
among English judges [,] the answer is probably no.43 9 Thirty-three years
before Lord Mansfield's ruling in Holman v. Johnson, another court de-
clared in 1734: "[w]here [a] party has paid a sum upon an illegal contract,
he shall not recover it upon an action brought by him.".44 °
Apparently, this principle was a major pillar in English law at an ex-
ceedingly earlier period, even before the reign of Queen Elizabeth in the
mid-to-late 1500s. In fact, during the Elizabethan era, the rule against
asking courts to enforce or to award relief under a covin 441 was already
settled. 442 Once more, in 1589, the Court of King's Bench Court decided
Fish v. Sadler; and the court held: all agreements to defraud or harm a
third party are "abhorred in law"; as a result, courts will not hear any
action arising out of such illegality.443 Certainly, during the height of the
slave trade in the 1600s, English courts embraced this doctrine. 44
Finally, in 1826, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Armstrong v. Toler.a n 5
And as Chief Justice Marshall correctly observed in that decision: this
"rule of universal law ... [has] been incorporated into the civil code of
transaction; and it must not appear, from his own shewing at least, that he has infringed the
laws of his country."). See also Clugas v. Penaluna, 100 Eng. Rep. 1122, 1123 (1791) (Chief
Justice Lord Kenyon's ruling: "[T]hough the mere selling of the liquors might not be [an
immoral transaction], if they were sold by a subject of this country with a view to evade the
laws of this country, it savors strongly of immorality. [I]f so, it taints the whole transaction,
and, payment cannot be enforced by judicial process in any Court in this country.").
439. See BIRKENHEAD, supra note 261, at 186.
440. Bosanquett v. Dashwood, 25 Eng. Rep. 648, 649 (1734).
441. Simply put, a covin is a secret agreement between two or more person in which
they agree or promise to injure or defraud another individual. See also, Anonymous, 84
Eng. Rep. 1171 (1678) ("Fraud and covin make legal acts illegal and void.").
442. Cf Anonymous, 21 Eng. Rep 10 (1468-69).
[This case involves a] grand [of] lease forfeited by covin .... [I]f a lessee for years demiseth
[a] parcel of the term to another, and covinously forfeiteth his whole lease for any condi-
tion broken, and taketh the land back in lease again, his lessee shall find help in Chan-
cery ... And Stillington, the Chancellor (8 E. 4. 4r 1468-69]), was of opinion that [for a ]
breach of promise, a man was at liberty to sue either in the spiritual court (Canonica in-
jurice) or else in the Chancery, for the damage accrued by the breach. Id.
443. Fish v. Sadler, 74 Eng. Rep. 165, 166 (1589) ("[T]he plaintiff should not have
judgment for that suit was begun by Sadler in the name of Collison without his privity and
therefore it was unlawful. [A]nd as to the covin, it is not material, for [even] without that,
the matter is illegal enough.").
444. See, e.g. Mackaller v. Todderick., 79 Eng. Rep. 915, 915 (1634) (holding that "the
consideration was illegal, [therefore,] the action lies not; for the consideration to have
money to procure him [as] rector of the church, is a simoniacal contract, and an unlawful
act condemned by all laws.").
445. Armstrong v. Taylor, 24 U.S. 258 (1826).
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every nation., 4 46 But more important, during the entire course of the
transatlantic slave trade, American courts especially those in the South
recognized and stated variations of that same universal principle: 1) "[no
person] shall be heard [in court] who claims the fruits, or seek the en-
forcement, of an illegal transaction"; 447 2) "[where transactions] involve
so much moral guilt.... courts of justice [will] not suffer themselves to be
polluted with them directly or indirectly"; 448 3) "[an illegal and void con-
tract cannot] be enforced in a court of equity";449 and, 4) "courts of jus-
tice will not open their forums to enforce contracts which are illegal,
immoral, prohibited, or contrary to public policy."'450
PART VI. ACCESS To COURTS AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES FOR
COMMERCIAL TERRORISTS AND THE INSURERS WHO AIDED
AND ABETrED THEM DURING THE
TRANSATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE
As documented earlier in this article, commercial terrorism is just as
prevalent, old and violent as state-supported or state-sponsored terror-
ism. Moreover, the unspeakable and diverse horrors of the transatlantic
slave trade are arguably the quintessential representations of commercial
terrorism. Therefore, at this point, it is appropriate to ask: how did
American and English judges aid and abet commercial traders, merchant-
underwriters and insurance companies during the transatlantic slave
trade? Or stated more specifically, did those jurists' rulings encourage
slave traders to murder, terrorize and enslave millions of innocents dur-
ing a span of three-plus centuries? Substantial convincing evidence es-
tablishes conclusively that American and British judges' declarations and
remedies encouraged and prolonged the terrors of the slave trade.
446. Id. at 265 (An expansive listing of English and American courts' decisions appear
in Footnote B.).
447. See Wheeler v. Russell, 17 Mass. 258, available at 1821 WL 1489, *12 (1821). "No
principle of law is better settled than that no action will lie upon a contract made in viola-
tion of statute, or a principle of the common law." Id., at *14.
448. Andersons v. Moncrieff, 3 S.C. Eq. 124 (3 Des. 124), available at, 1810 WL 300,
*5 (1810).
449. Outon v. Rodes, 10 Ky. 432, available at, 1821 WL 1122, *2 (1821).
450. Carrington v. Callier, 2 Stew. 175, available at, 1829 WL 372 *19 (1829); see also
Belding v. Pitkin, 2 Cai. R. 147, available at, 1804 WL 813, *3 (1804) ("It is well settled that
courts of justice [will not] assist an illegal transaction in any respect. To sustain the present
action would be in some degree ratifying, countenancing and sanctioning an illegal con-
tact.") (emphasis in the original); Mitchell v. Smith, 1 Binn. 110, 119 (Pa. 1804) ("Courts of
justice sit to carry into execution the general will of the community. It would seem sole-
cism in jurisprudence that a contract which defeat[s] the provisions of an act of the legisla-
ture should receive judicial sanction and support.").
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However, before discussing the general question presented above,
there are some more compelling, preliminary questions that we must con-
sider before starting that discussion. First, during the transatlantic slave
trade, did British and American citizens have a constitutional right to
stand on the corner of, say, Lombard Street or Wall Street and conspire
to traffic in slaves? Could they have formed contracts to kidnap, terror-
ize, enslave and murder, if necessary, free persons in order to achieve
financial success? Now, if your answer to each question is yes, were those
contracts to enslave and terrorize legally binding and enforceable under
British and American common law? Were they legally sound and enforce-
able before and after the enactment of the respective anti-slave trade stat-
utes in England and in the United States?
In addition, were such contracts void from their inception in both coun-
tries because they were highly immoral and unconscionable? Were they a
violation of public policy in Britain and in America? This part answers
these latter questions first. Then it presents a discussion of, arguably, un-
ethical British and American judges who aided and abetted the horrors of
the slave trade. Necessarily, this part explores and critiques courts' highly
unapologetic and unprincipled declaratory and equitable rulings as well
as the types of contractual remedies that they awarded to slavers and to
slavers' secondary supporters merchant-underwriters and large insurance
companies.
A. The Illegality and Immorality of Slavery and Slave Traders'
Terroristic Conduct in Britain and America- Before the
Enactment of Anti-Slave Trade Acts
At the dawn of the slave trade, what did settled English law say about
British subjects' kidnapping, terrorizing, intimidating, enslaving and forc-
ing free persons to work for the benefit of another without pay? In 1567,
the utterly reviled and oppressive Star Chamber Court decided the Mat-
ter of Cartwright45' and declared: "Cartwright brought a slave from Rus-
sia,... for which he was questioned; and it was resolved that England was
too pure an air for slaves to breathe in."'4 52 One hundred and thirty-five
years after Cartwright, the influential Court of the King's Bench decided
Smith v. Brown.4 53 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Holt reached
451. See JOHN RUSHWORTH, HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS, at 468 (1680), cited in JOHN
C. HuRD, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 179 (photo.
reprint 1968) (1858 and ROBIN BLACKBURN, THE OVERTHROW OF COLONIAL SLAVERY,
1776-1848, at 41 n.9 (1988).
452. See also WILLIAM GOODELL, SLAVERY AND ANTI-SLAVERY, at 50 (N.Y.: William
Harned, 1852) (reporting that Cartwright was decided in 1569 instead of 1567).
453. Smith v. Browne, 90 Eng. Rep. 1172, 1173 (1702).
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the same conclusion and declared "one may be a villein in England, but
not a slave." '454
But did Justice Holt and the hopelessly unethical, biased, and politi-
cally corrupted judges 455 sitting on the Star Chamber Court get it right?
Was slavery unconstitutional within the borders of England? Here is the
short answer: it depends on whether the captives were innocents or ene-
mies of war. Without question, Parliament, Lords of Appeal, 56 and com-
mon-law judges in England have an exceptionally long history of
approving and enforcing public and private enslavement of war captives.
In fact, centuries before the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, it was morally
defensible, quite legal, and extremely common to suppress, torture, har-
ass, and enslave captives of war. Bracton reports that English law legiti-
mized this type of de jure slavery long before the eleventh century. He
writes: "[e]very man is either in his own potestas (authority or power) or
another's ... for the law says one captured by the enemy is a slave.""'5 7
There is more: ancient English rules also state: 1) "there are things that
belong to individuals... as the lands and the slaves of the citizens""'58 and
2) "other things ... belong to the universitas... as the lands and the slaves
of a city, which belong to all the citizens in such a way that they belong to
none individually., 4" 59 Of course, de jure slavery and all of its terror can
occur by the operation of law where free persons are the captives. But
Parliament neither authorized nor formally sanctioned the suppression,
humiliation, terrorization, and enslavement of innocent persons. Why?
Again, according to both dishonored and ethical English judges, such be-
454. Id.
455. See supra note 393 and the accompanying text.
456. Briefly put, the Parliament of Great Britain is a three-pronged governing or "leg-
islative" body: The Monarch (Crown), House of Commons and House of Lords. In every-
day usage, however, "parliament" refers to the House of Commons. Within the House of
Lords, there are two broad groups of lords - lay lords and law lords. The former are
essentially unelected politicians who sit in the House of Lords by right of birth or by title.
The law lords or the Lords of Appeal - their official title - are the "educated" supreme
judges of England. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court justices, the law lords do not have a
separate structure to hear and decide legal cases. They sit within the House of Lords. On
the other hand, like the U.S. Supreme Court justices, the Lords of Appeal are - in theory
- independent of the lay lords' influence. But a long historical record shows otherwise.
Actually, for the greater part of the slave-trade years, the law lords were certainly not
"independent," which could partially explain why they consistently ignored settled princi-
ples of law when deciding cases involving insurance contracts and the slave trade.
457. HENRIcUs DE BRACTrONA, 2 BRAcrON ON THE LAWS, 34 (Samuel E. Thorne
trans.), at http://hlsl.law.harvard.edu/bracton/unframed/English/v2/34.htm (last visited Feb.
27, 2004).
458. Id. at 40.
459. Id.
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havior violated the constitution.46 ° Or put differently, the air in the Brit-
ish Isles was just too pristine for Englishmen to terrorize, murder, and
enslave any free peoples for a profit. Without doubt, it was settled law in
England from the beginning to end of the transatlantic slave trade.
What's the evidence?
First, ancient English judges enthusiastically embraced and defended
the principle of natural rights and delivered this edict:
Things are said to be [no one's property] in several different ways: by
nature or [natural law], as wild beasts, birds and fish [and] by the com-
mon opinion of mankind .... There are things that are res nullius by
nature which nature does not permit to be anyone's property [such] as
free men. Free men are not subjects of ownership and commerce and the
same may be said of a sick slave.4 61 ... The law declares him to be free.4 62
Second, more modem English judges also adopted the principle that
persons have a natural right to be free. Third, in every century in which
the transatlantic slave trade flourished - from the mid-sixteenth century
to the latter part of the nineteenth century - English judges issued an
opinion proclaiming that de jure slavery was unconstitutional.463
460. See Forbes v. Cochrane, 107 Eng. Rep. 450, 458-459 (1824). Justice Best com-
menting that, There is no statute recognizing slavery which operates in the part of the
British Empire in which we are now called upon to administer justice. It is a relation,
which has always in British Courts been held inconsistent with the constitution of the coun-
try .... [While] economists and politicians were recommending to the Legislature the
protection of this traffic, and senators were framing statutes for its promotion, and declar-
ing it a benefit to the country, the Judges of the land, above the age in which they lived,
standing upon the high ground of natural right... declared that slavery was inconsistent
with the genius of the English constitution, and that human beings could not be the subject
matter of property. Id.
461. Here, the ancient judge had to be referring to a slave captured in war; otherwise,
the sentence or the rule doesn't make sense. Therefore, according to natural law, once a
man secures his freedom, he could never become a slave, that is, unless he is a war captive.
See also, Butts v. Penny, 83 Eng. Rep. 518 (1677) (concluding that "no property could be in
villains but by compact [a formal agreement] or [by] conquest [captivity in war].").
462. BRACTONA, supra note 457, at 41.
463. The following cases lend some general support for the view asserted: The MID-
SIXTEENTH CENTURY - In re Cartwright, 11 Elizabeth, 2 Rushworth's Coll. 468 (1569)
(again holding that "England was too pure air for slaves to breathe in"); the SEVENTEENTH
CENTURY - Chamberlaine v. Harvey, 87 Eng. Rep. 598, 600 (1696)
[I]f the plaintiff [has] any property in this Negro, he must either have an absolute or a
qualified property in him at the time of the trespass supposed to be committed. He could
not have an absolute or general property, because by Magna Charta, and the laws of En-
gland, no man can have such a property over another. Id.;
the EIGHTEENTH CENTURY - Smith v. Gould, 92 Eng. Rep. 338 (1706) ("There is no such
thing as a slave by the law of England."); and the EARLY-NINETEENTH CENTURY - Forbes
v. Cochrane, 107 Eng. Rep.450, 452 (1824) ("[T]he [jiudges of the land, above the age in
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Then again, however, any astute legal historian would quickly point
out: along with the inhumanity and cruelty that it produced, the horrors
and terrors of the slave trade were very prevalent in the British colonies,
including the American colonies. Furthermore, the keen observer would
also mention that the English government informally supported that sys-
tem of terror and involuntary servitude. For certain, those observations
cannot be easily overlooked. To repeat, the Houses of Lords and Com-
mons acknowledged and approved private, de facto slavery on the streets
of London464 and they also supported de jure slavery in the colonies. 65
Arguably, by any objective measure, this latter system of suppression, in-
timidation and rule by fear was nothing less than an earlier form of state-
supported or state-sponsored terrorism.466
which they lived... declared that slavery was inconsistent with the genius of the English
constitution, and that human beings could not be the subject matter of property.").
464. Of course, there is little doubt about what occurred in the streets of London. See,
e.g., The Slave Grace, 166 Eng. Rep. 179, 182-183 (1827). "The personal traffic in slaves...
in England had been as public and as authorized in London as in any of [the] West India
Islands. They were sold on the Exchange and other places... in London without impeach-
ment from a very early period up to nearly the end of the [eighteenth] century." Id. Al-
though some would stress that very few slaves touched the earth in Bristol, England during
the zenith of the slave trade, they were there nevertheless. See A Bristol Hero, supra note
219, at A30 (stating that, "The economic legacy to Bristol is enormous," Courtier said.
Very few slaves were ever brought to Bristol, whose 9,000 or so black residents today are
descended from later immigrants, he said.").
465. To illustrate, even after England had formally declared the slave trade illegal, the
Court of King's Bench decided Forbes, 107 Eng. Rep. at 450. In that opinion, Justice Best
wrote:
I beg [that what I say does not trench] upon the local rights of the proprietors in our West
India Islands [regarding] their slaves.... They have acquired those rights under the en-
couragement of the Legislature of this country, and they [should not be] put in jeopardy by
any power in this country .... We have unfortunately recognised the existence of slavery
there, although we have never recognized [state-initiated de jure slavery] in our own coun-
try. Id at 465-8.
466. The British government - to a greater extent, the Monarch - monopolized the
African slave trade from the mid-sixteenth until the very late seventeen century. Then, in
1697, Parliament enacted legislation that terminated Britain's monopoly, formally sanc-
tioned and encouraged de facto slavery in England, and fostered de jure slavery and un-
speakable terror indirectly in distant colonies. The title of the statute was, "An Act to
Settle the Trade to Africa", 8-10 Will. III, c. 26 (1697), which gave the Royal African Com-
pany and the king's subjects the only authority to participate in the slave trade and its
terrible abuses and subjugation. Fifty-two years later, however, Parliament enacted a sec-
ond anti-monopoly statute in 1749 entitled, "Act for Extending and Improving the Trade to
Africa," 23 Geo. II, c. 31 (1749-50). This latter act extended the right to trade, torture and
commit horrors off the coast of Africa to all private persons and entities throughout Great
Britain. The preamble to the 1749 anti-monopoly statute reads in relevant part:
Whereas as trade to and from Africa, is very advantageous to Great Britain, and is neces-
sary for the supplying the plantations and colonies thereunto belonging, with a sufficient
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But it is important to stress: parliament never enacted any positive laws
that formally legitimized the terrorization, intimidation, and forced re-
moval of a free people - from one continent to another - in the name
of private commerce or free trade. However, English and American
judges certainly recognized, permitted, and supported the terrorization of
innocent Africans under the guise of protecting one's right to form con-
tracts and engage in commerce. Even more remarkable, those learned
jurists endorsed the systematic deprivation of human rights in the name
of commerce, while simultaneously declaring that commercial terrorism
was unconstitutional, and stressing that "[tihere are natural rights against
which there cannot ... be a prescription.,
467
A glaring example of such uninhibited judicial hypocrisy occurred in
1716, during the very height of the slave trade. While state-supported
terror was raging on slave ships and on distant plantations, an English
judge declared the following in Fazakerley v Wiltshire:4 68 "A man can-
not... have a more natural right to anything than to the free use of his
bodily labour; and, therefore a. . . law that. . . restrain[s] a man from the
use of that [labour]. . . must be naught[,] especially when no recompence
is given in lieu of it." ' 4 69 Was the judge thinking about the innocents on
those ships and plantations when he made that declaration? It is very
unlikely.
American courts also embraced the rule appearing in Fazakerley. In
1799, the Maryland Supreme Court decided Mahoney v. Ashton.4 7 ° Writ-
ing for the court, Chief Justice Chase declared: "slavery is incompatible
with every principle of religion and morality. It is unnatural and contrary
to the maxims of political law, more especially in this country.... [And
number of Negroes at reasonable rates, and for that purpose the said trade ought to be
open and free to all his Majesty's subjects. Therefore, be it enacted .... Id.
467. See Corporation of Kingston Upon Hull v. Horner, 98 Eng. Rep. 807, 811 (1774).
"There are many instances, in which the power of the Crown is now understood restrained,
in which it before was not so understood. There were... prescriptions contrary to the
natural and civil rights of subjects, and detrimental to trade. These are not maintainable
now, nor were three hundred years ago: there must be a strict prescription to support them.
Id. See also, Money v. Leach, 97 Eng. Rep. 1075, 1086 (1765). "To search a man's private
papers ad libitum, and even without accusation, is an infringement of the natural rights of
mankind." Id.; Offord v. Davies, 142 Eng. Rep. 1336, 1338 (1862).
In Story on Agency, the learned author stated that, 'in general, the principal has a right to
determine or revoke the authority given to his agent, at his [o]wn [m]ere pleasure[.]' The
same principle has infused itself into the jurisprudence of modern Europe, as, indeed, it
could not fail to do, since it is but an application of a maxim founded upon the natural
rights of men in all ages, in regard to their own private concerns, when the law has not
interfered to prohibit the exercise of them. Id.
468. Fazakerley v Wiltshire, 88 Eng. Rep. 754 (1716)
469. Id. at 755.
470. Mahoney v. Ashton, 4 H & McH. 295, available at, 1799 WL 397 (Md. Gen 1799).
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by] the common law of England no person can have a property [interest]
in another as a slave; and, slavery can only be established by municipal
regulations .... The trade from Africa to America was.. .contrary to the
policy of the common law and of England [.]47l
Yet, even after declaring that private citizens cannot capture, terrorize,
humiliate, and enslave innocents, English and American courts still
helped slave traders, ship owners, merchant-underwriters, and insurance
companies to accomplish those very ends. To underscore the seriousness
of this charge, consider Justice Comyn's incisive remarks in Forbes v.
Cochrane472 . He reminded his brethrens on the Court of King's Bench
that England's common law judges and Lords of Appeals had always rec-
ognized and supported slavers' natural right to go to distant shores in
order to terrorize and enslave free peoples. 473 Moreover, English judges
endorsed such inhumanity and misery over three centuries, even though
such conduct was unconstitutional, illegal, immoral, and a violation Great
Britain's public policy. To be sure, American judges behaved similarly.474
B. British Courts' Declaratory and Equitable Decisions Before the
Enactment of the Anti-Slave Trade Act of 1807
In an earlier section, a brief discussion of the controversy surrounding
the Baby M. case appeared. Again, jurists, commentators and others se-
verely criticized the New Jersey Supreme Court for several reasons: 1)
the court opened its doors to a litigant who violated a criminal statute and
came to court with "unclean hands; '4 75 2) the court enforced an illegal
surrogacy contract; and 3) the learned judges decided against the biologi-
cal mother and awarded both legal and physical custody of Baby M. ar-
471. Id. at *2-3.
472. Forbes v. Cochrane, 107 Eng. Rep. 450 (1824).
473. Id. at 453 (noting that although, by the 47 Geo. 3, c. 36, the traffic in slaves has
been declared unlawful in a British subject, the Courts of England have respected the
trade itself when carried on by the subjects of a State which continues to tolerate it. "[In]
this country slavery does not exist; but an action is maintainable for the price of slaves in
the Courts of this country.").
474. GEORGE MELLEN, UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 28, 34 (Boston: Saxton
& Pierce 1841); JOEL TIFFANY, UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY, 27-32
(Cleveland, Ohio: J. Calyer, 1849). See also, EVIDENCE THAT PRE-CIVIL WAR U.S. SLAV-
ERY AS ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL: EVIDENCE FROM THE ENGLISH COMMON
LAW, COURT PRECEDENTS, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, THE U.S. CONSTITU-
TION, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, AND THE MANY ANTI-KIDNAPPING PRECEDENTS, 4-5 at http:/
/medicolegal.tripod.com/slaveryillegal.html (last visited June 22, 2002).
475. To read a more thorough discussion of the application of the equitable defense of
"unclean hand" or the defense of in pari delicto as they relate to insurance contracts and
controversies, see Rice, supra note 75, at 1166-1167 nn. 187-8.
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guably to a criminal who initiated the crime, and who occupied the
superior bargaining position under the contract.
Perhaps, of the three, the first one generated the most outrage and
virulent commentary. By now, the reason should be fairly obvious: "a
party alleging his own turpitude shall not be heard in a court of justice to
sustain an action founded upon it; and, where the parties stand in pari
delicto, the law leaves them as it finds them to reap the fruits of their
dishonesty, as well as they may." '4 76 Unfortunately, like the Supreme
Court of New Jersey, many English and American judges did not leave
the blemished litigants - unlawful slave traders and insurers - where
they found them, immersed in criminality, illegality, immorality, and,
above all, terrorism. Instead, judges assisted them, by giving the ter-
rorists and the tainted underwriters access to courts. Judges also awarded
declaratory and equitable relief to the terrorists or to their aiders and
abettors under illegal insurance contracts. What is the evidence?
First, over the centuries, British courts decided several celebrated in-
surance cases in which insured slave traders or their agents murdered
hundreds of slaves during voyages and insurrections on ships and on land.
Still, other insurance cases involved the death of slaves from the horrors
of slaving and from slave traders' and ship owners' gross negligence.
However, barring a few trial-by-jury cases, insured traders invariably
asked courts to declare that the underwriters had a duty to pay or indem-
nify under the insurance contract.
For example, in 1783, the Court of the King's Bench decided the infa-
mous case, Gregson v. Gilbert.477 In that case, commercial terrorists kid-
napped, branded, and forced 417 people to board the slave ship Zong.
Nearing the end of a long voyage, the captain discovered that fresh water
was very scarce. To complicate matters, disease broke out. Then, the cap-
tain remembered that the voyage was insured; but he knew the under-
writers would not pay for sick slaves or for innocents who died from a
disease. On the other hand, the captain remembered that death by
drowning was a covered peril under the insurance agreement. Conclud-
ing that the sick slaves were going to die anyway and wanting to reduce
the owner's financial losses, the captain decided to throw unhealthy
slaves overboard. By the time the Zong reached its destination in the
Caribbean, 132 persons had been murdered.47 s
476. See Fales v. Mayberry, 8 F. Cas. 970, 971 (D. R.I. 1815) (emphasis added).
477. Gregson v. Gilbert, 99 Eng. Rep. 629 (1783).
478. See generally, Id. at 629-630. See also FRED D'AGULAR, FEEDING THE GHOST
(1999). This is an excellent novel that is based on the tragedy surrounding the slave ship
Zong. Remarkably, Chapters 9 and 10 beautifully and intelligently incorporate the actually
facts of this case - using the actual names of Lord Mansfield, the attorneys, and other -
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William Gregson, an attorney and the Mayor of Liverpool, was the in-
sured-plaintiff; he also was a slave trader and the owner of the murdered
slaves.479 He asked the insurers to pay. Astonishingly and for reasons
unknown, the attorney-terrorist argued that economic necessity - rather
than drowning - was the proximate cause of the murders. The under-
writers disagreed. And they asserted that even if economic necessity
were the cause of the financial losses, it was not a peril insured against
under the contract. 480 Therefore, they refused to indemnify Gregson.
The majority of the King's Bench Court accepted the underwriters' argu-
ment and ruled in their favor. Chief Justice Lord William Murray Mans-
field declared: there was "no necessity" stemming from an inadequate
supply of fresh water, because Gregson's agents threw innocent men and
women overboard after a down pour of rain.48 1
Twelve years later, the Court of the King's Bench decided Tatham v.
Hodgson.4 82 In that case, the court had to decide whether insurers had a
duty to compensate slave traders for the natural death of innocents. At
that time, Chief Justice Lord Lloyd Kenyon 483 delivered the opinion. He
cited Parliament's hastily enacted anti-insurance statute 484 in response to
the Gregson massacre and declared: "this Act of Parliament [was]
founded in humanity .... [Therefore,] the plaintiff cannot call on the
underwriters to make good this part of the lOSS.,,485 Over the years, and
before Parliament enacted even tougher anti-slave trade legislation, in-
surers prevailed in many more declaratory and equitable actions. Quite
simply, underwriters embraced an unstated policy that was deceptive and
contemptuous: they sold insurance to the commercial terrorists; but, after
the terrorists reported losses, insurers refused to compensate traders for
and paint an exhilarating picture of the civil trial between the slave traders and
underwriters.
479. See THOMAS, supra note 148, at 575.
480. Gregson, 99 Eng. Rep. at 630 ("It would be dangerous to [allow] the plaintiff to
recover on a peril not stated in the declaration, because it [appears that the peril was not]
within the policy.") (comment of Justice Buller after embracing the underwriters' defense).
481. Id.
482. Tatham v. Hodgson, 101 Eng. Rep. 756 (1796).
483. LORD KENYON, at http://www.genuki.org.uk/big/eng/History/Barons/bar-
onsl2.html (last visited June 24, 2002) ("Lord Kenyon...was appointed 6 September 1786
one of the lords commissioners of trade and plantations; and having resigned the appoint-
ment of master of the rolls, he was declared 9 June 1788 Lord Chief Justice of the court of
King's Bench, and created baron Kenyon of Gredington.").
484. Tatham, 101 Eng. Rep. at 756 ("[T]he 34 Geo. 3, c. 80, § 10 provides 'that no loss
or damage shall be recoverable on account of the mortality of slaves by natural death or ill
treatment, or against loss by throwing overboard of slaves on any account whatsoever.'").
485. Id. at 757.
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losses stemming from the murder of innocent captives,486 the negligent
death of slaves, 48 7 costly and fatal slave voyages, 488 and the loss of privi-
lege slaves, which seamen received as compensation instead of wages for
practicing their terrorism.489  And underwriters adopted that position
even though they contracted to cover some of those perils.
486. Jones v. Schmoll, 99 Eng. Rep. 1012, 1012 (1786) (Writing for the majority of the
Court of King's Bench, Chief Justice Lord Mansfield declared that "the underwriter is not
answerable for [losses associated with the death of slaves] who "swallowed salt water,
leaped into the sea, hung [themselves] upon the sides of ship [and] died of chagrin [after
receiving wounds in a mutiny]." According to Mansfield, the loss was "a remote conse-
quence, and not within any peril insured against by the policy."); Farmer v. Legg, 101 Eng.
Rep. 923, 926 (1797) (Writing for the majority of the Court of King's Bench, Chief Justice
Lord Kenyon declared that the insured-owner of a slave ship could not recover for losses
incurred during a slave insurrection because the insured breached a condition precedent by
failing to certify that the captain was certified to command the ship as required by an act of
Parliament).
487. Hodgson v. Glover, 102 Eng. Rep. 1308, 1310 (1805) (In an assumpsit upon a
policy of insurance and delivering the opinion for the Court of King's Bench, Chief Justice
Lord Ellenborough declared that "the plaintiff [did] not shew that he has sustained a loss
by the perils of the sea. He [did] not shew that if there had been no shipwreck, and the
slaves had all got to a market profit would have been produced. It should have been shewn
that but for the peril insured against, which happened, there would have been profit upon
the adventure.").
488. Hartley v. Buggin, 99 Eng. Rep. 527, 528 (1781) ("This was an action on a policy
of insurance upon the ship Blossom, at and from the coast of Africa to the West Indies,
with liberty to exchange goods and slaves." Writing for the majority on the Court of
King's Bench, Chief Justice Lord Mansfield upheld the jury's finding that the ship deviated
from the planned voyage, an affirmative defense under the insurance policy; therefore, the
insurer did not have to indemnify the slave traders and ship owner. In passing Mansfield
stated what is current settled law in England and in America: "It is not material, to consti-
tute a deviation, that the risk should be increased."); Sellar v. M'Vicar, 127 Eng. Rep. 365,
366 (1804) ("This was an action brought to recover the amount of the [underwriter's] sub-
scription on a policy of insurance. The [insured] was owner of the ship La Fraternite, men-
tioned in the policy at the time of the loss and [when] she had discharged a cargo of
slaves." The underwriter claimed that the insured deviated from the voyage. Both the jury
and the Court of Common Pleas agreed. Justice Alvanley declared: "In this case such
voyage never commenced; the case itself excludes any inception of the voyage."); Law-
rence v. Sydebotham, 102 Eng. Rep. 1204, 1206 (1805) ("This was an action on a policy of
insurance on the ship Tamer, with or without letters of marquee on slaves and goods as
interest might appear .... [T]he material question was whether the policy [was] avoided by
a deviation in the course of the voyage." Writing for the majority of the Court of King's
Bench, Chief Justice Lord Ellenborough declared, "The slackening [of] sail for the purpose
of convoying the prize was a deviation which annuls the policy.").
489. Webster v. De Tastet, 101 Eng. Rep. 908, 908 (1797) (The Court of the King's
Bench held: "Where a mate of a ship or a sailor is to receive something at the end of the
voyage in lieu of wages, e g. slaves, he cannot insure it .... [T]he slaves were not the
subject of insurance, and that the plaintiff could not recover in this [negligence] action
more than he could have recovered in an action against the underwriters."); Robertson v.
Ewer, 99 Eng. Rep. 1011 (1786) ("[S]mallpox broke out amongst the slaves, who were all
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But insurers did not always prevail. British courts certainly permitted
the insured torturers and terrorists to file breach-of-contract, declaratory
and equitable actions; and the insureds often received positive outcomes.
Without doubt, the ruling in Jones v. Schmol 49 ° presents the clearest ex-
ample of how celebrated English judges, without an inkling of disquiet or
remorse, encouraged slave traders to murder, intimidate and enslave
blameworthy men and women. Put simply, the captain and crew on a
slave ship murdered more than two hundred slaves on a voyage from
Africa to the West Indies.491 At the time, the blameless captives were
trying to secure their freedom. The owner of the murdered slaves had
secured insurance in England; therefore, he asked the underwriters to
cover the losses. When the underwriters refused to indemnify, the in-
sured filed a breach-of-contract action and asked for a trial by jury before
the Court of Guildhall.492
Speaking for the entire Court of King's Bench, the renowned and
learned Chief Justice Mansfield4 93 declared: "[i]t is very clear that those,
who were killed by the firing, or died in consequence of their bruises, are
within the policy, [therefore, the underwriters must pay]."'4 94 But Lord
obliged to be put on shore." Writing for the majority on the Court of the King's Bench,
Chief Justice Lord Mansfield declared: "There is no authority to shew that the insured can
recover for such a loss; [lit is contrary to the constant practice. On a policy on a ship,
sailors' wages or provisions are never allowed in settling the damages. The insurance is on
the body of the ship, tackle, and furniture; not on the voyage or crew.").
490. Jones v. Schmoll, 99 Eng. Rep. 1012 (1786).
491. Id. at 1012.
[This] was an action on a policy of assurance '[at] and from Bristol to the coast of Africa,
during her stay and trade there [and] thence to her port or ports of discharge in the West
Indies.' The demand upon the policy was the loss of a great many slaves by mutiny. The
evidence [shows that] the captain shipped 225 prime slaves [The insured slave trader] con-
tended that they had all died in consequence of the mutiny. Id.
492. Id. at 1013 ("[A]t Guildhall, [t]he question for the jury will be, whether any of
those who died by any other means, except the being fired upon, or in consequence of the
wounds and bruises which they received during the struggle, are within the meaning of that
policy, which insures against damage by mutiny.").
493. It must be stressed at this point that Justice Lord William Murray Mansfield was
probably the most respected and preeminent judge in English history. Yet, he condoned
the torture, murder and terrorization of innocent Africans. In fact, he gave slave traders
and their murdering agents full access to the Court of King's Bench and presided over
many of the jury trials involving commercial and insurance matter at the very height of the
transatlantic slave trade. See BIRKENHEAD, supra note 261, at 186 (noting, "[I]t was first
and foremost [Lord Mansfield's] work in developing and explaining the commercial law
that has ensured him a foremost place among English judges.").
494. Jones, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1013 ("The first class certainly comes within the meaning
of the policy, of mortality by mutiny; such as were killed in the affray. The second also
comes under the same description, namely, those who died of the wounds they received
from the firing and other hostilities.").
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Mansfield left the other complicated insurance-related issues for the jury
to decide.495 The jury returned two verdicts in favor of the insured,
whose agents had murdered the slaves. Amazingly, Lord Mansfield and
the full Court of King's Bench upheld those verdicts and awarded com-
pensatory damages to the insured for practicing terrorism and murdering
innocent human beings in the name of commerce.496
Unquestionably, the terrorism, highly unprincipled decisions and reme-
dies outlined in Jones v. Schmoll were not aberrations. Eleven years
later, the Court of King's Bench, with the assistance of another jury of
merchants decided Rohl v. Parr.497 The facts in Rohl were extremely sim-
ilar to those in Jones v. Schmoll: when the innocent captives on a slave
ship tried to obtain their freedom, the insured's agent murdered them. 498
Citing the covered-perils clause in the property insurance contract, the
insured asked the underwriters to pay for the loss of property. 499 Of
course, the insurers refused, forcing the insured to sue. Simply put, the
jury had to decide whether the underwriters were responsible for the to-
tal or partial loss of property.5 °° They concluded that the underwriters
had to compensate the insured terrorist for the partial loss of his human
495. BIRKENHEAD, supra note 261, at 186 ("His practice was to try such cases at the
[Court of] Guildhall. The panel was chosen with great care from among the merchants of
the city, to whom there was no greater source of pride than to become 'Lord Mansfield's
jurymen.' [He] was accustomed to take their verdict subject to the opinion of the full
Court.") (emphasis added.). See, e.g., Tyrie v. Fletcher, 98 Eng. Rep. 1297, 1297 (1777)
("This was an action on the case, brought by the insured in a policy of insurance, against the
underwriter. The cause was tried before Lord Mansfield at Guildhall, when, by consent, a
verdict was found for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the Court upon the question.");
Bernardi v. Motteux, 99 Eng. Rep 364, 364 (1781) ("[This was] an action on a policy of
insurance [on] freight and goods, upon the ship ... Joanna .... The cause was tried before
Lord Mansfield, at Guildhall, when a verdict was found for the plaintiff, subject, to the
opinion of the Court[.]").
496. Jones, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1013 (The first verdict stated: "[AIll the slaves who were
killed in the mutiny, or died of their wounds, were to be paid for." And the second one
read: "[AIII those who died of their bruises, which they received in the mutiny, though
accompanied with other causes, were to be paid for.").
497. Rohl v. Parr, 170 Eng. Rep. 414 (1796).
498. Id. ("The ship sailed from St. Bartholomew on the 1st of September 1792, arrived
safe on the coast of Africa, and began to trade .... [T]here was an insurrection of the
slaves on board the ship. They had then forty-nine on board, and seven were killed [.]").
499. Id. ("[T]wo points arose in the case: whether this was a total loss arising from the
perils of the sea; or, [whether it was a] partial loss above five per cent for which the plain-
tiff was entitled to recover.").
500. Id. ("The jury (which was a special one) found, that this was not a loss within the
term of perils of the sea in policies of insurance and of course that the plaintiff could not
recover for a total loss. Then became a question, as to the partial loss from the insurrec-
tion, which it was necessary should exceed five per cent in order to give the plaintiff a title
to recover.").
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cargo. Chief Justice Lord Kenyon, who succeeded Lord Mansfield in
1788, accepted the verdict and entered the judgment.5"'
And like his esteemed predecessor on the Court of the King's Bench,
Chief Justice Lord Kenyon showed absolutely no concern about question-
ing the legitimacy of a property insurance contract that encouraged an
insured to commit murder and one that required the underwriter to pay
for the loss. Clearly, from the perspective of a reasonable person, the
rulings and verdicts in Jones and in Rohl are gut wrenching and horren-
dous for two reasons. First, in both cases, the insurance agreements were
obviously illegal from their inception. To repeat, England's constitution
and common law prevented English citizens from creating contracts in
which they agree to enslave innocents. Therefore, the breach-of-contract
actions in Jones and Rohl should have been dismissed summarily because
both the underwriters and insured were tainted with criminality.
But more important, the condition precedent clause in the respective
insurance contracts required insurers to compensate the insured slave
traders, if those terrorists murdered their slaves under clearly specified
conditions.5 °2 Without doubt, those provisions were highly unconsciona-
ble and immoral. Accordingly, as English courts have done on other oc-
casions, the learned justices in Jones and in Rohl should have declared
that the insurance contracts were void ab initio. Why? The agreements
encouraged slavers to murder guiltless and highly vulnerable individuals
to achieve social control and, ultimately, commercial prosperity.50 3
501. Id. at 415. Specifically the jury had to address this question: "If the calculation
[of damages] was taken at the time when the loss happened by the insurrection, when the
slaves were killed, then above five per cent was the loss; but if at the time of the condemna-
tion of the ship at Cape Coast, at which time the whole cargo was sold, [damages] would be
under five per cent .... Lord Kenyon expressed his assent to the finding of the jury on
both points. The plaintiff had a verdict for an average loss. Id.
502. Jones v. Schmoll, 99 Eng. Rep. 1012, 1012 (1786) ("There was a memorandum on
the policy, that, 'the assurers are not to pay for mortality by mutiny, unless the same
amount[ed] to 101 per cent to be computed upon the first cost of the ship, outfit and cargo,
valuing Negroes so lost at 351. per head."'); Rohl, 170 Eng. Rep. at 414 ("There was a
memorandum, 'to be free, from average, under ten per cent for loss in boats, and from five
per cent for loss from insurrection.").
503. See, e.g., Amicable Society v. Bolland, 5 Eng. Rep. 70, 75-76 (1830) The Lord
Chancellor in the Court of Chancery observing:
The principles of law established in marine insurances are applicable to this case .... Sup-
pose that the party insuring had agreed to pay a sum of money upon condition, that in the
event of his committing a capital felony and executed for that felony, his assignees shall
receive a certain sum of money [from the insurer]. [I]s it possible that such a contract
could be sustained? Is it not void upon the plainest principles of public policy? Would not
such a contract take away one of those restraints operating on the minds of men against the
commission of crimes namely, the interest we have in the welfare and prosperity of our
connexions. [T]his policy cannot be sustained, and that the Respondents are not entitled
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Insured slavers also won other cases in English courts before the enact-
ment of 1807 anti-slave trade act. For example, in 1806, the Court of
Common Pleas decided King v. Glover.5" 4 Writing for the majority after
considering the jury's verdict, Chief Justice Sir James Mansfield declared
that underwriters had to pay death benefits to a captain's widow. 50 5 It
was irrelevant that the captain died while participating in an illegal and
immoral activity- an outlawed voyage to kidnap free persons and force
them into involuntary solitude.50 6 And on three occasions 50 7 and under
the leadership of Chief Justices Lord Kenyon and Ellenborough, the
Court of the King's Bench forced insurers to reimburse thieving and im-
moral commercial traders, following the destruction and total loss of their
slaves ships and supplies.508 Again, in each case, the destruction of the
property occurred during illegal voyages to traffic in slaves.
to recover. Id.; Fisher v Bridges, 118 Eng. Rep. 713, 716 (1852) ("When we see money
given in consideration of an act which is and always must be illegal, for instance a murder,
a contract to pay the money would be illegal.").
504. King v. Glover, 127 Eng. Rep. 603 (1806).
505. Id. at 603.
[The suit] was commenced by [the widow to recover a loss] upon a policy of insurance
effected by her husband 'on his commissions, privileges, &c. as may be hereafter valued.'
[She] obtained a verdict on this policy at [the Court of] Guildhall. [The insurer called] on
plaintiff to show cause why that verdict should not be set aside, and a nonsuit or a new. trial
be had. Id.
506. Id. at 604.
[The insurer] moved on several points [;] but [there is only one] objection which is material
[:] [T]he insurance [was] illegal [under] the authority of Webster v. De Tastet, 7 Term Rep.
157, 158, 101 Eng. Rep. 908 (1797). The policy in this case is only against the perils of the
sea. If the policy were upon the health of the slaves, I think there would be considerable
force in the objections last made. But this is a policy against the perils of the sea only,
which is an answer to the objection. Id.
507. See Shawe v. Felton, 102 Eng. Rep. 310 (1801). This was an action on a policy of
insurance on the ship Indian, and goods on a voyage at and from Liverpool to the coast of
Africa, including provisions and sea stores laid in for the slaves. In the course of her voy-
age she met with a violent concussion. [S]he was kept afloat by pumping until she reached
Demerara[;] a few days afterwards, she sunk[.] Id.
See also Parr v. Anderson, 102 Eng. Rep. 1264, 1264 (1805) (noting, "This was an action
upon a policy of insurance on the ship Mercury [to] and from Liverpool to places of trade
on the coast of Africa to her final port of discharge in the British West [Indies] .... [She]
wrecked in the course of the voyage described in the policy."); Freeland v. Glover, 7 East
457, 457, 103 Eng. Rep. 177, 177 (1806) (stating, "This was an action on a policy of insur-
ance on goods on board the ship Neptune - 'lost or not lost, at her first place of trade on
the coast of Africa [and] thence to Liverpool.').
508. Shawe, 102 Eng. Rep. at 311-3 ("[The insurer called] on the plaintiff to shew
cause why the verdict should not be set aside on the grounds that the subject matter of the
insurance was so much reduced from the original value at the time of the loss [.]" Chief
Justice Lord Kenyon declared: "The jury [did not] doubt that the ship was seaworthy when
she sailed, and that there was a total loss; [Since the] rule [regarding] valued policies [is
settled], it is too late to open it again."); Parr, 102 Eng. Rep. at 1265-6.
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Once more, it is important to repeat that such criminality and corrup-
tion did not impress venerated English justices enough to persuade them
to dismiss traders' breach-of-contract actions summarily. Clear and con-
vincing evidence also reveals that such illegality did not impress some
pre-1807American judges sufficiently enough to motivate them to dismiss
similar actions based on unlawful slave-trade agreements. Now earlier,
we learned that British underwriters insured the overwhelming majority
of the slave trafficking that originated in colonial and in early-Indepen-
dence America. Consequently, careful research failed to uncover any re-
ported, pre-1807 American cases involving litigation between insurers
and slave traders, per se. However, Andersons & Tilley v. Moncrieff,50 9 is
an exceptionally enlightening breach-of-contract case involving an illegal
slave-trade agreement.
To help ensure large profits, the once highly successful and influential
British firm of John and Alexander Anderson & Company 51 ° employed
agents to kidnap, intimidate, capture and sell citizens of the African con-
tinent.511 William M'Leod, a resident of Charleston, was one of those
agents. Under the terms of a consignment contract, M'Leod had a con-
tractual duty to sell the captives and send the proceeds to the Andersons.
Before his death, M'Leod failed to give a full accounting of the sale.512
The insurer refused to pay, claiming that the ship deviated from her original voyage; and
the jury agreed. Writing for the court, Chief Justice Lord Ellenborough reversed and
stated:" [I]t may be material to ascertain in what manner [have] parties to contracts con-
taining this form of words have acted upon them in former instances, where deviations of
the kind now in question have happened. [Therefore,] this case should undergo a second
trial. Id.
Freeland v. Glover, 103 Eng. Rep., at 178-9. (The insurers asserted, "material information
had been concealed from the underwriters [;]" consequently, they had not duty to reim-
burse the thieving terrorist. The jury at Guildhall disagreed; and, after examining and
approving the verdict, Chief Justice Lord Ellenborough declared: "[T]he assured disclosed
every thing which he knew as to the existing state of the ship at the time: it was a true
statement of its then actual situation. There was therefore no concealment of any thing
material.").
509. Anderson & Tilley v. Moncrieff, 3. S.C. Eq. 124, available at, 1810 WL 300 (S.C.
1810).
510. See generally, In re William Coles, 164 Eng. Rep 1243, 1244 (1863); Ryan v. An-
derson, 56 Eng. Rep. 474, 475 (1818); Rowe v. Anderson, 58 Eng. Rep. 100, 101-2 (1831).
511. Anderson & Tilley, 1810 WL 300, at *1 ("The complainants-John & Alexander
Anderson - are London [m]erchants... [They hired Captain Walsh, the owner of the
schooner Phoebe to kidnap] forty-five Negroes from the Island of Bance, on the coast of
Africa.").
512. Id. ("[Under the consignment contract,] William M'Leod [had a duty] to sell the
Negroes [in] Havana to the best advantage, and then [to] remit the [net] proceeds to the
Andersons... [M'Leod] received and sold [the [Negroes] ... [but the Anderson were igno-
rant of the time and amount of the sale because they never received complete accounting
the transaction] or proceeds of the sale] during William M'Leod's life time.").
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The Andersons filed an equitable action against M'Leod's administrator
in a South Carolina court.
From the beginning, the consignment contract was highly offensive and
morally wrong because its performance contributed to the terrors and
atrocities of the slave trade. But more important, the agreement violated
South Carolina's513 and the federal government's 5 14 first anti-slave trade
statutes. Yet, the court of equity still considered the Andersons' tainted
complaint and ruled in their favor. How did the court justify its decision?
First, the judge acknowledged the following: 1) courts of equity should
not assist any person with unclean hands;515 and, 2) courts should neither
enforce a corrupt agreement nor hear any action premised on an illegal
contract.516 However, citing agency principles,517 the judge decided to
resolve the controversy between the British terrorists and their American
agent.
To help underscore the correctness of his ruling, the South Carolina
judge cited two English cases - Tenant v. Elliott,518 an insurance case,
and Farmers v. Russell.5 19 In both cases, the Court of Common Pleas
used agency theory rather than contract principles to resolve conflicts,
which were somewhat similar to the one appearing in Andersons.5 20 The
513. Id. at *2.
[A]n act of the [South Carolina] legislature [that] prohibit[ed] the importation of [N]egroes
until the 1st January, 1799 [stated]: '[T]he importation of [N]egroes from Africa and other
places beyond the seas, be and is hereby prohibited until the 1st of January, 1799'; and it
further declared that every slave so imported should be forfeited; and in and by a certain
other act of the legislature, passed 27th of December, 1798, the act of 1799 was extended to
the 1st of January, 1801. Id.
514. Id. at *4 ("[T]he Act of Congress 1794 prohibit[s] citizens and residents in
America fitting out vessels, for the African trade, to supply foreign ports or places, which
would affect the shipment for the Havana."
515. Id. at *4-5 (The attorney for the Moncrieff asserted: "A party coming into Court,
to ask equity, must come in with clean hands." But incredibly, the judge insisted: "I will not
say that there may not be cases, where the transaction may involve so much moral guilt that
courts of justice would not suffer themselves to be polluted with them directly or indirectly.
But I do not think that this is one of those cases.") (Emphasis added).
516. Id. *5 ("The position laid down by the defendant's counsel is certainly true in
general, that courts of justice will not enforce illegal contracts, nor assist parties in recover-
ing under them. The cases of insurance on illegal voyages, and other examples, have been
cited and relied upon in support of this doctrine.").
517. Id. ("The counsel [for the defendant] insist[s] that this was a contract, whereby
Mr. M'Leod undertook, by receiving the [N]egroes, to sell them and be accountable for
the proceeds; and that this contract being contrary to law, was void and could not be en-
forced in our courts. I cannot [agree] .... This is a mere agency.").
518. Tenant v. Elliot, 126 Eng. Rep. 744 (C. P. 1797).
519. Farmers v. Russell, 126 Eng. Rep. 913 (C.P. 1798).
520. Tenant, 126 Eng. Rep. at 745 (Chief Justice Eyre stating: "The question is,
Whether he who has received money [for] another's use on an illegal [insurance] contract,
[Vol. 6:1
AMERICAN & BRITISH INSURERES
South Carolina court, of course, conveniently ignored or summarily dis-
missed three crucial facts. First, then as now, Tenant and Farmers are
extremely questionable minority decisions because the very inferior
Court of Common Pleas decided both conflicts. Second, the Court of
Common Pleas' application of agency principles in both cases was decid-
edly appropriate, because the complainants were innocent, third-party
beneficiaries521 under the illegal agreements. However, in Andersons,
the plaintiff was a party to an illegal employment contract. Although
courts may employ agency principles to decide a controversy between a
principal and an agent, two facts remain: the foundation of that relation-
ship is still based on an employment contract; and, if there is a breach of a
contractual duty, the resulting action sounds in contract and not under a
theory of agency. Also, if either party has engaged in any illegality, a
court of equity should refuse to award any relief to the principal or to the
agent, under the settled doctrine of "unclean hands."
Most assuredly, the outcome in Andersons represents a supreme exam-
ple of how American courts of equity cavalierly ignored the will of both
state legislators and members of Congress - as reflected in state and fed-
eral anti-terrorism statutes - and, intentionally dismissed settled princi-
ples of equity and contract law, while expediently proffering untenable
ones. Finally, the South Carolina judge in Andersons strongly asserted:
permitting M'Leod's estate to keep money that arguably belonged to the
British terrorists would be "monstrous., 522 For sure, this writer strongly
disagrees with that conclusion. The propensity for extremely unprinci-
pled American judges to willfully enforce exceptionally corrupt slave-
can be allowed to retain it, [given that it is not] the desire of those who paid it to him? I
think he cannot."); Farmers, 126 Eng. Rep. at 914. Chief Justice Eyre stating:
Plaintiff's demand arises simply out of the circumstance of money being put into the De-
fendant's hands to be delivered to him. This creates an indebitatus - from which an as-
sumpsit in law arises [;] [therefore,] an action on the case may be maintained. It was on this
ground that the [clourt proceeded in Tenant v Elliott, and I find myself under a difficulty in
making any distinction between that case and the present [case]. Id.
521. Id. at 744 ("A -[who] received money [on behalf] of B [under] an illegal con-
tract between B and C - shall not be allowed to [use] the illegality of the contract as a
defence, in an action brought by B [to collect the] money."); Farmers, 126 Eng. Rep. at 913
(" If A receive[s] money [from] B [for] the use of C, it may be recovered by C in an action
for money [even] though the consideration on which B paid it [was] illegal.").
522. Anderson & Tilley, 1810 WL 300, at *5. [The] defendant [alleges] that whatever
may have been the moral obligation, the complainants were not entitled to recover from
the defendant, because the money in question arose from a shipment of [N]egroes [in]
1799, from the coast of Africa, to Mr. M'Leod, in Charleston, at a time when the importa-
tion of [N]egroes, was made illegal by the acts of [the South Carolina] Assembly prohibit-
ing such importation [But, it] would be monstrous that the defendant should be permitted to
keep the money. (Emphasis added) Id..
2003]
THE SCHOLAR
trade agreements between commercial terrorists and their aiders and
abettors was certainly the greater monstrosity.
C. British and American Courts' Declaratory and Equitable Decisions
After the Enactment of the Anti-Slave Trade Act of 1807
Certainly, before Britain and America enacted their respective, com-
prehensive anti-slave trade legislation in 1807 and 1824, judges in both
countries exhibited callous indifference to traders' commercial terrorism.
More astounding, those otherwise learned justices consistently ignored
settled principles of law regarding the unenforceability of illegal and im-
moral contracts. And courts proudly enforced illegal insurance contracts,
which required insurers to reimburse slavers after the latter had terror-
ized enslaved and, even murdered, millions of innocent men, women and
children.
One could argue, however, that the laws prohibiting such abuses and
inhumanity were less than crystal clear before 1807. Therefore, fairness
requires one to view English and American judges' allegedly unprincipled
rulings and purported endorsement of commercial terrorism against that
background. Definitely, this argument has some merit and it should be
addressed. We know for sure that Parliament and state legislatures in
America did not formally prescribe the terrorism, subjugation and inhu-
manity of the slave trade. But British and American legislative bodies
certainly gave slave trafficking and its accompanying terrors more than a
nod and a wink.523 One could even argue that English and American
courts were simply embracing the conventional wisdom or enforcing the
public policy of their respective countries at the time.
Of course, after a more thorough analysis, those arguments ring
hollow. We must remember that in 1807 and 1824, respectively, both
Congress and Parliament totally abolished all commercial activities and
insurance agreements involving the slave trade. Additionally, under both
acts, the government could prosecute all violators- principals, aiders and
523. See, e.g., Forbes v. Cochrane, 107 Eng. Rep. 450, 453, 458-459 (1824).
It is true, that in this country slavery does not exist; but an action is maintainable for the
price of slaves in the Courts of this country ... [W]e have unfortunately recognised the
existence of slavery [in the West Indies], although we have never recognized it in our own
country. Although the English law has recognised slavery, it has done so within certain
limits only... [Even] Queen Elizabeth expressed her trope to Sir John Hawkins that the
Negroes went voluntarily from Africa to submit to domestic slavery in another country [.]
[And she] declared, that if ANY FORCE WAS USED TO ENSLAVE THEM, she [knew] it would
bring down the vengeance of Heaven upon those who were GUILTY OF SUCH WICKEDNESS.
It is unfortunate, however, for the memory of that Queen, that in her reign patents were
granted to encourage the trade, and those were followed a by Acts of Parliament expressly
recognising it. (Emphasis added) Id.
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abettors- and send then to prison for practicing terrorism. More impor-
tant, to show that they were extremely serious about ending commercial
terrorism, Parliament and Congress gave their respective naval forces
broad enforcement powers such as: 1) the power to arrest commercial
terrorists, 2) the muscle to take alleged violators before a civil court for
prosecution, and 3) the authority to seize and condemn the terrorists'
slave ships and property.524 Therefore, in light of Congress and Parlia-
ment's unquestionable intent to stop slave traders' terroristic activities,
we ask: did English and American judges assist or impede the process
after 1807?
A comparison of pre- and post-1807 rulings reveals fairly similar re-
sults. After 1807, English and American justices still unashamedly al-
lowed commercial terrorists and their corrupt abettors-especially
insurance underwriters - to. resolve breach-of-contract and related
squabbles in courts of law and equity. Moreover, post-1807 courts also
ignored settled legal and equitable principles to achieve strained and con-
voluted decisions. There is, however, one significant contrast between
the two periods. Among the post-1807 cases, American and British
courts decided the greater majority of the insurance controversies in
favor of commercial terrorists.
More specifically, barring two decisions, the central question in the
post-1807 cases was constant: whether insurance companies had a con-
tractual duty to indemnify slave traffickers for losses, after American and
British navies seized the terrorists' slave ships, furnishings and cargo. As
reported earlier, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided Schwartz v.
Insurance Company of North America (INA). 25 in 1814. In that case,
British authorities seized the insured's ship, which was transporting slaves
and other contraband.526 After the financial loss, INA refused to indem-
nify, arguing that Schwartz had breached an express warranty in the in-
surance contract.527 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed, adopted
the jury's verdict, and declared that INA had no duty to compensate the
insureds.528
524. See supra notes 353-359 and 366-369 and accompanying text.
525. Schwartz v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 6 Binn. 378 (Pa. 1814).
526. Id. at 380 ("[B]oth ship and cargo were condemned.. .[because] the voyage was
an adventure commencing in contraband.")
527. Id. at 381 ("[T]he Chief Justice explicitly charged the jury that the warranty of
American property had been violated[;] ... therefore [the insureds] were not entitled to
recover.")
528. Id. at 383 (Writing for the court, Chief Justice Tilghman stated: "The cause was
tried before me, and the jury agreeably to my charge gave a verdict for the [insurance
company].").
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A year earlier, Lord Chancellor Eldon - the father of equity law, who
presided over the Court of Chancery in England - reached a similar
conclusion in Tennant v. Henderson.529 In that case, the slavers repre-
sented on the application for insurance that they were not murderous and
thieving traffickers. 530 During the voyage, a French privateer, rather than
the Royal Navy, seized the slavers' ship.53' After the slavers reported the
seizure and economic losses, their Scottish underwriters discovered that
the insureds had lied and concealed material information on the applica-
tion, and therefore, the underwriters refused to compensate the terrorists.
In the court of equity, the underwriters defended their decision by assert-
ing that the contract was void from its inception in light of the criminals'
material misrepresentation and concealment.532
That the underwriters employed those affirmative defenses is not ex-
traordinary; insurers often raise them in various breach-of-contract ac-
tions. But the Tennant insurers advanced another creative and arguably
cynical defense. The parties consummated the insurance agreement in
1803.533 From the perspective of some legal scholars that was a period
during the slave trade when insurance contracts were arguably legal be-
cause English statutes did not clearly proscribe them. But note: the un-
derwriters certainly did not defend themselves by asserting that the
insurance contract was legal. Instead, the insurers stressed that the pro-
posed voyage and slave ships were illegal from the very beginning, thus
making the insurance contract illegal from its inception.
More telling, the deceptive and criminally inclined underwriters still
agreed to insure the terrorists' property. 534 And even more enlightening,
529. Tennant v. Henderson, 3 Eng. Rep. 716 (1813).
530. Id.
The original order of the insurance was as follows: 'Please effect £2000 upon 5/6ths of the
ship at and from Liverpool to the coast of Africa and the African islands, during her stay
and trade there, and from thence back to Liverpool, with liberty to exchange goods with
other ships, at £6 per cent .... [W]e purchase no slaves, nor does the ship go to the West
Indies.' Id.
531. Id. at 717.
532. Id. ("[The] mutual or combined trading was not communicated to the underwrit-
ers, and the concealment, it was contended, was of a material fact. The underwriters in
Scotland refused to settle the loss. [T]hey insisted that the ship did traffic in slaves.").
533. Id. at 716.
Upon the faith of this representation, insurance to the extent of £2000 was [purchased] on
the 21st of January, 1803 [and] effected on the ship Imperial. The next insurance made was
upon the cargo [and] dated 18th June 1803. A third policy, also on the cargo, was effected
[on] 1st November, 1803, 'At and from Africa and the African islands to Liverpool.' Id.
534. Id. at 718 ("[T]he underwriters rested their case in both appeals [upon this de-
fense]: It was represented that the Imperial did not traffic in slaves; [but] she did actually
deal in slaves, without being regularly entered as a slave ship. [Therefore], the voyage was
illegal.").
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the underwriters' unabashed admission of illegality did not impress Lord
Chancellor Eldon one iota. The celebrated justice simply ignored the in-
surers' illegality, highlighted the slavers' misrepresentation, and ruled in
favor of the immoral underwriters. 535 Lord Eldon should have dismissed
the action altogether under settled principles of equity. After all, centu-
ries later, the legal community would praise him and give him most of the
credit for developing hallowed principles of equity.
536
It is important to repeat, however, that Schwartz and Tennant are mi-
nority decisions. After 1807, the overwhelming majority of American 537
and British 538 judges forced insurance companies to reimburse commer-
535. Id. at 719 (holding that "the decision of the court below, in favour of the under-
writers, was affirmed.").
536. BIRKENHEAD, supra note 261, at 224. To Eldon's Chancellorship is usually as-
signed the completion of equity. The Chancellor sought to do right by the petitioner with-
out regard to what he might have done in similar cases in the past or might do in the future.
But no [c]ourt can exist long without establishing a practice or habit for similar cases. It
was inevitable that some Chancellor would complete the work, and it so happened that
Eldon was called upon to do it. Id.
537. Henry Messonier v. Union Ins. Co., 10 S.C.L. 155 (1 Nott & McC. 155), available
at, 1818 WL 847, at *3, 9 (1818) ("The British government had no right to capture a Span-
ish vessel engaged in the slave trade. The majority of the [clourt [feels] that the plaintiff is
entitled to recovery for a partial loss [under the insurance contract]"); David Bailey v. The
South Carolina Ins. Co., 6 S.C.L. 381 (1 Tread. 381), available at, 1813 WL 339, at *17-18
(S.C. Const. App. 1813). Justice Brevard wrote: I now proceed to give my opinion in the
case of the schooner and in the case of the fifty-two Negroes in which [a] verdict was for
the plaintiff. The contract of insurance is a contract of indemnity for all losses within the
policy. Damage by capture and detention, and damage by the perils if the sea, were in-
sured against. The detention [by His Britannic Majesty's schooner] was illegal, and the
assured are entitled for all losses thereby sustained. Id.
See also Lockhart v. The Merchant Ins. Co. of New Orleans, 10 Rob. 339, available at, 1845
WL 1472, at *1-2, 8 (La. 1845) ("This was an action to recover $10,000, the insurance upon
fifteen slaves. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff .... [T]he evidence [does
not show] a deviation in the usual voyage from Richmond, as to authorize our interfering
with the verdict of the jury."). But see Jeremiah Murden v. S.C. Ins. Co., 8 S.C.L. 200,
available at, 1817 WL 612, at *1, 4-5 (S.C. Const. App. 1845).
[T]he owners of brig [had] eighty-three slaves, beside three privilege slaves .... The vessel
had been detained on the coast of Africa before the prohibitory [slave trade] act of Con-
gress took effect .... [The] vessel was unfortunately loss; and this is an attempt to visit the
misfortune on the underwriter .... But the misdirection of the presiding judge, on the
question of deviation, furnishes an irresistible ground for a new trial. Id.
538. Brown v. Smith, 3 Eng. Rep. 725, 726-28 (1813).
This was a question of insurance on the ship and cargo of The Friendship, employed in a
voyage to Africa in the slave-trade .... [I]n Barbados she was boarded and taken posses-
sion of by a ship of war. The Government Agent at Barbados took charge of the ship and,
[disposed] the whole of the cargo and stores." The ship was sold accordingly. Lord Chan-
cellor Eldon, sitting on the Court of Chancery held: "Under the particular circumstances of
this case, the Assureds were entitled to abandon [the ship altogether and collect the insur-
ance proceeds. Id. Heath v. Durant, 152 Eng. Rep. 1268, 1269-70 (1844) ("[T]he defen-
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cial terrorists, following the British and United States governments'
seizure and condemnation of slave traders' ships, instruments and cargo.
Furthermore, like their pre-1807 brethrens, the post-1807 judges inten-
tionally ignored settled legal and equitable principles to achieve highly
amoral decisions. Most assuredly, the post-1807 justices' seizure rulings
were much more destructive and indefensible because they significantly
undermined both Congress' and Parliament's determined efforts to stop
traders from trafficking slaves and practicing commercial terrorism.
VII. CONCLUSION
Immediately after the September 11th attacks on the World Trade
Center and Pentagon, President Bush and Attorney General Ashcroft
proclaimed passionately, incessantly, and loudly that federal agents and
military forces would travel the globe searching for and punishing ter-
rorists and their aiders and abettors. When President Bush and members
of his administration made those announcements, they did not clearly de-
fine terrorism and they failed to identify the salient attributes of "true"
terrorists. Nevertheless, careful analyses of subsequent speeches strongly
suggest that federal officials have unwisely adopted an extremely narrow
definition of terrorism. More significant, it appears that the administra-
tion has decided to target and arrest only a few contenders and prosecute
them and their aiders and abettors for practicing terrorism.
This is a disturbing and shortsighted development. The administration
should expand the definition of terrorism and enlarge the focus of con-
cern to include "domestic terrorism" - domestic violence, spousal abuse
and other concerted terrorist activities, which are based on one's ethnic-
ity, gender or religious affiliation. Additionally, the pool of persons who
qualify as aiders and abettors of terror should be larger, too. Early on,
this article documented conclusively that terrorism appears in many
forms. And although elected officials have the luxury of embracing
dant and the plaintiffs [agreed] that the policy and the risks insured against, should not
include capture, except in case of war. This vessel was in fact taken by the authority of the
Portuguese government [rather than the British authorities], in time of peace, on the al-
leged ground of her being concerned in the slave-trade." Viewing the case more favorably
from the slave traders' perspective, Chief Baron Lord Abinger, sitting on the Court of
Exchequer declared: "It will be a question for the jury whether the memorandum formed
part of the original contract or not."); Lozano v. Janson, 121 Eng. Rep. 61, 67-68 (1859).
In June, 1854, the Newport was seized, near Ambriz, by a Queen's ship, under STAT. 5 G. 4,
c. 113, s. 4, for being illegally engaged in the slave trade." However, writing for the Court
of Queen's Bench, Chief Justice Lord Campbell disagreed and held: "If this had been a
lawful taking at sea by a British cruiser, the underwriters would not have been liable but it
must now be definitively considered to have been a wrongful taking. The wrongful taking
of this ship cannot be regarded as an act ordered or sanctioned by the English Govern-
ment. Judgment [is] for [the insureds]. Id.
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tapered definitions and descriptions to satisfy certain political realities
and constraints, the legal community would do itself and the community
at large a grave disservice by painting terrorism as well as the aiders and
abettors of terrors so narrowly.
The reason for raising this concern is not very complex. It is indisputa-
ble that international terrorism is a clear and present danger; there are
disgruntled groups beyond the United States' borders who want to terror-
ize and destroy Americans for economic and political reasons. But, if
current projections are correct, homegrown terrorists will injure, murder
and terrorize just as many or more American citizens in the immediate-
to-distant future than the entirety of international, state-sponsored and
state-supported terrorists.539 Much more disquieting, domestic malcon-
tents within families will continue to injure and terrorize an even greater
number of parents, children and spouses - especially women- if the
estimates are sound.5
40
Once more, the Bush Administration declared that the government
would pursue and punish aiders and abettors of terror and violence.
Does the President include certain national and international liability in-
surance companies in the pool of aiders and abettors of terrorism? Since
the September 11th attacks, an increasing number of Americans have
purchased or tried to purchase liability insurance to cover personal, prop-
erty and business losses in the event they become victims of domestic or
539. See, e.g., Sandra Murillo, Los Angeles Jewish Group and Police Team Up Against
Hate, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2002, at B4 ("LAPD Chief Bernard C. Parks said, 'We've put a
lot of energy since Sept. 11 looking at terrorists in other countries, but you can never forget
the terrorists that are home-grown."); Tom Baxter, On Politics: Terror Risks Are A 'Lot
Closer Than Kabul, ATLANTA J. CONST., Dec. 4, 2001, at A9 (stating, "What may have
been the most successful anti-terrorist operation since 9/11 was carried out last week....
[at the] New Bedford [high school].... [T]here were 3,300 students in that school, roughly
the same number currently listed as dead at the WTC. . . . 'We have met the enemy,' wise
little Pogo said, 'and he is us.' And the terrorist? Why, that must be the kid next door.");
Margaret Talev, Ventura County Panel Tells of Countywide Anti-Terrorism Steps, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2001, at B3 (reporting that, "Law enforcement intelligence suggests the
county could be at least as vulnerable to home-grown terrorists as those connected to the
Sept. 11 attacks. 'The terrorists you'd have anyway may be emboldened, Sheriff Bob
Brooks said 'You can't just look at Middle Eastern terrorism."'); and Howard Kurtz, Pow-
ell Urges Calm in Face of New Threats. WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2001, at A4 ("Secretary of
State Colin L. Powell said that Americans should 'not become chickens' in the face of
terrorist threats as he warned of [terror from] 'home-grown terrorists.').
540. Cf. Insights On Family Violence, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 18, 2001, at B6.
The massive violence caused by suicide hijackers [on September 11th] is gripping and still
incomprehensible. Yet for most Americans the risk of harm from a terrorist is remote
compared to the wrath of a neighbor or the jealous rage of a spouse. Domestic violence is
an insidious threat to society .... [M]any victims would call domestic [violence a] form of
terrorism. Id.
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international terrorism. But, as the historical evidence in this article
reveals, insurance companies have a very long history of aiding and abet-
ting terrorism, especially commercial terrorism. More recent evidence
also demonstrates that insurers aid and abet- intentionally or negli-
gently-murderers, 54' employers who victimize employees, 542 husbands
and mates who terrorize women,5 43 and persons who engage in malicious
conduct.5 44
Since September llth, many underwriters have refused to sell property
and casualty insurance to "high-risk' individuals and businesses, those
that have been terrorized or have a greater likelihood of becoming vic-
tims of terrorism.5 45 Yet, as of this writing, the Bush Administration
wants to transfer the heavy burden of insuring high-risk persons and busi-
541. Cf Michael v. Michael, No. L-99-1397, 2000 WL 1005209, *4 (Ohio Ct. App. July
21, 2000) (asserting "that State Farm was negligent [for] issuing a life insurance policy [to
his wife] that was an incentive/motive for murder."); Schoeman v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
726 P.2d 1, 3 (Wash. 1986) (barring a wrongful death action that asserted "that the Insurer
acted negligently in reinstating [a life insurance] policy because it knew or should have
known that [the owner of the policy] had no insurable interest in the life of [the murdered
insured] based on res judicata ."); Williams v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 718 S.W.2d
611, 611 (Mo. App. Ct. 1986) (the court's refusing "to hold that an insurance company has
no liability if it negligently issues an insurance policy which acts as a incentive for a murder
or attempted murder."); and Lopez v. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 406 So. 2d 1155, 1159 (Fla.
App. Ct. 1981) (embracing the view "that an insurer has a duty to use reasonable care not
to issue a policy of life insurance in favor of a beneficiary who has obtained such policy
without the knowledge or consent of the insured [and with the intent to murder.]").
542. See, e.g., Gardenhire v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 754 A.2d 1244, 1248 (N.J.Super. 2000)
(finding that the insurance company "may be potentially liable" under New Jersey's Law
Against Discrimination for aiding and abetting the employers' discriminatory conduct and
harassment). See also Colorado Civil Rights Com'n v. Travelers Ins. Co., 759 P.2d 1358,
1366-1367 (Colo. 1988) (holding that Travelers was liable under Colorado's civil-rights stat-
ute for aiding and abetting the employer's discriminatory practices, by issuing a policy that
lacked sufficient coverage for normal pregnancy expenses.).
543. See, e.g., Editorial, Stop Bias Against Battered Women 2000 Georgia Legislature,
supra note 68, at A22 (stating "[t]he horror stories abound - from women denied renewal
of homeowners' policies because an abusive ex- spouse had previously kicked down the
front door to women refused coverage for chronic back injuries, the result of multiple
beatings.").
544. Cf Gibraltar Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hoosier Ins. Co., 486 N.E.2d 548, 553 (Ind. App.
Ct. 1985) (asserting that the insurer aided and abetted a third party by circulating malicious
and derogatory information to injure complainant's business.).
545. See, e.g., Lyndsey Layton, Cash-Strapped Metro Looks at Higher Fares, WASH.
POST, July 12, 2002, at B1. Metro's insurance costs are expected to balloon in the next
fiscal year. Property and general liability insurance is projected to increase by $ 4 million
annually, or 184 percent. Like other transit systems in the country, Metro also expects to
lose its terrorism insurance. Metro now has a $ 3 billion coverage plan, but its insurance
provider will not renew the policy when it expires. Id.
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nesses from private insurers to American taxpayers.546 More amazing,
the administration wants Congress to endorse this proposal even though
liability insurers have already accumulated large reserves and made fairly
substantial profits by selling insurance to high-risk individuals and busi-
nesses before September 11th.5 47 For some, allowing insurers to abandon
insurance consumers and forcing taxpayers to assume and bear the risks
of terrorism simply amounts to more victimization.
There is more. Some observers of the liability-insurance industry assert
that many insurance companies terrorize and re-victimize wounded in-
sureds directly by refusing to compensate policy holders promptly after
the latter have proved financial losses by refusing to settle claims when
settlements are clearly appropriate, and by forcing traumatized victims to
file expensive lawsuits to secure insurance proceeds. Still, others have
asserted that insurers also aid and abet terrorists in ways that one would
least expect- for example, by financing international, domestic and com-
mercial terrorism.
This article has investigated the level of insurance companies' illegal
participation in the transatlantic slave trade. And the findings are fairly
conclusive. For purely economic reasons, American and English
merchants, professionals and their agents effectively intimidated, en-
slaved, murdered and tortured millions of innocents for more than three
centuries. Without doubt, both British and American insurers helped the
perpetrators by financing, supporting and participating directly in that
horrible and immoral enterprise.
546. Jackie Spinner, Terrorism Insurance Bill Passed By Senate: Battle Expected Over
Competing Versions, WASH. POST, Jun. 19, 2002, at El ("The Senate approved legislation
that would provide insurance companies with billions of dollars in government funding to
help pay claims from future terrorist strikes ... President Bush [said] 'Terrorism insurance
is critical to promoting and protecting jobs and America's economic security [.]').
547. Compare Andrew Bary, Follow-Up- Premium Insurer: Can Chubb Go Still
Higher? BARRON'S, Aug. 7, 2000, at 14 ("The long-depressed property/casualty insurance
industry may finally be turning around .... [S]everal companies stated in that premiums
for many policies are up 10%-15% and some forms of reinsurance rates have risen
100%."), with Thomas G. Donlan, Creating Reserves: Dealing With Inadequate National
Supplies of Money and Blood, BARRON'S, Nov.19, 2001, at 43. 'Heads I win, tails you lose'
has always been an unwritten part of the contract for property and casualty insurance.
Then something 'unexpected' occurs, such as a terrorist attack in New York City. That
drives premiums up. Insurers who were happy to charge low premiums when they weren't
paying claims ('Heads I win') suddenly PERCEIVE THAT PREMIUMS WERE TOO LOW and
they raise them all at once ('Tails you lose'). Robert E. Vagley, president of the American
Insurance Association told the banking committee that reinsurers are likely to cut back or
cancel their coverage of claims arising from terrorist attacks at the first opportunity. And
for about two-thirds of 1roperty-casualty insurance in the United States, reinsurance is
renewed annually. Reinsurers, most[ly] based in countries beyond the reach of U.S. regu-
lators, may do as they please, or as they must to survive. (emphasis added) Id.
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There is, however, a final and an even more compelling issue. To re-
peat, Attorney General Ashcroft proclaimed that the government would
pursue and bring aiders and abettors of terrorism to justice. So we ask
seriously: would the attorney general place some federal- and state-court
judges on his list of aiders and abettors? Esteemed American and British
judges helped traders and insurers terrorize and injure innocent persons
during the triangular slave trade. For certain, insurers could have never
assisted the slave traders so competently without the added protections
and endorsements of American and British courts.
More incredible, some of the most celebrated and brightest English
judges - Lord Justices Edward Coke, John Holt, William Murray (Lord
Mansfield), William Blackstone, John Somers, Philip Yorke (Lord Hard-
wicke), and John Scott (Lord Eldon), to name a few- provided the assis-
tance. These judges played prominent roles in the development of
English common law and the law of equity. Therefore, it is painful to
learn that they were much more concerned with protecting commercial
terrorists' and insurance companies' property interests and contractual
rights than stopping the terrors of the slave trade. Even more dishearten-
ing, those celebrated judges showed little, if any, compassion for the
plight and the unimaginable suffering of the victims of commercial terror-
ism. Certainly, such judicial insensitivity should disturb all fair-minded
and compassionate jurists and laypersons, especially those who claim that
they abhor terrorism in all of its ugly forms. Perhaps, this should be the
major story that evolves from this article.
Why must the present legal community be extremely alarmed about
judges' highly objectionable, strained and, arguably, immoral rulings dur-
ing the transatlantic slave trade? Again, if the projections are valid, all
sorts of terrorist acts will increase in the United States in the not-too-
distant future; both insured and third-party victims will expect insurance
companies to cover the losses. However, evidence strongly suggests that
insurers will simply ignore their contractual obligations and refuse to
compensate victims of terrorism.
But more important, evidence also indicates that insurance companies
will continue to aid and abet domestic terrorists wittingly or unwittingly;
and affected individuals are likely to file an increasing number of law-
suits. Therefore, it is appropriate to ask: will American judges embrace
settled legal and equitable principles and apply them consistently and
fairly to achieve just results? Or will judges behave like English and
American justices behaved during the transatlantic slave trade? Will
judges carefully weigh the interests of terrorist victims when deciding
whether to award declaratory and equitable relief to insurers? Or will
courts just consider and protect the interests of insurance companies?
[Vol. 6:1
2003] AMERICAN & BRITISH INSURERES 119
Unquestionably, members of the legal community and congressional
members should not sit passively and quietly in the wake of September
11th and allow American judges to travel down the latter path. Argua-
bly, if we acquiesce to state and federal judges' engaging in behavior rem-
iniscent of their sixteenth-to-nineteen centuries brethrens' immorality
and misconduct, then we become very much like those justices and insur-
ance companies - aiders and abettors of terrorism.

